Is it Time to Unify the Regulation of Depository Institution Holding Companies? Historical Review of Differentiation and Convergence in the Regulation and Supervision of Depository Institutions, Bank Holding Companies, and Savings and Loan Holding Companies by Greenlee, Mark B.
NORTH CAROLINA BANKING 
INSTITUTE 
Volume 25 Issue 1 Article 5 
3-1-2021 
Is it Time to Unify the Regulation of Depository Institution Holding 
Companies? Historical Review of Differentiation and Convergence 
in the Regulation and Supervision of Depository Institutions, Bank 
Holding Companies, and Savings and Loan Holding Companies 
Mark B. Greenlee 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Mark B. Greenlee, Is it Time to Unify the Regulation of Depository Institution Holding Companies? 
Historical Review of Differentiation and Convergence in the Regulation and Supervision of Depository 
Institutions, Bank Holding Companies, and Savings and Loan Holding Companies, 25 N.C. BANKING INST. 1 
(2020). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncbi/vol25/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in North Carolina Banking Institute by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu. 
 
Is it Time to Unify the Regulation of Depository 
Institution Holding Companies?  
Historical Review of Differentiation and Convergence 
in the Regulation and Supervision of  
Depository Institutions, Bank Holding Companies, and 
Savings and Loan Holding Companies 
MARK B. GREENLEE 
I.  INTRODUCTION.................................................................................. 3 
II.  CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK .............................................. 6 
A. Regulators ........................................................................... 6 
B. Forms of Ownership ............................................................ 7 
C. Charters............................................................................... 8 
D. Deposit Insurance ................................................................ 9 
E. Regulation ......................................................................... 10 
F. Supervisory Tools ............................................................. 11 
G. Receivership...................................................................... 12 
III.  DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE REGULATION OF 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS ....................................................... 13 
A. Differentiation ................................................................... 13 
1.  Public Policy of the Early 1930s ................................... 13 
2.  Institution Powers ......................................................... 15 
3.  Banking System Membership ....................................... 16 
4.  Branching Rights .......................................................... 17 
5.  Restraints on Activities ................................................. 19 
6.  Accounting Rules and Tax Treatment ........................... 20 
7.  Institution Policy .......................................................... 20 
B. Convergence ..................................................................... 21 
1.  Congressional Support of the Role of Thrifts in Home 
Mortgage Lending........................................................ 22 
2.  Repeal of Prohibitions on Affiliation with Securities 
Firms ........................................................................... 23 
 
 Vice President and Counsel, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland.  The views expressed 
herein are those of the author and not those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 
2 NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE [Vol. 25 
3.  Institution Powers Equalized ........................................ 24 
4.  Banking System Membership and Access to Services 
Expanded ..................................................................... 25 
5.  Deposit Insurance Extended and Unified ...................... 25 
6.  Branching Rights Parity ................................................ 26 
7.  Restraints on Activities Extended ................................. 28 
8.  Similar Accountability Measures Imposed .................... 29 
9.  Uniform Accounting Rules and Tax Treatment Mandated
 .................................................................................... 30 
10.  Ambiguous Institution Names Permitted ..................... 31 
11.  Institution Policy Changed .......................................... 31 
C. Remaining Differences ...................................................... 33 
1.  FHLB System Membership Eligibility .......................... 33 
2.  Intrastate Branching Rights ........................................... 33 
3.  Lending and Investment Limitations ............................. 34 
4.  Permissible Activities ................................................... 34 
D. Proposals to Eliminate the Thrift Charter ........................... 35 
IV.  DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE REGULATION OF 
DIHCS ..................................................................................... 36 
A. Growth in the Number of Holding Companies ................... 38 
B. Differentiation ................................................................... 41 
1.  Prohibitions on Affiliation with Securities Firms .......... 41 
2.  Limitations on Transactions with Affiliates................... 42 
3.  Affiliate Reports, Examinations, and Voting Permits .... 43 
4.  Permissible Activities ................................................... 44 
i.  Bank Holding Companies ........................................ 44 
ii.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies .................... 48 
5.  Separation of Banking and Commerce .......................... 49 
i.  Bank Holding Companies ........................................ 49 
ii.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies .................... 50 
iii.  Parent Companies of ILCs ..................................... 51 
C. Convergence ..................................................................... 54 
1.  Competition Preserved and Concentration Prevented .... 54 
2.  Affiliation Prohibitions Equalized and then Eliminated . 56 
3.  Limitations on Transactions with Affiliates Extended ... 57 
4.  Substantial Parity Regarding Permissible Activities ...... 58 
5.  Increased Consistency Related to the Separation of 
Banking and Commerce ............................................... 59 
2021] DIHC REGULATION 3 
6.  Capital Required on a Consolidated Basis ..................... 62 
D. Remaining Differences ...................................................... 63 
V.  DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE SUPERVISION OF DIHCS
 ................................................................................................ 65 
A. Examinations .................................................................... 69 
1.  Bank Holding Companies ............................................. 69 
2.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies.......................... 71 
B. Capital .............................................................................. 74 
1.  Bank Holding Companies ............................................. 75 
2.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies.......................... 77 
3.  Source of Strength ........................................................ 79 
4.  Basel II ......................................................................... 80 
5.  Stress Tests................................................................... 80 
6.  Basel III ....................................................................... 81 
C. Reporting .......................................................................... 82 
D. Applications ...................................................................... 83 
E. Enforcement ...................................................................... 84 
F. Consolidated Supervision .................................................. 86 
G. Remaining Differences in Supervision ............................... 89 
VI.  CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 91 
APPENDIX A – TERMS AND ACRONYMS ................................................ 97 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The federal legislation governing bank holding companies 
(“BHCs”) and savings and loan holding companies (“SLHCs”) share 
several public policy objectives.1  The Bank Holding Company Act of 
1956 (“BHCA”)2 and Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments 
of 1967 (“SLHCA”)3 both sought to preserve competition, prevent undue 
concentration, and separate banking from commerce.4  In subsequent 
legislation, Congress brought further parity to the regulation of BHCs and 
SLHCs related to affiliations with securities firms, transactions with 
 
1. Key terms and acronyms are defined when first used in this article and are collected in 
Appendix A. 
2. Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (1956). 
3. Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1968); see also H. REP. No. 90-997, at 1–5 (1967). 
4. See infra Sections IV.B.5. and IV.C.1. 
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affiliates, permissible activities, separation of banking and commerce, 
and capital requirements.5   The convergence in the regulation of BHCs 
and SLHCs raises the question: Is it time to unify the regulation of 
depository institution holding companies (“DIHCs”)?   This article 
answers that question in the affirmative based upon its historical review 
of divergence and convergence in the regulation of DIHCs, as well as the 
benefits of a unified statutory scheme for the regulation of DIHCs. 
During the twentieth century, the ownership of depository 
institutions became concentrated in DIHCs.  At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, it appears that no companies controlled depository 
institutions.6  However, companies began to acquire banks in the first 
decade of the century. 7  By 1929, twenty-eight banking groups controlled 
511 banks in the United States.8  In the early 1930s, Congressional 
concerns about “group banking” led to limited regulation of what are now 
called “bank holding companies” or “BHCs”.9  At the same time, 
Congress prohibited bank affiliations with securities firms.10  In 1956, 
Congressional concerns about further increases in the number of 
companies controlling banks led to comprehensive regulation of BHCs—
defined as a company controlling two or more banks.11  In 1959, 
Congressional concerns about companies beginning to acquire control of 
savings associations led to enactment of legislation prohibiting the 
formation of new holding companies controlling more than one savings 
 
5. See infra Section IV.C. 
6. Group Banking in the United States, 24 FED. RES. BULL. 92, 97 (1938). 
7. GAINES T. CARTINHOUR, BRANCH, GROUP AND CHAIN BANKING 90–91 (1931); W. RALPH 
LAMB, GROUP BANKING 81–82 (1961). 
8. GERALD C. FISCHER, BANK HOLDING COMPANIES 32 (1961); see also Branch, Chain, and 
Group Banking, Hearings Under H.R. Res. 141 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 71st Cong., vol. 1, pt. 2 at 162–84 (1930) (listing the bank groups in operating in 
the United States as of December 1929); Branch, Chain, and Group Banking, Hearings Under 
H.R. Res. 141 Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 71st Cong. vol. 1, pt. 4 at 454–
55 (1930) (categorizing banking groups by size); Roll Call of Leading Bank Groups in the 
United States, December 31, 1929, AM. BANKER, Feb. 20, 1930, at 7–12.  
9. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 5(c), 19, 48 Stat. 162, 166, 186; SEN. REP. 
NO. 72-584, at 10 (1932); SEN. REP. NO. 73-77, at 10 (1933); 77 CONG. REC. 3835 (May 20, 
1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall); Regulation P, Series of 1933, Holding Company 
Affiliates—Voting Permits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 505 (1933). 
10. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. at 168, 179, 184, 188, 189, 194.   
11. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133 (current version 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2018)); H. REP. NO. 84-609, at 1–6 (1955); SEN. REP. NO. 84-1095, at 1–
2 (1955). 
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association.12  In 1968, Congressional concerns about further increases in 
the number of SLHCs, which were defined as a company controlling one 
or more savings associations, led to comprehensive regulation of 
SLHCs.13  Holding companies began to acquire a large number of banks 
and savings associations in the 1960s and 1970s.14   
This article focuses on differentiation and convergence in the 
regulation and supervision of DIHCs from the early years of the twentieth 
century to the present.15  Part II reviews the current regulatory framework 
for depository institutions and DIHCs.16  Part III summarizes areas of 
differentiation and convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions.17  Part IV highlights areas of differentiation and convergence 
 
12. Spence Act, Pub. L. No. 86-374, 73 Stat. 691 (1959); H. REP. NO. 86-679, at 1–4 
(1959); SEN. REP. NO. 86-810, at 1–5 (1959).  In 1957, only two companies were known to 
control a savings association.  Id. at 4. 
13. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 
Stat. 5 (1968); REP. No. 90-997, at 2 (1967). 
14. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 1322, 
H.R. 8696, and H.R. 12025 Before the Subcomm. on Domestic Fin. of the H. Comm. on 
Banking and Currency, 90th Cong 10 (1967) (statement of John E. Horne, Chairman, Fed. 
Home Loan Bank Bd.) (“At the end of 1959, there were 44 holding companies controlling 93 
associations, which possessed 7.2 percent of the assets of all insured associations.  By the end 
of 1966 [all] of those figures had increased very substantially; there were 98 holding 
companies controlling 134 associations representing 12.5 percent of the whole industry.”); 
FED. RESERVE BD., THE BANK HOLDING COMPANY MOVEMENT TO 1978: A COMPENDIUM 
(1978), at 56, 62, 63 (“In 1956 there were only 117 unregulated one-bank holding companies, 
with total deposits of $11.6 billion.  By 1965, there were 550 one-bank holding companies, 
but the major banks had not yet converted to that status.  In 1956-59, 53 one-bank holding 
companies were formed, but in 1960-66 there were 291 formations.  From 1966 to June 1968, 
201 more one-bank holding companies were formed, and from June 1968 to the end of 1970, 
690 more were created.  . . . By the end of 1976, bank holding companies were operating in 
all fifty states and the District of Columbia.  Just over one-quarter -- 25.8 percent -- of all 
banks were owned by bank holding companies; one-bank holding companies owned 10.2 
percent of all banks; and multibank holding companies, 15.6 percent.  By the end of 1976, 
66.1 percent of all commercial bank deposits were held by subsidiaries of bank holding 
companies.  Multibank holding companies held 34.2 percent of total deposits and one-bank 
holding companies, 31.9 percent.”). 
15. While credit unions are depository institutions, this article only addresses credit unions 
in a cursory manner because it focuses on depository institution holding companies.  Credit 
union membership rules preclude control of a credit union by a holding company by limiting 
each member to one vote at member meetings.  See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1760 (2018) 
(“Irrespective of the number of shares held, no member shall have more than one vote.”).  If 
a credit union finds a holding company useful for execution of its business plan, the credit 
union converts to a stock bank or thrift with a mutual holding company.  James Wilcox, Credit 
Unions, Conversions, and Capital, FED. RES. BANK S.F. ECON. LETTER, No, 2007-16, at 1–2 
(June 22, 2007); see also 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(o), 1785(b).   
16. See infra Part II. 
17. See infra Part III. 
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in the regulation of DIHCs.18  Part V describes the areas of differentiation 
and convergence in the supervision of DIHCs.19  Part VI recommends 
that Congress unify regulation of all holding companies controlling a 
depository institution insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (“FDIC”) under one statute of uniform application.20  In 
short, it is time to unify the regulation of DIHCs.  
II.  CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
The current statutory framework for depository institutions and 
DIHCs developed in a patchwork manner, often in response to crises, 
from the beginning of the twentieth century to the present. 
A. Regulators 
The allocation of regulatory responsibility for depository 
institutions and DIHCs is based on the type of charter of the depository 
institution.  The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 
(“FRB”) regulates BHCs, SLHCs, and state member banks.21  The Office 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) regulates national banks, 
federal savings banks, and federal savings associations.22  The FDIC 
regulates state nonmember banks, industrial loan companies, (“ILCs”), 
state-chartered savings banks,23 and state-chartered savings 
 
18. See infra Part IV. 
19. See infra Part V. 
20. See infra Part VI. 
21. 12 U.S.C. §§ 324–325 (2018) (state member bank); § 1467a(b) (SLHCs); id. § 1844 
(BHCs).  A state member bank is a state-chartered bank that elects to become a member of 
the Federal Reserve System. Id. § 221. 
22. 12 U.S.C. § 1(a) (national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1(b) (federal savings banks and federal 
savings associations); see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 
(“Dodd-Frank Act”),  Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1522 (2010).  All national 
banks automatically become members of the Federal Reserve System.    
23. The FDIC regulates state non-member banks, state savings banks, state savings 
associations, and cooperative banks.  12 U.S.C. § 1820(b).  A state nonmember bank is a state-
chartered bank that does not elect to become a member of the Federal Reserve System.  The 
parent holding company of a state savings bank or cooperative bank that makes an election 
pursuant to section 10(l) of The Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”) to be treated as a savings 
association is not regulated as a BHC but as an SLHC.  12 U.S.C. § 1467a(l).  ILCs are subject 
to FDIC regulation if they obtain FDIC insurance.  12 U.S.C § 1820(b).  State laws usually 
require that ILCs obtain FDIC deposit insurance.  See e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE § 18521.5(b) 
(2019); COLO. REV. STAT. § 11-10.5-106(2)(a) (2019); NEV. REV. STAT.§677.247(a) (2019); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-3(4) (2019). 
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associations.24  The National Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”) 
regulates federally insured credit unions chartered by the NCUA and 
state-chartered credit unions insured by the National Credit Union Share 
Insurance Fund.25  State-chartered institutions, whether a bank, thrift, 
credit union, or industrial loan company, are regulated by their chartering 
state.26  Most states also regulate the BHCs and SLHCs that control, or 
propose to acquire control of, a depository institution in the state.27   
B. Forms of Ownership 
Depository institutions and DIHCs are organized in stock or 
mutual form.  Stock institutions are owned by stockholders that usually 
operate as for-profit organizations.28  Mutual institutions are “owned” by 
the institution’s members, which are the depositors of the institution itself 
or of a subsidiary.29  Mutual institutions are non-profit organizations that 
benefit their members through dividends and access to services.30  
Historically, thrift institutions strongly favored the mutual form of 
ownership.31  However, depository institutions generally moved away 
from mutual forms of ownership in the later part of the twentieth century 
to raise low-cost capital and attract and retain qualified personnel.32  
 
24. Dodd-Frank Act, § 312c, 12 U.S.C. § 1813(b) (2018).  Savings associations include 
savings and loan associations, building and loan associations, cooperative banks, and 
homestead associations. . 
25. 12 U.S.C. § 1784(a) (covering insured credit unions).  The fund was established in 
1970.  Act of October 19, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-468, § 203, 84 Stat. 994, 999 (1970) (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1783). 
26. See, e.g., CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 500(a), 1000(a) (2019); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 14.1(k)–(o) 
(2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1113.01, 1121.10 (West 2019). 
27. CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE CHARTERED BANKING 
92–94, 118–121 (16th ed. 1996) (listing bank holding company requirements and interstate 
bank holding company entry requirements by state as of December 31, 1995). 
28. 1 KENNETH M. LAPINE ET AL., BANKING LAW §§ 1.05[1], 1.05[2], 1.05[3] (Matthew 
Bender & Co., Inc., 2021); 3 LAPINE ET AL., supra  § 69.02.  
29. FRANKLIN H. ORNSTEIN, SAVINGS BANKING: AN INDUSTRY IN CHANGE 50, 53–54 
(1985). 
30. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1759, 1768 (2018); 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).  
31. Conversion of Savings and Loan Associations from Mutual to Stock Form: Hearings 
on S. 3132 and S. 3234 before Subcommittee on Financial Institutions of the S. Comm. on 
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93rd Cong. 121 (1974) (statement of Thomas R. Bomar, 
Chr., FHLBB) (practically all savings and loan associations organized as mutual associations 
in 1933 and only 12% of all savings associations organized as stock associations as of 1974). 
32. See generally Peter B. Saba & Robert B. Robbins, Savings and Loan Associations – 
Mutual to Stock Conversions Under the Revised Regulations, 17 AKRON L. REV. 413, 416 
(1984).   In 1983, there were 3,126 savings associations of which 2,404 (77%) were mutual 
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C. Charters 
Depository institutions obtain special types of charters issued by 
federal and state regulatory agencies empowering them to accept 
deposits.   This is a unique authority not available to other types of 
entities.  The agencies establish requirements for the issuance of a charter, 
such as organizer qualifications, management expertise, capital 
adequacy, and business plan sufficiency.33  Within the current regulatory 
framework, the OCC issues charters for national banks, federal savings 
banks, and federal savings and loan associations,34 while state agencies 
issue charters for banks, state savings banks, state savings associations, 
and ILCs.35   
DIHCs obtain general and special types of charters.  BHCs and 
SLHCs organizing in stock form obtain general charters under the 
corporation or partnership law of the chartering state.36  SLHCs 
organizing in mutual form obtain special charters from the FRB,37 and 
BHCs organizing in mutual form obtain special charters from state 
 
savings associations.   By 1996, the number of mutual savings associations dropped to 565, 
or 42% of all savings associations.  Elijah Brewer III et al., Pricing IPOs of Mutual Thrifts 
Conversions: Joint Effect of Regulation and Market Discipline 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi., 
Working Paper Series, WP-01-252001).    Between 1983 and 1988, 571 mutual savings 
associations converted to stock form.  Vojislav Maksimovic & Haluk Unal, Issue Size and 
“Underpricing” in Thrift Mutual-to-Stock Conversions, 48 J. FIN. 1659 (1993).  Federal 
banking regulators review the terms of conversions from mutual to stock form, including 
determinations of the fairness of the transactions to the mutual members.  12 C.F.R. § 143.8–
143.14 (OCC); § 333.4 (FDIC); § 239.50–239.62 (FRB).  At the end of 2019, there were 468 
mutual institutions.  FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MUTUAL INSTITUTIONS AND STOCK 
INSTITUTIONS OWNED BY MUTUAL HOLDING COMPANIES AS OF 12/31/2019, 
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/mutual/mutuals.html [https://perma.cc/R4RM-
AF36] (downloaded Jan 22, 2021). 
33. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF CURRENCY, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING 
MANUAL, CHARTERS 4–5 (2019), https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-
type/licensing-manuals/charters.pdf [https://perma.cc/JV56-ZWPB]; Guide for Groups 
Interested in Chartering a State Bank in California, CAL. DEP’T BUS. OVERSIGHT, 
https://dbo.ca.gov/guide-for-groups-interested-in-chartering-a-state-bank-in-california/ 
[https://perma.cc/2CUU-VU76] (last visited Mar. 15, 2019); Commercial Bank: Information 
and Procedure, N.Y. DEP’T FIN. SERV., 
https://www.dfs.ny.gov/apps_and_licensing/banks_and_trusts/information_and_procedure 
[https://perma.cc/5V9Q-TTVU] (last visited Nov. 29, 2019).  
34. 12 U.S.C. §§ 21 (national bank), 1464(a) (federal savings bank and federal savings 
association);  see also 12 C.F.R. § 5.20. 
35. See, e.g., N.Y. BANKING LAW, §§ 14 (commercial bank), 230 (savings bank), 375 
(savings association) (2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-8-3 (West 2020) (industrial bank). 
36. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 8, § 101 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.04 
(2019); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1306 (2019). 
37. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(o). 
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regulatory agencies.38  All BHCs and SLHCs are required to register with 
the FRB.39  To register as an SLHC rather than a BHC, the holding 
company must not control a bank, and any savings association subsidiary 
must be a “qualified thrift lender” (“QTL”).40   
If a depository institution wishes to convert from one type of 
charter to another, the institution must obtain the prior approval of the 
regulatory agency of the resulting institution.41  For example, if a savings 
association subsidiary of SLHC plans to convert to a national bank, the 
approval of the OCC is required.  In addition, the prior approval of the 
FRB is required for the holding company of the proposed bank to become 
a BHC.42 
D. Deposit Insurance 
Deposit insurance was established to restore and maintain 
confidence in the banking system.43  In 1933, federal deposit insurance 
became available for bank deposits through the FDIC.44  Federal deposit 
 
38. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 524.1809 (2019); N.Y. BANKING LAW § 290 (2019); OHIO REV. 
CODE ANN. § 1701.04 § 1116.02 (2019). 
39. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(b), 1844(a); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.5(a), 238.4(c). 
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I), (b).  To be a QTL under current law, the thrift must 
maintain at least 65% of its portfolio assets in qualifying thrift instruments, which includes 
home mortgage loans, mortgaged-back securities, educational loans, small business loans, and 
credit card loans.  12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1), (3)(C).  
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(2).  Federal law generally prohibits charter conversions by a 
national bank, state bank, or federal or state savings bank or savings association while the 
institution is subject to a cease and desist order (or other formal enforcement order) issued by, 
or a memorandum of understanding entered into with, its current federal banking agency or 
state bank supervisor with respect to a “significant supervisory matter.  Dodd-Frank Wall 
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) § 612, 12 U.S.C. § 214d; 
see also Fed. Reserve Bd. et al., SR 12-16/CA 12-12, Interagency Statement on Section 612 
of the Dodd-Frank Act Restrictions on Conversions of Troubled Banks (Nov. 26, 2012), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1216a1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GKK-T7VM]. 
42. 12 U.S.C. § 1842;  12 C.F.R. § 225.11. 
43. 77 CONG. REC. 3837 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall) (“[T]he purpose of this 
legislation is to protect the people of the United States in the right to have banks in which 
their deposits are safe.  They have a right to expect of Congress the establishment and 
maintenance of a system of banks in the United States where citizens may place their hard 
earnings with reasonable expectation of being able to get them out again upon demand . . . . 
Bankers . . . successful operation depends upon deposits and they must have the confidence 
of the public to get deposits . . . .”).  
44. Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 684 (1935) (amending § 12B 
to FR Act, permanently establishing the FDIC and the FDIC deposit insurance fund);  Banking 
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 8, 48 Stat. 162, 168, 179 (1933) (adding § 12B(a) and (y) 
to FR Act temporarily establishing the FDIC and the deposit insurance fund).  
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insurance became available for thrift deposits in 1934 through the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (“FSLIC”).45  Currently, bank 
and thrift deposits are insured up to $250,000 per depositor, per 
institution, and per ownership category by the deposit insurance fund 
administered by the FDIC.46 
E. Regulation 
Depository institutions and DIHCs are subject to regulations that 
govern their operations.  The federal laws and implementing regulations 
specifically applicable to depository institutions and DIHCs include those 
applicable to governance,47 capital,48 deposits,49 reserves,50 branching,51 
lending,52 margin stock loans,53 interbank liabilities,54 investments,55 
permissible activities,56 management interlocks,57 insider and affiliate 
transactions,58 privacy and data security,59 anti-money laundering,60 
 
45. National Housing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 403, 48 Stat. 1246, 1257 (1934).   
46. 12 U.S.C § 1821(a)(1)(E); 12 C.F.R. pt. 330.  
47. 12 U.S.C § 1831m; 12 C.F.R. § 363.5 (requiring independence of members of audit 
committee).  Public companies are subject to additional corporate requirements under the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and stock exchanges rules.  See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 
(2002).  
48. Capital adequacy: 12 U.S.C. § 1467a (SLHCs) § 1844(b) (BHCs); § 3907 (insured 
depository institutions); 12 C.F.R. § 217.1 (SLHCs, BHCs, and state member banks); 12 
C.F.R. § 3.1 (national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 324.1 (FDIC-supervised institutions).  Small bank 
holding company policy statement: 12 C.F.R. pt. 225, app. C (BHC); 12 C.F.R. 238.9 (SLHC).  
Source of strength: 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.4(a) (BHC), 238.8(a) (SLHC).  Prompt corrective action: 
12 U.S.C. § 1831o  (insured depository institution); 12 C.F.R. §§ 6.1 (national banks), 208.40, 
(state member banks), 303.200 (state nonmember banks and state savings associations). 
49. 12 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4010; §§ 5001–5018; Regulation CC, 12 C.F.R. pt. 229. 
50. 12 U.S.C.  § 461; Regulation D, 12 C.F.R. pt. 204. 
51. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (national banks); § 321 (state member banks). 
52. Id. § 84; 12 C.F.R. § 32.3. 
53. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78qq; Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. pt. 221. 
54. Federal Reserve Act § 23, 12 U.S.C. § 371b-2; Regulation F, 12 C.F.R. pt. 206. 
55. 12 U.S.C. § 24(7); § 1464(c) (national bank and federal savings association 
investments). 
56. See, e.g., id. § 24(7), 92 (national banks); § 1843(c)(8), (k) (BHCs); § 1464 (federal 
savings associations); § 1467a(c) (SLHCs). 
57. Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title II, 92 
Stat. 3641, 3672 (1978) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3201–08); Regulation L, 12 C.F.R. pt. 212. 
58. Federal Reserve Act § 22(g), (h), 12 U.S.C. §§ 375a, 375b (restricting loans to insiders); 
Regulation O, 12 C.F.R. Part 215; Federal Reserve Act §§ 23A, 23B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 
371c-1; Regulation W, 12 C.F.R. pt. 223 (restricting transactions with affiliates). 
59. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Title V, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1436 (1999) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801–6809); Regulation P, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1016. 
60. Bank Secrecy Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 1970) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1951–1959, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5332); see also 31 C.F.R. pt. 1020.  
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community reinvestment,61 unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or 
practices,62 and consumer protection.63  Many of these laws and 
regulations are addressed below with a focus on the differentiation and 
convergence in the regulation of financial institutions. 
F. Supervisory Tools 
Federal and state banking regulators use a number of supervisory 
tools to assess and monitor the condition of financial institutions under 
their jurisdiction; address violations of law, rule, and regulation; and 
correct unsafe and unsound practices.  First, banking regulators require 
financial institutions to submit a variety of reports.64  Second, banking 
regulators conduct examinations or inspections of financial institutions 
under their jurisdiction, as well as assess or monitor the financial 
condition of those institutions through visitations, reviews, off-site 
surveillance, and collection of information from other regulators.65  
Third, banking regulators take enforcement action against institutions 
under their jurisdiction.66  Fourth, banking regulators act upon the 
 
61. Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (“CRA”), Pub. L. No., 95-128, 91 Stat. 1147 
(1977) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901–2908); Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(“GLBA”) § 711, 113 Stat. at 1465 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1831y); Regulation 
BB, 12 C.F.R. pt. 228; Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. pt. 207. 
62. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), § 
1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531.  The Dodd-Frank Act also repealed the Board’s authority to 
promulgate rules under Section 18(f)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act.  Dodd-Frank 
Act § 1092(2), 124 Stat. at 2095.  Pursuant to its previous authority, the Board issued 
Regulation AA.  50 Fed. Reg. 16695 (Apr. 29, 1985) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 227 (2015)).  
The Board repealed Regulation AA effective March 21, 2016.  81 Fed. Reg. 8133 (Feb. 18, 
2016). 
63. See, e.g., Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521 (1974) 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f) ; Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 
89 Stat. 1124, 1125 (1975) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801–2810); Electronic Fund Transfer 
Act, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 92 Stat 3641, 3728 (1978) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r); 
Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–
1667f (2018));  Truth in Savings Act, Pub. L. No. 102-242, §§ 261–274, 105 Stat. 2334, 2334–
2343 (1991) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4313); Consumer Credit Protection Act, Title 
VII, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977) (codified at 
15 U.S.C. §§ 1692–1692p); Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 
1128 (1970) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681–1681x); Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 
Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat. 1724 (1974) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601–2617); Regulation 
B, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1002; Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003; Regulation DD, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1030; 
Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005; Regulation M, 12 C.F.R. pt. 1003; Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. 
pt. 1026. 
64. See infra Section V.C.   
65. See infra Section V.A.   
66. See infra Section V.E. 
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applications filed by institutions to acquire control of depository 
institutions and applications for an institution to engage in banking and 
nonbanking activities.67  Finally, the federal banking agencies conduct 
stress tests and engage in other forward-looking activities related to 
capital, liquidity, and resolution planning to maintain the safety and 
soundness of financial institutions and the stability of the financial 
system.68 
G. Receivership 
The federal or state agency that chartered the depository 
institution is authorized to close a depository institution under its 
jurisdiction for sufficient cause, such as the inability to pay its deposits 
or debts.  The National Bank Act (“NB Act”) requires the OCC to appoint 
the FDIC as receiver for a failed national bank.69  The FRB is authorized 
to appoint the FDIC as receiver of a state member bank.70  State laws 
permit the state banking regulators to appoint the FDIC or another 
receiver.71   
In practice, the FDIC is almost always appointed as receiver of 
depository institutions.72  If appointed as a receiver, the FDIC liquidates 
the assets of the institution and distributes deposits to depositors up to the 
insured amount or the FDIC transfers the assets and liabilities to a third 
party or parties.  If an institution’s insured deposits are purchased and 
liability is assumed by a third party, the depositors will access their 
deposits through the acquiring institution.  The depositors are subject to 
risk of loss for uninsured deposits unless the acquirer assumes liability 
for all deposits.73 
 
67. See infra Section V.D. 
68. See infra Section V.B.5. 
69. 12 U.S.C. § 191.  This section is part of the NB Act, as amended.  The Act of June 3, 
1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99, 101—which built on the Act of February 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 
665, 668—was designated the “national bank act” by the Act of June 20, 1874, ch. 343, § 1, 18 
Stat. 123; see also Edward L. Symons, Jr., The “Business of Banking” in Historical 
Perspective, 51 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 676, 698–99 (1983).   
70. 12 U.S.C. § 248(o).   
71. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 5-8A-24 (2020); FLA. STAT. § 658.80 (2020); N.Y. BANKING 
LAW § 634 (McKinney 2020); OHIO REV. CODE Ann.  § 1125.20 (West 2020). 
72. FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., RESOLUTION HANDBOOK 25 (2019), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/resolutions-handbook.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BZ7Q-JTSV]. 
73. Id. at 17. 
2021] DIHC REGULATION 13 
III.  DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE REGULATION OF 
DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS 
A. Differentiation 
During the first half of the twentieth century, federal and state 
regulators chartered many types of depository institutions, including 
banks, savings associations, credit unions, and ILCs.  These depository 
institutions served separate segments of the financial services market.  
Banks offered deposit accounts to businesses and made commercial 
loans.74  Savings associations offered savings accounts to individuals and 
entered into share accumulation contracts or made home mortgage loans 
to individuals.75  Credit unions opened share accounts and made loans to 
members.76  ILCs issued investment certificates and made small loans to 
low- and moderate-income workers.77  This differentiation in activities 
flowed from variation in (1) public policy of the early 1930s; (2) 
availability of institution powers under various charters; (3) eligibility for 
banking system membership; (4) geographic limitations on branching; 
(5) restraints on deposit interest rates, affiliations, affiliate transactions, 
insider loans, and tying the availability of products to obtaining other 
products; (6) accounting rules and tax treatment; and (7) institution 
policies.   
1.  Public Policy of the Early 1930s 
First, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions 
arose from the federal public policy objectives in the early 1930s.  A wave 
 
74. EVANS CLARK, FINANCING THE CONSUMER 5–6 (1931); ROLF NUGENT, CONSUMER 
CREDIT AND ECONOMIC STABILITY 59 (1939); LENDOL CALDER, FINANCING THE AMERICAN 
DREAM: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF CONSUMER CREDIT 283–84 (1999).  
75. PRICE FISHBACK ET. AL., WELL WORTH SAVING: HOW THE NEW DEAL SAFEGUARDED 
HOME OWNERSHIP 14–15 (2013); Jonathan D. Rose & Kenneth A. Snowden, The New Deal 
and the Origins of the Modern Real Estate Loan Contract 2–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 18388, 2012). 
76. ROY F. BERGENGREN, CREDIT UNION: A COOPERATIVE BANKING BOOK 3, 8, 11 (1923); 
DONALD J. MELVIN & RAYMOND N. DAVIS, CREDIT UNIONS AND THE CREDIT UNION INDUSTRY 
24, 28 (1977); see generally J. CARROLL MOODY & GILBERT C. FITE, THE CREDIT UNION 
MOVEMENT: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT 1850-1970 (1971). 
77. THE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL LOANS AND INVESTMENTS 7–9, 42 (Indus. Fin. Corp., 
2nd ed., 1915); PETER W. HERZOG, THE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL BANKING 7, 19–21 
(1928). 
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of bank failures, home foreclosures, and unemployment followed the 
stock market crash of 1929.78  Congress addressed the perceived reasons 
for the crash79 with legislation that separated commercial banking from 
investment banking, insured deposits, and encouraged and maintained 
home ownership.  When Congress enacted the Banking Act of 1933 
(“1933 Act”) it included four sections that separated commercial banking 
from investment banking, commonly known as the “Glass-Steagall 
Act.”80  Congress also sought to restore confidence in the banking system 
through federal government insurance of deposits.81  In addition, 
Congress sought to encourage and maintain home ownership through 
creation of the Federal Home Loan Bank System, authorization of federal 
 
78.  1935 FRB ANN. REP. 134, 176 (stating that 2,113 banks placed in liquidation or 
receivership in 1933, 14.55% of all banks operating the United States as of June 30, 1933); 
Table DC1255-1270, Mortgage Foreclosures and Delinquencies: 1926-1979, in HISTORICAL 
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES (Susan B. Carter et al. ed., 2006) (252,400 foreclosures on 
nonfarm real estate in 1933; 13% of mortgaged nonfarm real estate); 5 FHLBB ANN. REP. 4 
(1938) (stating that urban foreclosures climbed to nearly 1,000 per day in 1933); Table Ba470-
477, Labor Force, Employment, and Unemployment, 1890-1990, in HISTORICAL STATISTICS 
OF THE UNITED STATES (Susan B. Carter et al. ed., 2006) (31.71% of civilian private nonfarm 
labor force unemployed in 1932).   
79. Congress believed that bank failures resulted from bank involvement in securities 
underwriting and stock speculation.  See e.g., 75 CONG. REC. 9906 (1932) (statement of Sen. 
Walcott) (“The excessive use of bank credit in making loans for the purpose of stock 
speculation . . . was generally admitted before the panic of 1929, and almost universally 
accepted since that time, to have been one of the sources of major difficulty . . . .”); 77 CONG. 
REC. 3835 (1933) (statement of Rep. Steagall) (“Bank deposits and credit resources were 
funneled into the speculative centers of the country for investment in stocks operation and in 
market speculation.”); 77 Cong. Rec. 3907 (1933) (statement of Rep. Kopplemann) (“One of 
the chief causes of this depression has been the diversion of depositors’ money into the 
speculative markets of Wall Street.  Instead of keeping the money for the use of the legitimate 
needs of commerce and agriculture, money has been lent to gamblers to use in buying stocks 
on margin.”).   
80. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 185, 188, 189, 
194.  The Banking Act of 1935 amended section 16 to permit a bank to purchase stocks for 
the account of its customers; clarified that section 21 would not prevent a deposit taking 
company from engaging in the securities underwriting and dealing activities permitted by 
section 16; and amended section 32 to make it consistent with section 20 and to prevent a 
securities company and bank from having any employee (not only any officer) in common.  
Pub. L. No. 74-305, §§ 303–308, 49 Stat. 684, 707, 709 (1935). 
81. Banking Act of 1933 § 8(d), (y), 48 Stat. at 168, 179 (adding § 12B to FR Act 
temporarily establishing the FDIC and deposit insurance fund); 77 CONG. REC. 3837 (1933); 
see also Banking Act of 1935 sec. 101, § 12B, 49 Stat. at 684  (amending § 12B to FR Act, 
permanently establishing the FDIC and the FDIC deposit insurance fund); National Housing 
Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-479, § 403(a), 48 Stat. 1246, 1257 (1934) (establishing the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation). 
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charters for savings and loan associations, and provision for federal home 
mortgage insurance.82   
2.  Institution Powers 
Second, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions 
arose from the powers available to the type of institution.  Historically, 
state-chartered banks were authorized to make loans secured by real 
property.83  National banks lacked the legal authority to make loans 
secured by real property.  However, national banks obtained the authority 
to make loans secured by farm land in 1913, and loans secured by first 
lien upon improved real estate in 1927.84  Historically, savings 
associations were limited to accepting time deposits, making residential 
loans, and investing in government securities.85  However, federal 
savings associations had broader authority than banks to engage in certain 
 
82. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, §§ 3, 10, 47 Stat. 725, 726, 731 
(1932) (providing for formation of Federal Home Loan Bank System); Home Owners’ Loan 
Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5, 48 Stat. 128, 132 (providing for chartering of federal 
savings and loan associations); National Housing Act of 1935 § 1, 48 Stat. 1246 (establishing 
federal guarantee of home loan mortgages). 
83. SAMUEL A. WELLDON, NATIONAL MONETARY COMMISSION, DIGEST OF STATE BANKING 
STATUTES, S. Doc. No. 61-353, at 40–43 tbl. A (1910) (showing that only eleven states 
restricted real estate lending by state-chartered banks). 
84. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, §24, 38 Stat. 251, 273 (1913) (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371 (2018)) (improved and unencumbered farmland); McFadden Act, 
Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 16, 44 Stat. 1224, 1232 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 371 
(2018)) (improved real estate).  Before enactment of these laws national banks were not 
authorized to make loans initially secured by real estate.  National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 8, 13 
Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 24) (loan money on personal 
security); 1878 OCC ANN. REP. 55 (“[N]ational banks may loan upon personal security 
only—that is as original security for any loan . . . .”); 1893 OCC ANN. REP. 51 (“National 
banking associations are by implication prohibited from taking mortgages on real estate as 
security for contemporaneous loans.”). 
85. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, §§ 5–6, 48 Stat. at 132, 134 (authorized mutual thrift 
institutions to encourage saving and home financing); Norman Strunk, The Improved 
Investment Position of Savings and Loan Associations, J. FIN., Oct. 1947, at 1, 2, 16 (stating 
that savings and loan associations offer savings accounts, not demand deposit accounts, invest 
in first mortgage home loans, and invest in U.S. government securities).  However, in the 
1980s, federal savings associations obtained the authority to offer demand deposit accounts, 
invest more broadly, and make additional types of loans.  See, e.g., Depository Institutions 
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 401, 402, 94 Stat. 
132, 151-156 (codified as amended at  12 U.S.C. § 1464(b), (c)); Thrift Institutions 
Restructuring Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 312, 321–330, 96 Stat. 1469, 1496, 1499–
1502 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 282-288 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (amending § 5 of HOLA). 
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activities, such as insurance agency and real estate development.86  Still, 
banks possessed authority not held by savings associations to accept 
demand deposits, make commercial loans, invest in securities other than 
government securities, and offer trust services.87   
3.  Banking System Membership 
Third, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions 
arose from banking system membership.  In 1913, the Federal Reserve 
Act (“FR Act”) required national banks to become members of the 
Federal Reserve System (“FR System”) and permitted state banks to 
become members.88  Building and loan associations and mutual savings 
banks were not eligible for membership in the FR System.89  Later, 
amendments to the FR Act authorized ILCs and mutual savings banks to 
become members of the FR System.90  In 1932, the Federal Home Loan 
Bank Act (“FHLBA”) allowed all building and loan associations, savings 
and loan associations, cooperative banks, homestead associations, and 
savings banks to become members of the Federal Home Loan Bank 
System (“FHLB System”).91  Later, the Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933 
(“HOLA”) required federal savings and loan associations chartered by 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (“FHLBB”) to become members of 
the FHLB System.92  Membership allowed members to borrow from and 
obtain services from their respective system.93    
 
86. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., A Unified Federal Charter for Banks and Savings 
Associations, 10 FDIC BANKING REV., No. 1, 1997, at 4. 
87. National Bank Act § 8, 13 Stat.  at 101 (authorizing national associations to receive 
deposits, loan money on personal security); Federal Reserve Act § 11(k), 38 Stat. at 262 
(authorizing the FRB to permit national banks to provide trust services); McFadden Act § 16, 
44 Stat. at 1232 (authorizing national associations to make loans secured by first lien upon 
improved real estate).  
88. Federal Reserve Act §§ 2, 9, 38 Stat. at 252, 259. 
89. Informal Rulings of the Board, 1 FED. RES. BULL. 211, 212 (1915) (stating that building 
and loan associations were ineligible for system membership); Informal Rulings of the 
Federal Reserve Board, 3 FED. RES. BULL. 949, 950 (1917) (stating that mutual savings banks 
were ineligible for system membership). 
90. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, sec. 5(a), (c), § 9, 48 Stat. 162, 164. 
91. Federal Home Loan Bank Act, Pub. L. No. 72-304, § 4, 47 Stat. 725, 726 (1932) 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1424 (2018)).  
92. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-42, § 5(f), 48 Stat. 128, 133 (codified 
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464). 
93. Federal Reserve Act § 13, 38 Stat. at 263 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 343); 
Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 4(b), 47 Stat. at 726 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 
1424). 
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4.  Branching Rights 
Fourth, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions 
arose from branching rights.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
the banking system consisted almost entirely of unit banks—independent 
banks with one office that served a local community.94  The geographic 
reach of individual state and national banks was very limited.95  State 
laws generally prohibited a state-chartered bank from opening branch 
offices.96  However, states began to expand the authority of state-
chartered banks to branches, first within the city of a bank’s existing 
office, then within an expanded geographic area, and then state-wide.97  
The NB Act did not explicitly authorize national banks to establish 
branch offices.98  However, in 1927, the McFadden Act authorized a 
 
94. FED. RESERVE COMM. ON BRANCH, GRP., AND CHAIN BANKING, BRANCH BANKING IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (1931) (“Following the passage of the National Bank Act of 1863, . . . 
public policy became committed to the unit banking system.”); JOHN M. CHAPMAN, 
CONCENTRATION OF BANKING: THE CHANGING STRUCTURE AND CONTROL OF BANKING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 6 (1934) (“The individual bank was a local affair devoted largely to the 
interests of its immediate community.”); PALMER T. HOGENSON, THE ECONOMICS OF GROUP 
BANKING 1 (1955) (“Independent unit banking is the more familiar pattern of banking in this 
country in which an individual bank unit has but one office . . . .”). 
95. FED. RESERVE COMM. ON BRANCH, GRP., AND CHAIN BANKING, supra note 94, at 1 (“In 
1900, according to the best information available, there were only 119 branches in 
existence.”).  
96. Digest of State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, 16 FED. RES. BULL. 258, 258 (1930) 
(22 states prohibited branch banking); Changes in State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, 18 
FED. RES. BULL. 455, 455 (1932) (18 states prohibited branch banking).  
97. Digest of State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, supra note 96, at 258 (10 states 
permitted branch banking within a limited area and 9 states permitted state-wide branch 
banking); Changes in State Laws Relating to Branch Banking, supra note 96, at 455 (14 states 
permitted branch banking with a limited area and 9 states permitted state-wide branch 
banking). 
98. Because the NB Act did not authorize branch offices, national banks were generally 
viewed as prohibited from opening branch offices.  In 1911, the U.S. Attorney General found 
that a national bank was restricted to carrying on general banking business to one office or 
banking house in the place designated in its certificate of organization.  Lowry National Bank 
of Atlanta, GA—Establishment of Branch Office, 29 Op. Att’y Gen. 81, 98 (1911).  In 1923, 
the U.S. Attorney General found that a national bank had the power to open offices at places 
other than its banking house to perform routine services, such as the collection of deposits 
and cashing of checks, within the city or place designated in its organization certificate.  
Power of National Banking Associations to Establish Offices, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 1, 5 (1923).  
In 1924, the U.S. Supreme Court sustained a challenge to a national bank opening branches 
in Missouri under a state statute.  First National Bank v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 657–60 
(1924).   
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national bank to establish branches in the city in which it was located if 
permitted by state banks in the same state.99 
During most of the twentieth century, the branching rights of 
federal savings and loan associations were slightly more favorable than 
the branching rights of banks.  As enacted in 1933, HOLA provided the 
FHLBB with exclusive authority to provide for the organization, 
incorporation, examination, operation, and regulation of federal savings 
and loan associations.100  Therefore, the states did not have the authority 
to limit branch locations of federal savings and loan associations.101  As 
the twentieth century progressed, the FHLBB issued policy statements 
expanding the ability of federal savings associations to establish 
branches.102  In 1996, Congress authorized federal savings associations 
 
99. Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 7(c), 44 Stat. 1224, 1228 (1927) (codified as amended at 12 
U.S.C. § 36(f) (2018)).  The McFadden Act defined a branch as any place of business at which 
“deposits are received or checks paid, or money lent.” Id. § 7(f), 44 Stat. at 1229 (codified as 
amended at 12 U.S.C. § 36(j)).  The Banking Act of 1933 further expanded the authority of 
national banks to branch within a state to the same extent state law permitted state banks to 
branch within such state establish branches anywhere in the state in which the national bank 
was situated to the extent the “law of the State in question by language specifically granting 
such authority affirmatively and not merely by implication or recognition” authorized State 
banks to establish branches, “subject to the restrictions as to location imposed by the law of 
the State on State banks.”  Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 23, 48 Stat. 162, 189 (1933).   
100. Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-43, § 5(a), 48 Stat. 128, 132 
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464).  In 1937, the FHLBB issued regulations that 
allowed a federal savings and loan association to file an application with the FHLBB to 
establish a branch office in any county within a state.  Amendment to Rules and Regulations 
for Federal Savings and Loan Associations, 2 Fed. Reg. 8244 (May 14, 1937). 
101. The FHLBB’s authority was confirmed in later court cases.  California v. Coast Fed. 
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Cal. 1951)  (“No provision is made for sharing 
the Board's delegated authority with state regulatory or supervisory agencies.”)  In 1982, the 
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that “Congress gave the [FHLBB] plenary authority to issue 
regulations governing federal savings and loans . . . .” Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. de 
la Cuesta, 450 U.S. 141, 160 (1982).  The FHLBB promulgated regulations governing “the 
powers and operations of every Federal savings and loan association from its cradle to its 
corporate grave.” Id. at 145 (citing Coast Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 98 F. Supp. at 316). 
102. Branching by Federal Savings Associations, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b), (d) (1993) 
(allowing federal savings associations to branch interstate, subject only to the limitations of 
federal law); Establishment of Branch Offices, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(3) (1982) (permitting 
interstate acquisition to prevent the failure of an institution or minimize risk or cost to the 
insurance fund); Establishment of Federal Savings and Loan Associations and Branch Office 
and Mobile Facilities of Such institutions, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(b)(2)–(3) (1973) (stating the 
general policy against establishing a branch other than in a federal association’s home state); 
Establishment of Branch Offices, 12 C.F.R. § 556.5(a)(2) (1968) (limiting branches to 
locations permitted by state law or practice);  see also Conference of State Bank Supervisors 
v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 792 F.2d 837 (D.D.C. 1992) (upholding OTS rule allowing 
national savings association to branch interstate subject only to federal law); JULIE L. 
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to branch across state lines if they qualified as a domestic building and 
loan association or as a qualified thrift lender.103 
5.  Restraints on Activities 
Fifth, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions 
arose from the varying restraints on activities based on the type of 
institution.  For many years, thrifts were not subject to many of the 
prohibitions, restrictions, and limitations on activities applicable to 
banks.  For instance, while the federal government regulated deposit 
interest rates paid by banks from the 1930s to the 1980s,104 the federal 
government did not regulate the rates paid by savings and loan 
associations until 1966.105  Other examples of lighter regulation of thrifts 
include affiliations with securities firms,106 restrictions on loans to 
insiders,107 and limitations on transactions with affiliates.108    
 
WILLIAMS, SAVINGS INSTITUTIONS: MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CONVERSIONS § 6.02[2][b] 
(2020).    
103. Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, § 2303, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009–424 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1464(r)). 
104. Member banks became subject to a prohibition against payment of interest on demand 
deposits and an interest rate ceiling on other deposits in 1933.  Banking Act of 1933 § 11(b), 
148 Stat. at 181.  State nonmember banks became subject to the same prohibition and ceiling 
in 1935.  Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 702.  The Board 
implemented the prohibition and ceiling through promulgation of Regulation Q.  Regulation 
Q, Series 1933, Payment of Interest on Deposits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 571 (1933).  The FDIC 
issued Regulation IV.  1935 FDIC ANN. REP. 95.  In 1980, Congress mandated the elimination 
of deposit interest rate ceilings by 1986.  Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat. 132, 142.  Congress eliminated the prohibition against 
payment of interest on demand deposits in 2010.   Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),  Pub. L. No. 111-203 § 627, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1640 (2010) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 371s, 1464, 1828).  Regulation Q was 
repealed effective July 21, 2011.  76 Fed. Reg. 42015 (July 18, 2011). 
105. An Act of September 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, §§ 2(c), 3, 4, 80 Stat. 823, 824–
825.  Until deposit interest rate ceilings were eliminated in 1986, savings associations could 
pay a higher rate of interest on deposits than banks.  Depository Institutions Deregulation Act 
of 1980 § 202, 94 Stat. at 142.  ILCs not subject to deposit interest rate limitations.  James R. 
Barth et al., Industrial Loan Companies: Where Banking and Commerce Meet, 21 FIN. MKT., 
INST. & INSTRUMENTS 1, 22 fn. 18 (2012). 
106. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. at 184, 188, 189, 194; Banking Act 
of 1935 §§ 302, 303, 305, 307, 49 Stat. at 707–09. 
107. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-630, §§ 104, 108, 92 Stat. 3641, 3644, 3664 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 375b(h), 
1828(j)). 
108.  Banking Act of 1933 § 13, 48 Stat. at 183; Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, 
§ 12(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242. 
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6.  Accounting Rules and Tax Treatment 
Sixth, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions 
arose from differences in accounting rules and tax treatment of banks and 
thrifts.  For most of the twentieth century, thrifts enjoyed more favorable 
accounting rules and federal income tax treatment than banks.109  While 
banks became subject to federal income tax in 1913,110 thrifts were 
exempt from federal income taxation until 1952.111  Even then, Congress 
provided thrifts with preferential tax treatment of reserves for bad 
debts.112  In addition, the FHLBB applied more lenient accounting 
principles to thrifts related to capital, goodwill, and losses than applied to 
banks during the 1980s.113   
7.  Institution Policy 
Finally, differentiation in the regulation of depository institutions 
arose from depository institution policy.  In the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, bank policy generally limited activities to the 
acceptance of demand deposits from and extension of demand loans to 
business customers.114  Banks did not usually accept deposits from lower 
 
109. See generally Margaret E. Bedford, Federal Taxation of Financial Institutions, FED. 
RES. BANK KAN. CITY ECON. REV., June 1976, at 3; Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at 
3. 
110. Underwood Tariff Act, Pub. L. No. 63-16, Sec. II., A., 38 Stat. 114, 166 (1913) 
(imposing income tax on every citizen and business, trade, or profession carried on in the 
United States, but providing exemptions for mutual savings banks, building and loan 
associations, and cooperative banks). 
111. Revenue Act of 1951, Pub. L. No. 82-183, § 313(a)–(d), 65 Stat. 452, 490 (imposing 
tax on mutual savings banks, building and loan associations, and cooperative banks). 
112. Id. § 313(e), 65 Stat. at 490. 
113. NAT’L COMM. ON FIN. INST. REFORM, RECOVERY, AND ENF’T, ORIGIN AND CAUSES OF 
THE S&L DEBACLE: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS OF 
THE UNITED STATES 37–39 (1993);  MARTIN E. LOWY, HIGH ROLLERS: INSIDE THE SAVINGS 
AND LOAN DEBACLE 39–45 (1991);  Alane Moysich, Chapter 4 The Savings and Loan Crisis 
and its Relationship to Banking, in 1 HISTORY OF THE EIGHTIES – LESSONS FOR THE FUTURE, 
168, 173–75 (Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. ed., 1997). 
114. Demand deposits are deposits that may be withdrawn at any time without prior notice 
of withdrawal to the depository institution.  A demand deposit is “payable as a matter of legal 
right on demand.”  PAULINE B. HELLER, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
LAW 5–6 (1976).  A demand loan does not have a fixed repayment schedule or maturity date.  
The borrower can make payments at any time without penalty.  The lender may call for 
repayment of the loan at any time.  O. HOWARD WOLFE, PRACTICAL BANKING 102 (1918) 
(“Call, demand, temporary, and overnight loans are loans which differ from other classes of 
loans chiefly in the matter of maturity . . . .  The time of their payment is optional, both with 
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and working class persons.115  Furthermore, bank policy generally 
precluded home mortgage and personal lending because such lending was 
too risky, too troublesome for the returns, or too long-termed when 
depositors could demand their money at any time.116  On the other hand, 
building and loan associations, credit unions, and ILCs were very willing 
to do business with the working class during the early years of the 
twentieth century.  State-chartered building and loan associations made 
loans to members tied to share accumulation contracts.117  Credit unions 
encouraged saving and made small loans to “people of small means” on 
reasonable terms.118  ILCs issued investment certificates and made 
uncollateralized installment loans to low- and moderate-income 
industrial workers.119   
B. Convergence 
During the second half of the twentieth century, market 
developments, legislative enactments, and institution policies and 
practices decreased the variation in the regulation, supervision, and 
activities of depository institutions and DIHCs.  In financial markets, 
rising interest rates and competitive pressure from money market funds 
led to federal legislation and changes in financial institution policy and 
 
the bank and the borrower, although ample warning is usually given by either party wishing 
to terminate the obligation.”). 
115. Federal Charter Legislation for Mutual Savings Banks: Hearings on H.R. 258 Before 
the H. Subcomm. on Bank Supervision, 88th Cong. 295 (1963) (statement of Jerry Voorhis, 
Executive Director, Cooperative League of the U.S.A.). 
116. CLARK, supra note 74, at 5–6;  NUGENT, supra note 74, at 59;  CALDER, supra note 
74, at 283–84.  
117. Association members made monthly payments on shares typically over a period of 
years, which accumulated in a sinking fund used to pay off the loan when the shares matured.  
Rose & Snowden, supra note 75, at 5–6 (describing the movement of savings associations 
from share accumulation loans to fully amortized residential mortgage loans in the 1930s);  
see also FISHBACK ET AL., supra note 75, at 14–15.  Other lenders typically required 50–60% 
down payments for loans with five-year terms and large balloon payments at the end of the 
term.  While some of these loans provided for payment on principal, most loans were made 
on an interest-only basis, which did not apply anything to the principal of the loan.  FISHBACK 
ET AL., supra note 75, at 12–13. 
118. MOODY & FITE, supra note 76, at 35. 
119. THE MORRIS PLAN OF INDUSTRIAL LOANS AND INVESTMENTS, supra note 77, at 9–10, 
42; see also Control and Regulation of Bank Holding Companies: Hearings on H.R. 2674 
Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 84th Cong. 585 (1955) (statement of Arthur 
J. Morris, Chairman, Morris Plan Corporation of America) (“I began the first Morris Plan 
bank . . . for the sole purpose of making a start in the democratization of credit. . . .  I was not 
long in discovering that fact that more than 80 percent of the American public had no access 
to credit of any kind except as they resorted to loan sharks or charitable institutions.”); 
HERZOG, supra note 77, at 20–21. 
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practice.  Congress enacted legislation related to depository institutions:  
(1) continuing to support housing finance; (2) extending and then 
eliminating prohibitions on affiliation with securities firms; 
(3) equalizing institution powers; (4) expanding eligibility for system 
membership and access to services; (5) unifying deposit insurance funds 
and extending coverage to industrial loan companies; (6) establishing 
branching rights parity; (7) extending restraints of bank activities to 
savings associations related to deposit interest rates, affiliations, affiliate 
transactions, insider loans, and tying the availability of products to 
obtaining other products; (8) mandating uniform accounting rules and tax 
treatment; (9) repealing prohibitions on bank affiliation with securities 
firms; and (10) imposing accountability measures for savings 
associations similar to those for banks.  Institutions changed policy to 
engage in newly authorized activities and adopted names that blurred the 
distinctions between different types of institutions. 
1.  Congressional Support of the Role of Thrifts in Home Mortgage 
Lending 
The first reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions was continued Congressional support of the role of thrifts in 
home mortgage lending.  In the high interest rate environment of the 
1970s and 1980s, depositors withdrew funds in banks and thrifts to invest 
in higher yielding money market funds.120  The impact on thrifts was 
particularly acute because of the mismatch between low-yield mortgage 
loans on their books and high cost of borrowing funds.121  Thrifts paid 
more to borrow funds than they earned on their mortgage loans.  Thrifts 
suffered huge operating losses and depleted retained earnings.122  
Congress responded to the difficulties faced by thrifts with legislation that 
 
120. 1981 FHLBB ANN. REP., as reprinted in 15 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BD. J., Apr. 1982, 
at 1, 26; SEN. REP. NO. 97-536, at 18 (1982) (“The statistical evidence of competitive 
imbalance between regulated and unregulated depository institutions is measurable by the fact 
that the asset size of the money market mutual funds grew from $60.9 billion in March, 1980, 
to $203.3 billion in June, 1982, an increase of over 230 percent.”). 
121. Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., supra note 120, at 22. 
122. Laura L. Mulcahy, Stock S&Ls Are Traveling a High Road Back, AM. BANKER, Mar. 
2, 1983, at 3 (“After massive losses in the past few years, the nation’s largest stock saving 
and loan associations are rebounding sharply to match or exceed record earnings per share.”);  
Fed. Home Loan Bank Bd., supra note 120, at 26  (“Profits deteriorated throughout 1981.  
Rising market interest rates affected the cost of funds more than the return on investments.  
Consequently, retained earnings declined for the first time since 1940.”). 
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deregulated deposit interest rates,123 expanded the loans and investments 
permissible for federal savings and loan associations and mutual savings 
banks,124 and recapitalized the FSLIC.125  These actions allowed thrifts to 
diversify their assets and compete more effectively in a high interest rate 
environment.126  In doing so, Congress affirmed the continuing role of the 
thrift industry in home mortgage lending.127   
2.  Repeal of Prohibitions on Affiliation with Securities Firms 
The second reason for convergence in the regulation of 
depository institutions was reversal of public policy barring the affiliation 
 
123. Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat. 
132, 142.   
124. Qualified Thrift Lender Reform Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 441(a), 105 Stat. 
2236, 2381 (amending HOLA to authorize unsecured consumer loans to up 35% of assets);  
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 
sec, 301, § 5(c)(D)(2), 103 Stat. 183, 287 (1989) (amending HOLA to authorize unsecured 
consumer loans to up 30% of assets);  Thrift Institutions Restructuring Act, Pub. L. No. 97-
320, § 325, 96 Stat. 1469, 1500 (1982) (amending HOLA to authorize commercial loans up 
to 10% of assets);  Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 401–402, 94 Stat. 132, 151–155 (authorizing unsecured consumer 
loans to up 20% of assets, commercial real estate loans up to 20% of assets, residential 
construction loans up to 5% of assets, education loans up to 5% of assets, and community 
development loans up to 2% of assets).  
125. Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation Recapitalization Act of 1987, Pub. 
L. No. 100-86, §§ 301–308, 101 Stat. 552, 585–604. 
126. 126 Cong. Rec. 6893–6900 (1980) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (“[T]he Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 . . . provides new lending powers 
to thrift institutions in order to enhance their competitive viability, which means that savings 
and loans can do many things banks can do, with trust powers, consumer loan powers, and so 
on . . . . [T]itle IV augments the powers of thrift—institutions—savings and loan associations 
and Federal mutual savings banks so that they may better serve the consumer and remain 
viable in a market environment.”). 
127. S. REP. NO. 96-368, at 12–13 (1979) (“Thrifts have historically functioned as 
depositories and home mortgage lenders . . . .  This legislation gives federal savings and loans 
the ability to compete for the savings dollar while remaining housing oriented.”).  Subsequent 
legislation during the 1980s continued to support the thrift industry.  See, e.g., S. REP. No. 97-
641, at 85 (1982) (Conf. Rep.) (The purpose of the Act was “to revitalize the housing industry 
by strengthening the financial stability of home mortgage lending institutions and ensuring 
the availability of home mortgage loans.”);  H.R. REP. NO. 100-261, at 164 (1987) (Conf. 
Rep.) (“The House Bill and the Senate amendment provide an approach for dealing with 
troubled but well-managed and viable thrifts . . . . The overall objective of the two approaches 
is to maximize the long-term viability of the thrift industry at the lowest cost to the Federal 
Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (SFLIC).”);  S. REP. NO. 101-19, at 3 (1989) (“[T]he 
Committee found most persuasive the testimony of those experts who concluded that good 
reasons to maintain a separate thrift industry still exist.  Essential to that conclusion, however, 
is the assumption that the thrift industry will continue to pay a distinct economic role, 
distinguishable from that fulfilled by the commercial banking industry, as the primary source 
of residential housing finance.”). 
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of banking organizations and securities firms.  In 1999, Congress enacted 
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), which repealed prohibitions on 
the affiliation of banking organizations and securities firms.128   
3.  Institution Powers Equalized 
The third reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions was the equalization of the powers of depository institutions.  
In 1980, Congress authorized savings associations to offer interest 
bearing checking accounts like banks,129 and required all insured 
depository institutions to maintain reserves on deposits.130  In the lending 
realm, Congress authorized savings associations to make commercial, 
consumer, educational, credit card, and other types of loans offered by 
banks.131  Congress also authorized the FHLBB to permit federal savings 
 
128. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 1341 (1999) (repealing sections 20 and 
32 of the Banking Act of 1933).  Congress extended the applicability of section 32 of the 
Banking Act of 1933 to savings associations.  Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, 
Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 103, 106, 101 Stat. 552, 566, 576.  The GLBA also modified public 
policy related to the regulation of insurance.  In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, granting states the power to regulate most aspects of the insurance business.  
Pub. L. No. 79-15, § 2(b) 59 Stat. 33, 34 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (2018)).  
The McCarran-Ferguson Act states that “no act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, 
impair, or supersede any law enacted by any state for the purpose of regulating the business 
of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically 
relates to the business of insurance.”  Id.  Under the Act, a state law regulating the business 
of insurance preempts a conflicting federal statute, unless the federal statute specifically 
relates to the business of insurance.  However, the GLBA specifically preempted any state 
law preventing or restricting a depository institution from being affiliated with any insurer.  
Still, reflecting Congressional deference to state law for the regulation of insurance activities, 
GLBA included 13 safe harbors permitting state regulation, which cover advertising practices, 
licensing requirements, various notices and disclaimers, tying, restrictions on paying fees to 
non-licensed employees, and other potentially coercive sales practices.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act ("GLBA”) § 104(d)(2)(B), 113 Stat. at 1353 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701(d)(2)(B)). 
129. Depository Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-221, § 303, 94 Stat. 132, 146 (1980) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1832(a) (2018)).   
130. Id. § 103., 94 Stat. at 133. 
131. Id. §§ 401–402, 94 Stat. at 153–55 (unsecured consumer loans to up 20% of assets, 
commercial real estate loans up to 20% of assets, residential construction loans up to 5% of 
assets, education loans up to 5% of assets, and community development loans up to 2% of 
assets);  Garn-St German Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 325, 96 Stat. 
1469, 1500 (1982) (commercial loans up to 10% of assets);  Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 287 (1989) 
(unsecured consumer loans to up 30% of assets);  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 441(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2381 (1991) 
(unsecured consumer loans to up 35% of assets);  Economic Growth and Regulatory 
Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2303, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-424 
(1996) (commercial loans up to 20% of assets). 
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associations to provide trust services, paralleling the authority available 
to national banks.132  In 1982, Congress authorized insured savings 
associations to offer demand deposits, which brought parity to deposit 
taking activity.133 
4.  Banking System Membership and Access to Services Expanded 
The fourth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions was the expansion of institutions eligible for FHLB System 
membership and access to FR System services.  In 1980, Congress 
mandated that Federal Reserve Banks make their services and loans 
equally available to all depository institutions.134  In 1989, Congress 
expanded the scope of institutions eligible for FHLB System membership 
by authorizing any depository institution with at least 10% of its total 
assets in residential mortgage loans to become FHLB members.135  In 
1999, the GLBA authorized FDIC-insured banks with average assets 
under $500 million to become members of the FHLB System, regardless 
of its percentage of assets in residential mortgages.136  
5.  Deposit Insurance Extended and Unified 
The fifth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions was the extension of deposit insurance to ILCs and merger of 
deposit insurance funds.  In the 1930s, Congress provided for separate 
insurance funds with the FDIC insuring bank deposits and the FSLIC 
insuring savings association deposits.137  In 1982, Congress required the 
FDIC to insure the deposits of ILCs.138  In 1989, Congress moved 
 
132. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 403, 94 
Stat. at 156. 
133. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 § 312, 96 Stat. at 1496. 
134. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 § 107, 94 
Stat. at 141. 
135. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 704, 103 
Stat. at 415. 
136. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 602, 113 Stat. 1338, 1450 (1999). 
137. Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-66, § 11(b), 48 Stat. 162, 181 (1933); Banking 
Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 684, 702 (1935).   
138. Garn-St Germain Act of 1982 § 703, 96 Stat. at 1538.  In 1933, the FDIC determined 
that that industrial loan companies (“ILCs”) were not eligible for deposit insurance.  Mindy 
West, The FDIC’s Supervision of ILCs: A Historical Perspective 8 FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. 
SUPERVISORY INSIGHTS, Summer 2004;  see also  GOV‘T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-
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administration of the savings association deposit fund from the FLSIC to 
the FDIC.139  In 2006, Congress merged the bank and savings association 
funds into one fund administered by the FDIC.140  Currently, banks, 
thrifts, and ILCs operate under the same laws and regulations applicable 
to deposit accounts. 
6.  Branching Rights Parity 
The sixth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions was that Congress and state legislatures slowly established 
parity in the branching rights of depository institutions.  Historically, 
thrifts141  and ILCs142 enjoyed more expansive rights to establish branches 
than banks.  In the early 1980s, several states authorized interstate 
branching by banks and BHCs.  Some states allowed banks from any state 
to enter the state.143  Other states provided for entry on a reciprocal 
 
621,  INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS: RECENT ASSET GROWTH AND COMMERCIAL INTEREST 
HIGHLIGHT DIFFERENCES IN REGULATORY AUTHORITY 16 (2005).  In 1934, the FDIC insured 
the thrift certificates of twenty-nine ILCs.  Barth et al., supra note 105, at 11.  Thereafter, the 
FDIC made deposit insurance determinations on a case-by-case basis.  GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138;  West, supra note 138, at 8  fn. 9 (stating that forty-
five industrial banks became federally insured before 1982 where state law permitted the use 
of “bank” in the name).   
139. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, §§ 401–402, 
103 Stat. at 354, 357. 
140. Deficit Reduction Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-171, § 2102, 120 Stat. 4, 9 (2006). 
141. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 6.02[1] (“Historically, federal thrift enjoyed a 
significant advantage over national banks, in terms of their ability to branch, as the latter were 
prohibited to branch interstate and were bound by state branching restrictions within the state 
where they were located.”)  In 1991, the OTS noted that Congress had given the FHLBB and 
OTS "exceptionally broad authority to regulate from 'cradle to grave' the branching operations 
and other activities of federal thrifts" and that "the courts have confirmed that the OTS's 
authority in this respect is plenary and not bounded by any restrictions of state law."  Policy 
Statement on Branching by Federal Savings Associations, 56 Fed. Reg. 67236, 67237 (Dec. 
30, 1991) (citations omitted).  Therefore, the OTS stated that “federal savings associations 
may be allowed to branch on an interstate basis."  Id. 
142. West, supra note 138, at 7; see also RAYMOND J. SAULNIER, INDUSTRIAL BANKING 
COMPANIES AND THEIR CREDIT PRACTICES 48–50 (1940) (some states allowed industrial loan 
company branches but imposed limitations).  
143. EMMANUEL N. ROUSSAKIS, COMMERCIAL BANKING IN AN ERA OF DEREGULATION 45 
(Praeger, 3d ed. 1997) (citing Alaska, Arizona, Texas, Oklahoma, and Maine).  In 1978, the 
state of Maine authorized interstate banking on a reciprocal nationwide basis.  Phillip E. 
Strahan, The Real Effects of U.S. Banking Deregulation, 85 FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS REV. 
July/Aug. 2003, 111, 112; see also Dean F. Amel, State Law Affecting the Geographic 
Expansion of Commercial Banks 18 (1993) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/state-laws-affecting-geographic-expansion-commercial-
banks-4954 [https://perma.cc/EL7Z-3ZKT] (describing entry laws in Maine). 
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basis,144 authorized entry for special-purpose facilities such as credit card 
operations,145 or authorized the acquisition of a troubled or failing 
institution.146  By 1992, all states but Hawaii had passed laws authorizing 
regional or nationwide branching.147  
The biggest step toward bank parity with savings association 
regarding branches came through the enactment of the Riegle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (“Riegle-Neal 
Act”).148  The Riegle-Neal Act authorized a bank in a state that satisfied 
several conditions to acquire an existing bank in another state, unless the 
state opted-out of interstate banking.149  Only two states opted out.150  
Forty-seven states adopted legislation authorizing interstate branching 
legislation.151  All but two of these states chose to bar de novo interstate 
branching–opening a new in-state branch rather than acquiring an 
existing branch.152  The Act largely eliminated the advantage federal 
savings associations held over banks related to interstate branching.153 
 
144. ROUSSAKIS, supra note 143, at 45 (citing Kentucky, New York, Washington, and West 
Virginia).  The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionally of the regional bank compacts 
in 1985.  Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159 
(1985); see also State Laws Gain Renewed Significance as Congress Stumbles, BANKING 
POL’Y REP., Jan. 6, 1992, at 10. 
145. ROUSSAKIS, supra note 143, at 45 (citing South Dakota and Delaware).   
146. Id. 
147. Jith Jayaratne & Phillip E. Strahan, Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, and 
Dynamic Efficiency: Evidence from Commercial Banking, 41 J. L. & ECON. 239, 243, 245 
tbl.1 (1998).  
148. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).   
149. Id. §§ 101, 102, 108 Stat. at 2339–2343;  see also Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 
1997, Pub. L. No. 105-24, § 2, 111 Stat. 238 (1997) (establishing that laws of a state bank’s 
host state apply only to the extent that they would apply to a branch of an out-of-state national 
bank). 
150. All But Few States Beat Trigger Date on Nationwide Branching, BANKING POL’Y REP., 
June 1992, at 11 (“Texas and Montana were the only states to opt-out but in both cases the 
law includes a sunset provision that will automatically cancel the opt-out provision.”); Fed. 
Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at 4 (“Only one state, Texas, had ‘opted-out.’”). 
151. All But Few States Beat Trigger Date on Nationwide Branching, supra note 150 (“As 
of May 23, 47 states plus the District of Columbia had acted on interstate branching under the 
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994.”).  
152. Id.  (“Most states chose to bar de novo interstate branching – that is, opening a brand 
new in-state branch rather than having to acquire an in-state bank.”). 
153. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at 3 (“The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 reduced much of the historical branching advantage of 
savings institutions.”).  Still, federal savings associations maintained slight branching 
advantages over banks.  A federal savings association could establish an interstate de novo 
branch, while a bank was not authorized to do so unless the state affirmatively opted-in to 
such branching (and only one state did so).  Id. at 4 (“Of the states that have ‘opted-in,’ 
however, only Indiana and Puerto Rico allow immediate interstate branching.”).  However, 
Congress eliminated the opt-in requirement for de novo branching in 2010, which allowed 
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7.  Restraints on Activities Extended 
The seventh reason for convergence in the regulation of 
depository institutions was the extension of many of the prohibitions, 
restrictions, and limitations initially applicable to banks to savings 
associations.  In 1966, Congress authorized the FHLBB to limit the 
deposit interest rates paid by savings associations,154 as the FRB and 
FDIC exercised similar authority to limit the deposit interest rates paid 
by banks beginning in the 1930s.155  In 1987, savings associations also 
temporarily became subject to a prohibition on affiliations with securities 
firms that applied banks.156  Congress repealed these prohibitions for all 
institutions in 1999.157  Restrictions on loans to directors, officers, and 
principal shareholders applicable to banks became applicable to savings 
associations in 1989.158  Savings associations also became subject to 
 
banks to establish branches nationwide on a de novo basis.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 613(a), 124 Stat. 
1376, 1614 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36(g)(1)(A) (pertaining to national banks); 12 
U.S.C. § 1828(d)(4)(A)(i) (pertaining to state insured banks)). 
154. An Act of Sept. 21, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-597, §§ 2(c), 3, 4, 80 Stat. 823, 824–825.  
Even then, the FHLBB, the FRB, and FDIC established interest rate ceilings that gave savings 
and loan associations an advantage over banks in attracting deposits.  DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S INTER-AGENCY TASK FORCE ON REGULATION Q: 
DEPOSIT INTEREST RATE CEILINGS AND HOUSING CREDIT 40 (1979) (“Thus, the beginning of 
the “differential” saw a 75 basis point advantage in passbook savings for savings and loan 
associations over commercial banks, and a 25 basis point advantage for the former in small 
CDs.”).  Savings associations could pay a higher rate of interest on deposits than banks until 
deposit interest rate ceilings were eliminated in 1986.  Depository Institutions Deregulation 
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 202, 94 Stat. 132, 142.   ILCs were not subject to deposit 
interest rate limitations.  Barth et al., supra note 105, at 22 n. 18. 
155. Member banks became subject to a prohibition against payment of interest on demand 
deposits and an interest rate ceiling on other deposits in 1933.  Banking Act of 1933, Pub. L. 
No. 73-66, § 11(b), 148 Stat. 162, 181.  State nonmember banks became subject to the same 
prohibition and ceiling in 1935.  Banking Act of 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-305, § 101, 49 Stat. 
684, 702.  The Board implemented the prohibition and ceiling through promulgation of 
Regulation Q.  Regulation Q, Series 1933, Payment of Interest on Deposits, 19 FED. RES. 
BULL. 571 (1933).  The FDIC issued Regulation IV. 1935 FDIC ANN. REP. 95.  In 1980, 
Congress mandated the elimination of deposit interest rate ceilings by 1986.  Depository 
Institution Deregulation Act of 1980 § 202, 94 Stat. at 142.  Congress eliminated the 
prohibition against payment of interest on demand deposits in 2010.  Dodd-Frank Act, § 627, 
124 Stat. at 1640.  Regulation Q was repealed effective July 21, 2011.  Prohibition Against 
Payment of Interest on Demand Deposits, 76 Fed. Reg. 42015 (July 18, 2011). 
156. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 106(a)–(b), 101 
Stat. 552, 576 (expired Mar. 1, 1988).   
157. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1341 (1999). 
158. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 342 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1468 (2018)). 
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limitations that applied to bank loans and other covered transactions with 
affiliates in 1989.159   
8.  Similar Accountability Measures Imposed 
The eighth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions was the imposition of similar accountability measures for all 
depository institutions.  In 1989, Congress imposed cross-guarantee 
liability on commonly controlled depository institutions.160  In 1991, 
Congress required all of the federal banking agencies to take prompt 
corrective action when a depository institution under its jurisdiction 
failed to meet capital requirements.161  At the same time, Congress 
imposed requirements on depository institution management, 
accountants, and audit committees to enhance accountability for financial 
statements, internal controls, and compliance with law and regulation.162  
Through laws enacted in 1966, 1978, and 1989, Congress strengthened 
the authority of all of the federal banking agencies to take enforcement 
action against depository institutions and institution-affiliated parties.163   
 
159. Id. at § 301;  see generally WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 13.01[1]. 
160. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 206, 103 
Stat. at 201 (stating that, with certain exceptions, if the FDIC or FSLIC incurred a loss in 
connection with the default of an insured bank or thrift or in connection with providing 
assistance to a bank or thrift in danger of default, any other commonly controlled insured 
depository institution may be required to reimburse the FDIC for such loss). 
161. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2253.  Congress established mandatory and discretionary 
restrictions on any depository institution that fails to remain at least adequately capitalized.  
12 U.S.C. § 1831o(e)–(i) (2018).  The mandates become progressively more restrictive as 
capital levels decrease: (i) restricting discount window borrowing, (ii) requiring a capital 
restoration plan, (iii) prohibiting asset growth, acquisitions, new lines of business, (iv) 
restricting interest rates paid, (v) requiring election of new directors or dismissal of senior 
management, (vi) requiring divestitures, and (vii) prohibiting payments on subordinated debt.  
Id.  The agencies must issue a PCA directive to impose certain provisions on a significantly 
or critically undercapitalized bank.  Id.  The agencies may also issue a PCA directive to 
impose discretionary provisions on an undercapitalized bank.  Id. at § 1831o(f)(2).  Within 90 
days of a depository institution’s becoming critically undercapitalized, the agency must 
appoint a receiver, or take such other action that the agency, with the concurrence of the FDIC, 
determines would better serve the purposes of a PCA.  Id. § 1831o(h)(3).   
162. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, § 112, 105 Stat. at 
2242. 
163. Financial Institutions Supervisory Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-695, §§ 102,201, 80 
Stat. 1028, 1036, 1040, 1046, 1049 (authorizing federal banking regulators to issue cease and 
desist orders, remove any bank officer or director for breach of fiduciary duty, and suspend 
any officer or director charged with a felony involving dishonesty or breach of trust); 
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-630, 
§§ 103,107(b), 92 Stat. 3641, 3643, 3657 (authorizing assessment of civil money penalties 
against depository institutions and issuance of temporary cease and desist orders); Financial 
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9.  Uniform Accounting Rules and Tax Treatment Mandated 
The ninth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions was that Congress mandated that thrifts use the same 
accounting rules that applied to banks and eliminated favorable tax 
treatment of thrifts over banks.  With regard to accounting, Congress 
required thrifts to shift from Regulatory Accounting Principles to 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“GAAP”) to the same extent 
required of banks,164 mandated the phase-out of the inclusion of 
“supervisory goodwill” in the calculation of regulatory capital,165 and 
directed an end to the deferral of loan losses resulting from adverse 
changes in interest rates.166  With regard to federal income tax, Congress 
subjected thrifts to federal income tax in 1954.167  However, Congress 
allowed mutual thrifts to calculate reserves for bad debts in ways more 
favorable than the method required for banks.168  Congress gradually 
diminished the favorable treatment mutual thrifts enjoyed related to 
reserves for bad debts.169  The tax acts of 1969, 1976, and 1986 gradually 
diminished the impact of this tax advantage.170  In 1996, Congress totally 
eliminated the preferential tax treatment of thrifts.171   
 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 §§ 224, 902(a), 907, 913, 926, 
103 Stat. at 450, 451, 462, 483, 488 (requiring FDIC approval for less than adequately 
capitalized banks to accept brokered deposits, expanded authority to issue cease and desist 
orders to cover specific banking activities, authorized issuance of temporary orders to restrict 
an insured bank’s growth, authorized expedited  termination of deposit insurance coverage, 
established a three-tiered system for assessment of civil money penalties, and required federal 
banking agencies to publicly disclose enforcement actions). 
164. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 § 301, 103 
Stat. at 280. 
165. Id.  This action caused many more savings associations to fall out of compliance with 
capital standards and face closure.  WILLIAMS, supra note 102 § 1.03[4]. 
166. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, § 301, 103 
Stat. at 280.  The FHLBB started to allow the deferral of loan losses in 1981.  Treatment of 
Gains and Losses on the Sale or Other Disposition of Mortgage Assets, Mortgage-Related 
Securities; Republication of Reserve Requirements, 46 Fed. Reg. 50048 (Sept. 9, 1981) 
(codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563c.14 (1981)). 
167. Internal Revenue Code of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-591, § 11, 68A Stat. 3, 11. 
168. Id. at § 593, 68A Stat. at 205. 
169. Revenue Act of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-834, § 6, 76 Stat. 960, 977–78 (1962) (amending 
§ 593 of Internal Revenue Code of 1954);  see also Ronald W. Masulis, Changes in Ownership 
Structure; Conversions of Mutual Savings and Loans to Stock Charter, 18 J. OF FIN. ECON. 
29, 30 (1987). 
170. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 57, 83 Stat. 487, 581–82;  Tax Reform 
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 605, 90 Stat. 1520, 1575;  Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. 
L. No. 99-514, § 901, 100 Stat. 2085, 2375. 
171. Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, § 1616, 110 Stat. 
1755, 1854 (codified at 26 U.S.C. 593 (2018)).  Before this Act, thrifts could claim deductions 
for addition to a bad-debt reserve, using either the percentage of income method (deduct 
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10.  Ambiguous Institution Names Permitted 
The tenth reason for convergence in the regulation of depository 
institutions is the use of names by depository institutions that blur the 
distinctions between different types of depository institutions.  
Ambiguity arises from use of trade names, names of acquired institutions, 
and legal names that reflect an institution’s charter prior to conversion to 
another type of charter (e.g., use of the word “bank” for the name of a 
branch of a savings association).172  Additional ambiguity about the type 
of institution represented by a name arises from the use of the word 
“bank” in the legal name of thrift institutions (e.g., federal savings bank 
and state savings bank).173  Furthermore, the use of the word “bank” by 
ILCs dilutes the meaning of the word in the name of a depository 
institution (e.g., “industrial bank”).174   
11.  Institution Policy Changed 
Finally, the regulation of depository institutions has converged 
because expanded powers and revised assessments of risk and 
profitability by depository institutions have prompted changes in policies 
and entry into lines of business occupied by other depository institutions.  
In simplistic terms, national banks entered the market for residential 
 
against taxable income additions to bad-debt reserve equal to 8% of taxable income) or 
experience method (based on institution’s bad-debt experience over previous 6 years).  Prior 
to January 1, 1987, the percentage of taxable income limitation was 40%.  Banks with total 
assets over $500 million required to deduct bad-debts as they occurred using the specific 
charged-off method, while smaller banks allowed to use the experience method or the specific 
charge-off method.  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra note 86, at 3.  
172. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., SR-98-14, INTERAGENCY POLICY STATEMENT ON BRANCH 
NAMES (1998), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1998/SR9814.HTM 
[https://perma.cc/X8SP-RRWC] (permitting depository institution use of a different trade 
name for branches acquired from another institution so long as the institution takes steps to 
avoid customer confusion with respect to the extent of deposit insurance coverage).  Cf.  FED. 
FIN. INST. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, FFEIC 041, CONSOLIDATED REPORTS OF CONDITION AND 
INCOME FOR A BANK WITH DOMESTIC OFFICES ONLY 44 (2020), 
https://www.ffiec.gov/pdf/FFIEC_forms/FFIEC041_202012_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKN2-
ZUBJ] (“trade names other than the reporting institution’s legal title used to identify one or 
more of the institution’s physical offices at which deposits are accepted or solicited form the 
public, if any”). 
173. Donald I. Hovde, Eight Trends Shaping the Industry, 19 FED. HOME LOAN BANK J., 
May 1989, at 14. 
174. BARTH ET AL., ILCS: SUPPORTING AMERICA’S FINANCIAL SYSTEM 28, 77 app. 3 (2012);  
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138, at 25. 
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mortgage loans175  and consumer loans176 in the late 1920s and thrifts 
entered the market for commercial and consumer loans in the early 
1980s.177  
 
175. Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, §24, 38 Stat. 251, 273 (1913) (improved and 
unencumbered farmland);  McFadden Act, Pub. L. No. 69-639, § 16, 44 Stat. 1224, 1232 
(1927) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 371) (improved real estate).  In 1900, non-institutional lenders 
held almost 50% of the nonfarm residential mortgage debt, followed by mutual savings banks 
with approximately 22%, savings and loan associations with 13%, commercial banks with 
6%, and life insurance companies with 5%.  LEO GREBLER ET AL., CAPITAL FORMATION IN 
RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE 197 tbl. 54, 200 chart 23 (1956) (non-farm residential mortgage 
debt);  see also CARL F. BEHRENS, COMMERCIAL BANK ACTIVITIES IN URBAN MORTGAGE 
FINANCING 33, tbl. 4 (1952) (commercial banks held 18.2% of nonfarm mortgage debt in 
1949).  In 1913, state banks accounted for more than 95% of residential real estate loans held 
by all commercial banks, and such loans accounted for 16% of the total assets of state banks.  
After national banks obtained the authority to make loans secured by a first lien on improved 
real estate in 1927, national banks began to hold a larger portion of residential real estate loans 
relative to state banks.     
176. At the beginning of the twentieth century, banks rarely made consumer loans.   See 
supra section III.A.8.  Working people relied on industrial loan banks, finance companies, 
credit unions, pawn shops, loan sharks, and others for small loans to purchase goods or meet 
unexpected expenses.   CLARK, supra note 74, at 27–29.  However, banks saw profit 
opportunities in lending to consumers as the century progressed.  In 1928, the National City 
Bank of New York (predecessor of Citibank) opened a personal loan department to make 
loans unsecured by tangible property.  Id. at 9, 75.  More than 100 banks quickly opened 
similar departments.  Id.  By 1936, 685 banks operated personal loan departments.  NUGENT, 
supra note 74, at 342.  The consumer debt held by the personal loan departments grew from 
$17 million in 1928 to $131 million in 1936.  Id. at 343. 
177. In the 1980s, thrifts began to offer new deposit and loan products enabled by broader 
authorities granted by Congress.  Thrifts were authorized to extend their lending beyond 
financing residential real estate to lending for consumer, commercial, educational, and other 
purposes.  See, e.g., Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, 
Pub. L. No. 96-221, §§ 401,402, 94 Stat. 132, 153–155 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1461) 
(authorizing unsecured consumer loans to up 20% of assets, commercial real estate loans up 
to 20% of assets, residential construction loans up to 5% of assets, education loans up to 5% 
of assets, and community development loans up to 2% of assets);  Garn-St Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 325, 96 Stat. 1469, 1500 (codified 
at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (authorizing commercial loans up to 10% of assets);  Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 
Stat. 183, 287 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (authorizing unsecured consumer loans to up 
30% of assets);  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, Pub. L. 
No. 102-242, § 441(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2381 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1464) (unsecured 
consumer loans to up 35% of assets);  Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork 
Reduction Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2303, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-424 (codified at 
12 U.S.C. § 1464) (authorizing commercial loans up to 20% of assets).  Congress also 
authorized thrifts to offer the interest-bearing checking accounts and demand deposit 
accounts.  Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, § 303, 94 
Stat. at 146; Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, § 312, 96 Stat. at 1496.  
Unfortunately, the inexperience of thrifts with these new lines of business became a 
significant contributor to the failure of many institutions.   NAT’L COMM’N ON FIN. INST. 
REFORM, RECOVERY, AND ENF’T, supra note 113, at 2, 42 (“The S&L’s asset and liability 
powers were expanded sharply, and they were allowed to move rapidly into risky new areas 
2021] DIHC REGULATION 33 
C. Remaining Differences 
Small differences remain in the regulation of banks and thrifts 
related to banking system membership, intrastate branching, types of 
lending, and permissible activities.   
1.  FHLB System Membership Eligibility 
First, some differences in eligibility for bank system membership 
remain in place.  Savings associations are not eligible for membership in 
the FR System,178 but savings associations are eligible for membership 
FHLB System.179  However, savings associations are subject to stricter 
eligibility requirements than banks for membership in the FHLB System.  
A savings association must meet the QTL test to be eligible for and 
maintain membership in the FHLB System.180  More dramatically, an 
insured bank with average assets under $500 million may become a 
member of the FHLB System, regardless of its percent of assets in 
residential mortgages.181 
2.  Intrastate Branching Rights 
Second, there are differences in federal law applicable to 
branching by banks and thrifts.  Thrifts are permitted to establish 
 
of business in which they lacked expertise . . . .  [The FHLBB] allowed members . . . to enter 
risky areas in which they had little or no experience, and in which there was an unusual 
potential for abuse and fraud.”);  LAWRENCE J. WHITE, THE S&L DEBACLE: PUBLIC POLICY 
LESSONS FOR BANK AND THRIFT REGULATION 115, 117 (1991) (“The hundreds of rapidly 
growing thrifts of the 1982-1985 period did not use their new powers for prudent 
diversification.  Rather, these thrifts plunged into new assets and investments in ways that 
increased their risks, not decreased them . . . . [Insolvent thrifts] largely failed because of an 
amalgam of deliberately high-risk strategies, poor business judgments, foolish strategies, 
excessive optimism, and sloppy and careless underwriting, compounded by deteriorating real 
estate markets.” (emphasis in original)).   
178. 1 FED. RES. BULL. 212 (1915). 
179. Federal Home Loan Bank Act § 4(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1424. 
180. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1)(D)(ii)(I), (b).  The QTL test requires a savings association to 
have at least 65% of its total assets in residential real estate loans or investments.  However, 
an insured bank with $500 million or more in total assets must only hold 10% of its total assets 
in residential real estate loans and investments to continue to maintain its FHLB System 
membership.  12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1), (3)(C).  
181. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) §§ 602, 605, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1422(10), 1424(a)(1). 
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interstate and intrastate branches regardless of state law.182  While 
national and state banks may establish interstate branches, they are still 
limited to locations within a state where a locally chartered state bank 
would be permitted to establish a branch.183 
3.  Lending and Investment Limitations 
Third, there are differences in federal law related to lending.  To 
remain regulated as a federal savings association, the association must 
meet the QTL test or qualify as a domestic building and loan association 
under the Internal Revenue Code.184  While federal savings associations 
can engage in almost all of the types of lending authorized for national 
banks, they are subject to a percentage of total asset limitations.  For 
example, a bank may concentrate its overall lending in commercial real 
estate loans subject only to the management of risk consistent with safe 
and sound banking practices,185 but the commercial real estate loans made 
by a federal savings association are limited to 20% of its total assets.186  
4.  Permissible Activities 
Finally, there are minor differences in the permissible activities 
of banks and thrifts under federal law.  For instance, federal savings 
associations are authorized to engage in real estate brokerage, 
management, and development activities through service corporations.187 
National banks and their subsidiaries, however, are not authorized to 
 
182. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 6.02[2] (“Federal savings institutions have the 
statutory authority to branch nationwide, subject to few constraints.  The authority of the . . . 
OTS to permit interstate expansion by federal institutions derives from the agency’s ‘plenary 
authority’ with respect to federal institutions.”).  id.  (“[I]ntrastate restrictions on branching 
continue to apply to national banks, to the same extent as their state counterparts, and federal 
thrifts are not similarly constrained.”) 
183. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
§ 613(a), 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g)(1)(A), 1828(d)(4)(A)(i) (pertaining to national banks and state 
insured banks respectively);  see also 12 U.S.C. § 321 (pertaining to state member banks).   
184. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(m)(1), (m)(3)(C).  
185. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., SR 15-15, INTERAGENCY STATEMENT ON PRUDENT RISK 
MANAGEMENT FOR COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LENDING (2015). 
186. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(2)(A) (2018).  Similarly, a federal savings association’s 
consumer lending is limited to 35% of its total assets, construction lending is limited to 5% 
of total assets, and community development lending is limited to 2% of total assets.  12 U.S.C. 
§ 1464(c)(2)(D), (c)(3)(A), (c)(3)(C) (2018). 
187. 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c)(4)(B) (2018); 12 C.F.R. § 5.59 (2019). 
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engage in these activities.188  On the other hand, national banks and state 
banks may engage in certain financial activities through a financial 
subsidiary, while savings associations are not permitted to form financial 
subsidiaries.189     
D. Proposals to Eliminate the Thrift Charter 
The convergence in the regulation and activities of banks and 
thrifts prompted proposals for the elimination of the thrift charter.  In the 
late 1990s, Congress considered legislation to eliminate the federal 
savings association charter, but support for a separate thrift industry led 
to the preservation of the charter.190  In 2018, Congress granted the OCC 
the authority to permit certain federal savings associations to operate 
subject to the same investment and lending powers as a national bank 
without converting to a national bank.191  The authority results in a 
functional elimination of the thrift charter without requiring thrifts to 
change their form of organization.  Going further, at least two states have 
eliminated their thrift charters while adopting a universal charter for 
banks.192   
 
188. Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 624, 123 Stat. 524, 678 
(2009) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 1843 nt.);  see also Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. 
L. No. 106-102, § 121(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 1373 (1999) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 24a(a)(2)(B)(ii) 
(2018)). 
189. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 121(a), (d), 113 Stat. at 1373, 1380 
(authorizing a national bank or state bank to form a financial subsidiary).  Neither a national 
bank nor a state bank may engage in securities underwriting, insurance underwriting, or 
merchant banking through financial subsidiary. 
190. See, e.g., H.R. 2363, 104th Cong. § 201 (1995); H.R. 268, 105th Cong. § 502 (1997);  
see also Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., supra Note 86, at 1;  CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ELIMINATING 
THE THRIFT CHARTER (1997).  These discussions followed the thrift crisis of the 1980s and 
the transfer of responsibility for supervision of thrifts from the FHLBB to the OTS by 
FIRREA.  Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 301, 401, 103 Stat. 183, 278, 354 (1989) (codified at 12 
U.S.C. 1462a, 1437 nt.).   At the time of enactment of FIRREA, there was still congressional 
support for a separate thrift industry.  S. REP. NO. 101-19, at 3 (1989) (“[T]he Committee 
found most persuasive the testimony of those experts who concluded that good reasons to 
maintain a separate thrift industry still exist.  Essential to that conclusion, however, is the 
assumption that the thrift industry will continue to pay a distinct economic role, 
distinguishable from that fulfilled by the commercial banking industry, as the primary source 
of residential housing finance.”). 
191. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 115-
174, § 206, 132 Stat. 1296, 1310 (2018) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. 1464a);  see also Covered 
Savings Associations, 84 Fed. Reg. 23991 (May 24, 2019) (final regulation). 
192. See, e.g.,  OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1101.01(B) (2019);  WIS. STAT. § 222.0102 (2019);  
see also Kevin Allard, State Focus: Ohio, CSBS (Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.csbs.org/newsroom/state-focus-ohio [https://perma.cc/TQ3B-NBKE] (“[T]he 
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The advantages and disadvantages of proposals to eliminate the 
thrift charter are beyond the scope of this article.  However, the related 
issue of a unified statutory scheme for the regulation and supervision of 
DIHCs is taken up in the conclusion of this article.  The following review 
of differentiation and convergence in the regulation and supervision of 
DIHCs provides the foundation for the recommendation made in the 
conclusion that Congress unify regulation of all companies controlling an 
FDIC-insured depository institution in one statute of uniform application.  
IV.  DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE REGULATION OF 
DIHCS 
Generally, a company owning or controlling a bank is a BHC,193 
while a company owning or controlling a saving association is an 
SLHC.194  If a company owns or controls both a bank and a savings 
association, it is a BHC.195  A company owning or controlling a state 
savings bank is a BHC unless its subsidiary state savings bank files an 
election with the FDIC to be treated as a savings association.196  Then, 
the holding company is regulated as an SLHC rather than a BHC unless 
the company also controls another entity that is a “bank” under the 
BHCA.197  Companies owning or controlling a credit card bank, a non-
depository trust company, or an ILC are not subject to regulation as BHCs 
or SLHCs198 unless they also own or control a bank or thrift.199   
The activities permissible for a DIHC depend upon the type of 
holding company.  BHCs are prohibited from owning or controlling any 
company other than a bank or engaging in any business other than 
managing or controlling banks unless the activity fits within the 
exemptions specified in the BHCA, such as an activity “so closely related 
 
creation of a “universal” bank charter in the state . . . consolidate[es] the three existing charter 
types into one universal charter.  On Jan. 1, 2018, this new universal “state bank” charter 
became effective, encompassing Ohio-chartered banks, savings and loan associations (S&Ls) 
and savings banks.”). 
193. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (2018). 
194. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(a)(1)(D). 
195. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1). 
196. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(l). 
197. Id. § 1841(a)(1). 
198. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(D), (F), (H). 
199. Id. §§ 1467a(a)(1)(D), 1841(a)(1). 
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to banking or managing or controlling banks as to be a proper incident 
thereto.”200   
SLHCs that own or control more than one savings association are 
prohibited from engaging in any business activity other than exempt 
activities specified in the Home Owners’ Loan Act (“HOLA”).201  Certain 
SLHCs that own or control only one savings association not subject to 
the activities restrictions of HOLA if their subsidiary savings associations 
satisfy the requirements for a QTL.202  These SLHCs are called 
grandfathered unitary savings and loan holding companies 
(“GUSLHCs”).   
BHCs and SLHCs that become financial holding companies 
(“FHCs”) may engage in certain financial activities, as well as activities 
incidental or complementary to a financial activity.203  Financial activities 
include securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting and 
agency, merchant banking activities, activities previously determined by 
the FRB to be closely related to banking, and activities routine in 
connection with the transaction of banking abroad.204  The FRB may also 
determine that an activity is “complementary to a financial activity and 
does not pose a substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository 
institutions or the financial system generally."205 
The activities of a parent company of an industrial loan company 
are not limited by banking law or regulation because they are not BHCs 
or SLHCs under the BHCA or HOLA, respectively.206  Parent companies 
of ILCs are free to engage in commercial activities without the 
restrictions of the BHCA an HOLA applicable to BHCs and SLHCs, 
respectively.  ILCs have engaged in a variety of commercial activities, 
including automobile manufacturing, retail consumer sales, 
transportation, and energy production.207   The FDIC’s recent proposal 
 
200. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, § 4(a), (c)(6), 12 U.S.C. § 1843. 
201. Home Owners’ Loan Act § 2, 12 U.S.C. § 1730a. 
202. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)((3)(A). 
203. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 103(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k);  Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”) § 606(b), 12 U.S.C. § 
1467a(c). 
204. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(4).     
205. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B).     
206. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1462(2), 1813(b)(1), 1841(c)(2)(H). 
207. BARTH ET AL., supra note 174, at 16–17;  GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 
138, at 66. 
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regarding the supervision of the parent companies of ILCs would not 
limit them to financial or any other activities.208 
A. Growth in the Number of Holding Companies 
During the latter half of the twentieth century, banks and thrifts 
generally found it advantageous to form DIHCs.  The commonly cited 
reasons for the formation of holding companies include providing access 
to capital markets, facilitating acquisitions, expanding activities, and 
avoiding state franchise taxes.209  The following chart shows the growth 





Source: FRB Annual Reports, FFIEC, National Information Center 
 
Figure 1 shows the number of BHCs grew from 69 in 1956 to a 
high of 6,474 in 1988.210  In 1988, BHCs controlled 9,025 banks, which 
held 91% of the assets of all insured commercial banks.211  At the end of 
2019, there were 3,725 top-tier BHCs that controlled 3,827 banks, which 
 
208. See Parent Companies of Industrial Banks and Industrial Loan Companies, 85 Fed. 
Reg. 17771 (Mar. 31, 2020).   This proposal differs from the FDIC’s 2007 proposal, which 
limited the control of ILCs to financial companies and required a commitment from the parent 
company that it would only engage, directly or indirectly in financial activities.  Industrial 
Bank Subsidiaries of Financial Companies, 72 Fed. Reg. 5217, 5224 (Feb. 5, 2007).   
209. See, e.g.,  L. GARRETT DUTTON, JR. & WILLIAM R. COLMERY, FORMATION OF A BANK 
HOLDING COMPANY IN PENNSYLVANIA 2–12 (Packard Press, 1982). 
210. MARK B. GREENLEE, GROWTH OF BHCS (1957–2019), [https://perma.cc/8SH4-JKYB] 
(calculating the change in the number of BHCs based on information obtained from FRB 
annual reports, available at provided link);  1957 FRB ANN. REP. 71;  1988 FRB ANN. REP. 
169. 
211.  1988 FRB ANN. REP. 169. 
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held $23.1 trillion in total assets, which represented 94% of the assets of 















Source:  FFIEC, National Information Center 
     
Figure 2 shows the growth in the number of SLHCs from two in 
1968 to a high of 893 in 2008.213  In 2008, SLHCs controlled 479 savings 
associations with total assets of $767 billion, which represented 62% of 
all assets of savings associations.214  At the end of 2019, there were 187 
top-tier SLHCs that controlled 195 depository institutions, which held 
$1.86 trillion in total assets.215  Approximately 92% of SLHCs engaged 
primarily in depository activities.216  The other SLHCs engaged primarily 
 
212. 2019 FRB ANN. REP., 41, 44.   Any company with direct or indirect control of a bank 
is a BHC.  Many banking organizations use a tiered ownership structure.    A “top-tier” BHC 
is the ultimate parent of a banking organization.  
213. National Information Center, FED. FIN. INSTITUTIONS. EXAMINATION COUNCIL, 
[https://perma.cc/SRS3-FPQ4] (providing a copy of calculations based on data download 
accessible through link);  see also S. REP. NO. 86-810, at 4 (1959) (“At the time of the hearings 
on the Financial Institutions Act of 1957, only two of these companies were known -one 
controlling four associations in California, the other controlling two associations in Utah and 
Idaho.”).  
214. National Information Center, supra note 213.    
215. 2019 FRB ANN. REP. 41, 45.  There were 358 SLHCs at this time, 171 of which were 
subsidiaries of top-tier SLHCs.  Id.  Any company with direct or indirect control of a savings 
association is an SLHC.  Many thrift organizations use a tiered ownership structure.  A “top-
tier” SLHC is the ultimate parent of a banking organization. 
216. Id. at 41. 
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in nonbanking activities, such as insurance underwriting, securities 
brokerage, and commercial activities.217  
Many commercial companies formed or acquired an ILC during 
the latter half of the twentieth century.  The following figure shows the 





Source: James R. Barth, Tong Li, Apanard Angkinand, Yuan-Hsin Chiang, and Li Li, ILCs: 
Supporting America’s Financial System (Milliken Institute, 2012), Appendix 4. 
 
Figure 3 shows the growth of ILCs from one institution in 1910 
to a high of 254 institutions in 1966.  The total assets held by all ILCs 
was $408 million in 1966.  The number of ILCs declined to 130 by 1977, 
before increasing to 155 in 1983.  The total assets of ILCs reached an all-
time high of $270 billion in 2007, which were held by 94 ILCs.  In 2010, 
the number of ILCs declined to 78, which held $122 billion in total assets.  
At the end of 2019, there were 34 ILCs with $102.4 billion in total 
assets.218  
For most of the twentieth century, the regulation of BHCs, 
SLHCs, and parent companies of ILCs differed significantly.  As the 
twentieth century progressed, changes in public policy, market 
developments, and changes in law made the regulation of BHCs and 
SLHCs more and more similar.  The following sections of this article 
 
217. See id. 
218.  INDEP. COMTY. BANKS OF AMERICA, INDUSTRIAL LOAN COMPANIES: CLOSING THE 
LOOPHOLE TO AVERT CONSUMER AND SYSTEMIC HARM 13 (2019), 
https://www.icba.org/docs/default-source/icba/advocacy-documents/reports/ilc-white-
paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF4J-GQ5P].    
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summarize the areas of differentiation and convergence in the regulation 
of DIHCs. 
B. Differentiation 
Differentiation in the regulation of DIHCs arose from variations 
in:  (1) Congressional public policy objectives  related to holding 
company affiliations with other companies; (2) limitations on 
transactions with affiliates; (3) reporting, examination, and voting permit 
requirements; (4) permissible activities for holding companies; and 
(5) Congressional concern about the separation of banking and 
commerce.  
1.  Prohibitions on Affiliation with Securities Firms 
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent 
companies of ILCs arose partially due to variations in federal law related 
to bank affiliations with other companies.  In the early 1930s, Congress 
became concerned about the role of banks, their affiliates, and holding 
companies in stock speculation that contributed to the stock market crash 
of 1929.219  This concern led to provisions in the 1933 Act that prohibited 
affiliations between a member bank and affiliates of a member bank with 
securities firms,220 limited member bank transactions with affiliates,221 
required member banks to obtain reports from affiliates,222 and 
conditioned voting of member bank stock by a holding company on 
obtaining a permit from the FRB.223   
 
219. The Senate report in support of the 1933 Act identified “excessive use of bank credit 
in making loans for the purpose of stock speculation” as a source of the “panic of 1929.”  S. 
REP. NO. 73-77, at 9 (1933);  S. REP. NO. 72-584, at 9 (1932). The same Senate report viewed 
bank affiliates devoted to “perilous underwriting operations, stock speculation, and 
maintaining a market for the banks’ own stock” as a large factor contributing to the panic of 
1929.  S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 10.  Similarly, the House Report supported legislation to “prevent 
the undue diversion of funds into speculative operations” and recommended provisions 
“strengthening restrictions upon banks . . . making loans for speculative purposes.”  H. REP. 
NO. 73-150, at 1 (1933). 
220. Pub. L. No. 73-66, §§ 16, 20, 21, 32, 48 Stat. 162, 184, 188, 189, 194 (1933). 
221. Id. § 13, 48 Stat. at 183 (adding section 23A to the FR Act). 
222. Id. § 5(c), 48 Stat. at 165. 
223. Id. § 19, 48 Stat. at 186.  The FRB issued Regulation P to implement the voting permit 
provisions of the Banking Act of 1933.  See Fed. Reserve Bd., Regulation P, Series of 1933, 
Holding Company Affiliates –Voting Permits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 505 (1933). 
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The Glass-Steagall Act prohibited the affiliation of banking 
organizations and securities firms.  Section 20 of the 1933 Act prohibited 
affiliations between a member bank224 and any firm engaged principally 
in the underwriting of securities, as well as affiliations between such 
securities firms and shareholders of a member bank that owned or 
controlled a majority of the shares of such a bank or owned or controlled 
more than 50% of the number of shares voted for election of such bank’s 
directors.225  This brought many companies that owned or controlled a 
member bank within the scope of the prohibition.  However, Section 20 
did not apply to nonmember banks, savings associations, or the 
companies controlling them.226  Section 21 prohibited any person 
engaged in the underwriting of securities from receiving deposits.227  
Section 32 prohibited interlocking directors and management between a 
member bank and a securities firm.228   
2.  Limitations on Transactions with Affiliates 
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent 
companies of ILCs also arose due to variations in the limitations on 
affiliate transactions.  The 1933 Act added Section 23A to the FR Act, 
which limited (1) the aggregate amount of member bank transactions, 
such as loans and investments, with any one affiliate to 10%  of the 
member bank’s capital and surplus; and (2) member bank transactions 
with all affiliates to 20% of the member bank’s capital and surplus.229  
 
224. All national banks were automatically member banks and state-chartered banks could 
elect to become member banks.  Federal Reserve Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 
(1913).  
225. See Banking Act of 1933, § 2(c), 48 Stat. at 163. 
226. WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 11.01[1] (The G-S Act “did not and does not apply to 
thrifts for two reasons.  First, at the time it was enacted, thrifts were small, locally oriented 
institutions with a narrow focus on residential lending. . . .  Second, thrifts were entirely state-
chartered and supervised . . . .  And even though the subsequent enactment of HOLA provided 
for federal chartering of thrifts, they still were not thought of as ‘banks’ because of their 
limited powers and functions.”).  Sections 20 and 32 of the G-S Act applied to savings 
associations from August 10, 1987 to March 1, 1988.  Competitive Equality Amendments of 
1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 106, 101 Stat. 552, 576.  Even then, the statute set forth a number 
of exceptions to the prohibition related to specifically named entities and activities.  Id. 
227. Banking Act of 1933 § 21., 48 Stat. at 166, 189.  As originally enacted, only section 
21 of the G-S Act applied to nonmember banks and savings associations.  Section 21 did not 
apply to an ILC unless it received deposits rather than issued thrift certificates. 
228. Id. § 32, 48 Stat. at 194. 
229. Id. § 13, 48 Stat. at 183 (adding section 23A to the FR Act). 
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These limitations applied to member bank transactions with a holding 
company that owned or controlled a majority of the shares of the bank or 
owned or controlled more than 50% of the number of shares voted for 
election of the bank’s directors.230  These limitations did not apply to 
transactions between a nonmember state bank, SLHC, or parent company 
of an ILC.231  
For most of the twentieth century, the regulation of savings 
association transactions with affiliates differed significantly from the 
regulation of bank transactions with affiliates, because the 1933 Act did 
not govern savings association transactions with affiliates.  However, in 
1968, the SLHCA prohibited certain transactions between a savings 
association subsidiary of an SLHC and its affiliates, such as a parent 
SLHC and its other subsidiaries.232  The SLHCA also required regulatory 
approval for certain other transactions between a savings association 
subsidiary of an SLHC and its affiliates.233 
3.  Affiliate Reports, Examinations, and Voting Permits 
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent 
companies of ILCs also arose from variation in the applicability of 
reporting, examination, and voting permit requirements.  The 1933 Act 
enabled bank regulators to determine the relationships between member 
banks and their affiliates.  Member banks were required to provide the 
FRB with reports obtained from affiliates to fully disclose the relations 
between affiliates and the bank to enable the FRB to determine the effect 
of the relations upon the affairs of the bank.234  In addition, holding 
 
230. Id. 
231. As discussed in Section IV.C.3, section 23A became applicable to state nonmember 
banks, savings associations, and their affiliates.  Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 
12(c), 80 Stat. 236, 242 (applicable to state nonmember banks); Competitive Equality 
Amendments of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104(d), 101 Stat. 552, 573 (applicable to savings 
association transactions with affiliates engaged in activities permissible for a BHC);  Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 
Stat. 183, 342 (applicable to savings association transactions with all affiliates). 
232. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2, 
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1730a(e) (2018)) (amending section 408(d) of 
the National Housing Act).   
233. Id.  The FHLBB also adopted implementing regulations.  54 Fed. Reg. 49552 (Nov. 
20, 1989).  In 1976, the FHLBB also promulgated conflict rules applicable to transactions 
with “affiliated persons.”  41 Fed. Reg. 35811 (Feb. 24, 1976). 
234. Banking Act of 1933 §§ 5; 27, 48 Stat. at 165, 191. 
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company affiliates were required to obtain a permit from the FRB before 
voting any stock of a member bank that it owned or controlled.235  In 
applications for a voting permit, the FRB required the holding company 
affiliate to agree to certain conditions, such as submission of reports and 
consent to examination.236   
4.  Permissible Activities 
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and parent 
companies of ILCs arose from variation in permissible activities.  
Currently, the BHCA and HOLA restrict the activities of BHCs, SLHCs 
and their non-depository subsidiaries,237 but not the activities of 
GUSLHCs238 or the parent companies of ILCs.239  BHCs and SLHCs may 
not engage in any business or activity that is not authorized by statute, 
regulation, or order.  While there are substantial similarities in the 
activities permissible under the BHCA and SLHCA, there also are 
significant differences.240   
i.  Bank Holding Companies 
In 1956, the BHCA required registration of companies owning or 
controlling two or more banks as BHCs, prohibited a company from 
acquiring two or more banks without the prior approval of the FRB, and 
authorized the FRB to issue regulations, approve certain nonbanking 
activities, require reports, conduct examinations, and enforce law and 
regulation.241  With regard to activities, the BHCA prohibited a BHC 
from engaging in any business other than managing or controlling banks, 
 
235. Id. § 19, 48 Stat. at 186.  The FRB issued Regulation P to implement the voting permit 
provisions of the Banking Act of 1933.  Fed. Reserve Bd., Regulation P, Series of 1933, 
Holding Company Affiliates –Voting Permits, 19 FED. RES. BULL. 505 (1933). 
236. Banking Act of 1933 § 19, 48 Stat. at 186.  
237. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(c), 1843(a). 
238. Id. § 1467a(c)(3), (9)(C). 
239. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H). 
240. The similarities and differences changed over time.  In the following subsections a. 
and b., a similarity is the authority to originate loans secured by real estate, and a difference 
is SLHC authority to develop and manage real estate, which is not authorized by BHCs.   See 
Section IV.C.4. for current similarities and Section IV.D. for current differences in 
permissible activities.  
241. Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 3(a), 4(c)(6), 5(a)-(c), 70 Stat. 133, 134, 137 (1956). 
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unless it fit within an exemption.242  The exemptions included holding 
property used substantially in bank operations, acquiring shares of a 
company in good faith in a fiduciary capacity, acquiring up to 5% of the 
voting securities of any company, and engaging in activities approved by 
the FRB as “so closely related to banking as to be a proper incident 
thereto.”243  In the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 
(“1970 BHCA Amendments”), Congress brought one-bank holding 
companies within the scope of the BHCA’s registration, activity, 
approval, report, examination, and enforcement authority.244 
The activities permissible for BHCs expanded most significantly 
as the FRB interpreted its ability to authorize activities closely related to 
banking.  The FRB determined whether activities were “closely related-
activities" by order on a case-by-case basis after notice and hearing.245  In 
1971, the FRB began to set forth permissible closely-related activities in 
its Regulation Y.246  The activities listed in Regulation Y came to be 
 
242. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 
1843(a)).  The 1970 amendments to the BHCA simplified the closely related to banking 
exception to the BHCA’s generally prohibition on engaging in activities other than managing 
or controlling banks by eliminating the requirement that the FRB determine it was 
unnecessary to apply the nonbanking prohibitions of the BHCA in order to carry out the 
purposes of the act.  Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 
§ 103, 84 Stat. 1760, 1765 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(8)) (replacing section 4(c)(6) of 
the BHCA with section 4(c)(8) of BHCA). 
243. In connection with these activities, the FRB was also required to determine the activity 
was so closely related to banking “as to make it unnecessary for the [nonbanking prohibitions 
of the BHCA] to apply in order to carry out the purposes of [the BHCA].”  Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1956 § 4(b)(6), 70 Stat. at 137.  This requirement was eliminated in 1970.   
244. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 §§ 101, 103, 84 Stat. at 1760, 
1762–63. 
245. See, e.g., First Wisconsin Bancshares, Corp., 45 FED. RES. BULL. 1136 (1959) 
(approved operation of credit life insurance program in connection with bank loans);  Otto 
Bremer Co., 45 FED. RES. BULL. 892 (1959) (approved insurance agency activities provided 
the company ceased real estate activities);  Otto Bremer Co., 47 FED. RES. BULL. 23 (1961) 
(approved making and discounting agricultural loans);  Virginia Commonwealth Corp., 49 
FED. RES. BULL. 934 (1963) (approved insurance agency activities related to automobile 
insurance on collateral for bank loans and credit life insurance on bank borrowers);  Citicorp, 
63 FED. RES. BULL. 416 (1977) (money orders and travelers checks). 
246. After a notice, comment, and hearing process, the FRB amended its Regulation Y to 
include a list of closely-related-activities.  36 Fed. Reg. 10777 (Jun. 3, 1971) (codified at 12 
C.F.R. § 222.4(a) (1971)) (permitting activities including making loans, operating an 
industrial bank, servicing loans, trust company functions, investment and financial advisory 
services, leasing personal property, and community welfare investments).  The FRB 
continued to add to the list through further amendments to its Regulation Y.  See, e.g., 36 Fed. 
Reg. 11805, 11806 (Jun. 19, 1971) (permitting bookkeeping and data processing services for 
internal operations and performing payroll, accounts payable, or billing services);  37 Fed. 
Reg. 18520 (Sept. 13, 1972) (permitting underwriting insurance directly related to extension 
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known as the “laundry list” of permissible activities.247  By 1986, the FRB 
determined by regulation that twenty-four activities were closely related 
to banking248 and determined by order that additional activities were 
closely related to banking.249  During the 1980s, the FRB also issued 
many orders approving securities broker, advisory, private placement, 
and underwriting activities as closely related to banking.250   
 
of credit);  37 Fed. Reg. 26534 (Dec. 13, 1972) (permitting leasing real and personal property);  
38 Fed. Reg. 32126 (Nov. 21, 1973) (permitting courier services);  44 Fed. Reg. 12019 (1977) 
(permitting selling money orders, traveler’s checks, and savings bonds). 
247. During debate leading up to the enactment of the 1970 BHCA Amendments, the 
phrase “laundry list” referred to a proposed statutory list of prohibited activities, which 
ultimately did not become part of the BHCA.  See, e.g., One-Bank Holding Company 
Legislation of 1970: Hearings on S. 1052, S. 1211, S. 1664, S. 3823, and H.R. 6778 Before 
the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 186–87 (statement of William B. Camp, 
Comptroller of the Currency).  Later, the phrase was used to refer to the regulatory list of 
permissible activities set forth in the FRB’s Regulation Y.  See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 9290, 9302 
(Feb. 28, 1997) (“The list of nonbanking activities contained in Regulation Y (the “laundry 
list”) is intended to serve the purpose of providing a convenient and detailed list of most of 
the activities that the FRB has found to be closely related to banking and therefore permissible 
for bank holding companies.”). 
248. 51 Fed. Reg. 39994, 40000 (Nov. 4, 1986) (24 activities);  see also 51 Fed. Reg. 36211 
(Oct. 9, 1986);  54 Fed. Reg. 37301 (Sept. 8, 1989);  57 Fed. Reg. 20961 (May 18, 1992);  57 
Fed. Reg. 41387 (Sept. 10, 1992);  62 Fed. Reg. 9290 (Feb. 28, 1997). 
249. See, e.g., Citizens & Southern Holding Co., 57 FED. RES. BULL. 1037 (1971) 
(operating a pool reserve plan for loss reserves of banks for loans to small businesses);  
Northwest Bancorporation, 67 FED. RES. BULL. 804 (1981) (provide audit services for 
unaffiliated banks);  Barnett Banks of Florida, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 263 (1979) (providing 
retail check authorization and guarantee);  Hong Kong & Shanghai, 69 FED. RES. BULL. 221 
(1983) (offering informational, advisory, and transactional foreign exchange);  Citicorp, 72 
FED. RES. BULL. 497 (1986) (develop, produce, and sell software that allows customers to 
conduct banking transactions). 
250. See, e.g., Bank of America Corp., 69 FED. RES. BULL. 105 (1983) (discount securities 
brokerage services);  NatWest Holdings, Inc., 72 FED. RES. BULL. 584 (1986) (adding 
investment advice in combination with brokerage services through a nonbank subsidiary);  
Bankers Trust New York Corp., 73 FED. RES. BULL. 138 (1987) (adding private placements of 
commercial paper through a nonbank affiliate);  The Chase Manhattan Corp., 73 FED. RES. 
BULL. 367 (1987) (adding underwriting and dealing in securities that a member bank may not 
underwrite or deal in directly);  Citicorp, 73 FED. RES. BULL. 473 (1987) (adding underwrite 
and dealing in commercial paper, municipal revenue bonds, and mortgage back-securities);  
Chemical New York Corp., 87 FED. RES. BULL. 731 (1987) (adding underwrite and dealing in 
consumer receivables);  Bankers Trust New York Corp., 75 FED. RES. BULL. 829 (1989) 
(adding private placement of commercial paper). Many of these determinations were 
challenged in court.  See, e.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
468 U.S. 207, 216–21 (1984) (holding that affiliation between a BHC and discount broker 
does not violate the G-S Act);  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve 
Sys., 821 F.2d 810, 811 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied 484 U.S. 1005 (1988) (holding that 
BHC subsidiary providing brokerage services and investment advice did not violate the G-S 
Act);  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 807 F.2d 1052, 1055, 1062 (D.C. Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied 107 S.Ct. 3328 (1987) (holding that BHC subsidiary placement of commercial 
paper did not violate the G-S Act);  Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Bd. of Governors, 839 F.2d 47 (2d 
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In 1997, the FRB reorganized its laundry list of permissible 
activities, dividing them into the following fourteen groups of 
functionally related activities: 
 
i. Extending credit and servicing loans; 
ii. Activities related to extending credit; 
iii. Leasing personal or real property; 
iv. Operating non-bank depository institutions; 
v. Trust company functions;  
vi. Financial and investment advisory activities;  
vii. Agency transactional services for customers; 
viii. Securities investment transactions as principal;  
ix. Management consulting and counseling 
activities for unaffiliated depository 
institutions;  
x. Support services, such as check courier, 
printing, and encoding; 
xi. Insurance agency, underwriting credit 
insurance, and sale of insurance in small towns; 
xii. Community development activities;  
xiii. Issuance and retail sale of money orders, 
savings bonds, and traveler’s checks; and 
xiv. Data processing, storage, transmission, and 
facilities for financial, banking, or economic 
data.251 
 
The FRB continued to approve by order other activities as closely related 
to banking.252   
 
Cir. 1987) (holding that BHC subsidiary underwriting and dealing in municipal revenue 
bonds, mortgage-related securities, and commercial paper did not violate the G-S Act). 
251. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28 (1998). 
252. See, e.g., Popular, Inc., 84 FED. RES. BULL. 481 (1998) (adding government 
services, including postage stamps, public transportation tickets, vehicle registration, and 
notary public services, and incidental services, such as mailboxes, photocopying, and 
facsimiles);  Dresdner Bank AG, 84 FED. RES. BULL. 361 (1998) (acting as commodity pool 
operator for private investment vehicles acting as commodity pool operator for private 
investment vehicles);  Compagnie Financiére de Paribas, 82 FED. RES. BULL. 348 (1996) 
(providing fraud detection services in connection with billing services). 
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ii.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies 
In 1968, the SHLCA prohibited a company that owned or 
controlled two or more savings associations from commencing or 
continuing any business activity other than those permitted by specific 
exemptions.  Permissible actions include furnishing management 
services for a subsidiary, conducting insurance agency business, acting 
as a trustee under a deed of trust, and engaging in activities approved or 
prescribed by FSLIC regulation “as being a proper incident to the 
operations of insured institutions and not detrimental to the interests of 
savings account holders.”253  The FSLIC, and subsequently the FHLBB, 
interpreted its authority to approve activities related to the operations of 
insured institutions through the issuance of regulations.  By March 5, 
1987, the list of related activities prescribed by regulations included the 
following:  
 
i. Originating, selling, and servicing real estate, 
educational, and consumer loans; 
ii. Clerical accounting and internal services 
primarily for affiliates; 
iii. Services primarily for affiliates and other 
SLHCs; 
iv. Acquisition of unimproved real estate; 
v. Development of unimproved real estate; 
vi. Acquisition of improved real estate; 
vii. Development of improved real estate; 
viii. Real estate management; 
ix. Insurance underwriting; 
x. Tax preparation; 
xi. Coin purchases and sales; and 
xii. Any services or activities approved by order of 
the FSLIC.254  
 
 
253. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2, 
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968).   
254. 12 C.F.R. § 584.2-1(b) (1987). 
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At that point in time, the most significant activities permissible 
for an SLHC but not a BHC were (1) real estate acquisition, development, 
and management activities;255 (2) insurance agency activities;256 (3) 
insurance underwriting;257 and (4) travel agency activities.258    
5.  Separation of Banking and Commerce 
Differentiation in the regulation of BHCs, SLHCs, and the parent 
companies of ILCs arose from varying degrees of Congressional concern 
about the separation of banking and commerce.  Congress imposed more 
restrictions on BHCs participating in commercial activities than it 
imposed on SLHCs and left the parent companies of ILCs free to engage 
in commercial activities. 
i.  Bank Holding Companies  
In 1956, the BHCA separated banking from commerce by 
prohibiting a company controlling multiple banks from engaging in any 
activity other managing or controlling banks unless it fit within an 
exemption, such as an activity closely related to banking.259  The BHCA 
 
255. See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 543 (Jan 7, 1987) (real estate investment);  UB Financial Corp., 
58 FED. RES. BULL. 428, 429 (1972), First Security Corp., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 325 (1975);  
Boatmen’s Bancshares, Inc., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 427, 428 (1972) (real estate brokerage);  
Regulation Y Interpretation, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 571 (1972), Bank Holding Companies: 
Property Management Services, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 652 (1972);  Activities Not Closely 
Related to Banking, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 905 (1972);  Regulation Y Interpretation, 58 FED. 
RES. BULL. 652, Activities Not Closely Related to Banking, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 905 (1972);  
United Missouri Bancshares, Inc., 64 FED. RES. BULL. 415, fn. 1 (1978) (property 
management). 
256. United Carolina Bancshares, 60 FED. RES. BULL. 678 (1974);  Fidelity Corp. of 
Pennsylvania, 59 FED. RES. BULL. 472 (1973) (denying sale of term credit life insurance). 
257. Activities Not Closely Related to Banking, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 905 (1972) (FRB 
denied underwriting general life insurance not related to an extension of credit);  Bank 
Holding Companies Activities Decision, 60 FED. RES. BULL. 681 (1974);  Bank Holding 
Companies, Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding Companies, 60 FED. RES. BULL. 727 
(1974) (FRB denied underwriting mortgage guaranty insurance);  Bank of America, 66 FED. 
RES. BULL. 660 (1980) (FRB denied underwriting home loan life mortgage insurance);  NCNB 
Corporation, 64 Fed. Res. Bull. 506 (1878) (FRB denied underwriting property and casualty 
insurance). 
258. Nonbanking Activities of Bank Holding Companies; Operation of a Travel Agency, 
62 FED. RES. BULL. 148 (1976) (impermissible for a BHC). 
259. Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 2, 4, 70 Stat. 133, 133, 135 (1956).  
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required divestiture of nonbanking activities within two years.260   
Congress reaffirmed its support for the separation of banks and commerce 
in the 1970 BHCA Amendments, which brought one-bank holding 
companies within the scope of regulation as a BHC.261  This required a 
company controlling one bank to divest of impermissible commercial 
activities or the bank by December 31, 1980.262   
ii.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies 
Congressional concern with the separation of banking and 
commerce with respect to SLHCs has lagged behind congressional 
concern with respect to BHCs.  While Congress passed the Spence Act 
in 1959 to temporarily halt the acquisition of two or more savings 
associations by any company, the Spence Act did not limit the activities 
of the parent companies of savings associations, nor did it require any 
divestiture.263  In 1968, Congress took action to comprehensively regulate 
companies controlling multiple savings associations in the SLHCA, 
which required divestiture of unrelated activities within two years.264  
Still, the SLHCA allowed for greater blending of banking and commerce 
than the BHCA because the SLHCA did not prohibit unitary SLHCs—
those controlling only one insured institution—from engaging in 
unrelated activities, including commercial activities.  The lack of concern 
with maintaining the separation of SLHCs from commerce may arise 
from the fact that subsidiary savings associations did not take demand 
deposits or make commercial loans.265 
 
260. Id. § 4(a)(2), 70 Stat. at 135 (requiring divestiture within two years or as of the date 
of becoming a BHC). 
261. Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760, 1762 (1970). 
262. One-bank holding companies had until December 31, 1980 to conform their activities 
to the BHCA.  Id. § 103, 84 Stat. at 1762–63;  see generally HELLER, supra note 114, at 182–
203 (describing “Grandfather” exemptions for one-bank holding companies). 
263. Pub. L. No. 86-374, 73 Stat. 691 (1959);  S. REP. NO. 86-810, at 1 (1959) (“The bill . 
. . would not require an existing holding company to divest itself of an insured association it 
now controls.  But the company could not acquire control of any additional insured 
association.”). 
264. Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2, 82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (requiring divestiture within two years 
or 180 days after becoming an SLHC). 
265. See WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 11.01[1] (The G-S Act “did not and does not apply 
to thrifts for two reasons.  First, at the time it was enacted, thrifts were small, locally oriented 
institutions with a narrow focus on residential lending . . . .  Second, thrifts were entirely state-
chartered and supervised . . . . And even though the subsequent enactment of HOLA provided 
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iii.  Parent Companies of ILCs 
Generally, the regulation of the commercial activities of parent 
companies of ILCs has remained outside the scope of the activity 
restrictions applicable to BHCs and SLHCs.  As originally enacted, and 
amended by the 1970 BHCA Amendments, ILCs did not fit the definition 
of a bank and the parent companies of ILCs were not BHCs subject to the 
activity restrictions of the BHCA.266  The Competitive Equality Banking 
Act of 1987 (“CEBA”) amended the BHCA’s definition of a “bank” to 
include an insured bank as defined by the Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
(“FDIA”).  This action brought ILCs within the definition of a bank 
unless they satisfy at least one of the following conditions:  (1) the 
institution does not accept deposits, (2) the institution’s total assets are 
less than $100 million, or (3) control of the institution has not been 
acquired by any company after August 10, 1987.  This left qualifying 
parent holding companies of ILCs free to engage in commercial 
activities.267  In 1999, GLBA did not alter the exclusion of the parent 
companies of ILCs from regulation as BHCs.268   
In 2005, Walmart and Home Depot filed applications with the 
Utah Department of Financial Institutions (“UDFI”) and FDIC to acquire 
ILCs.269  These filings ignited a storm of controversy.  The FDIC imposed 
a moratorium on the acceptance of new applications for deposit insurance 
and solicited public comment on commercial ownership and regulation 
of ILCs.270  Walmart and Home Depot eventually withdrew their 
applications because of overwhelming opposition from lawmakers, 
 
for federal chartering of thrifts, they . . . were not thought of as ‘banks’ because of their limited 
powers and functions.”). 
266. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 2, 70 Stat. 133;  Bank 
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 101, 84 Stat. 1760, 1762. 
267. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 101, 101 Stat. 552, 
554 (amending § 2(c)(2)(H) of the BHCA). 
268. N. ERIC WEISS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32767, INDUSTRIAL LOAN 
COMPANIES/BANKS AND THE SEPARATION OF BANKING AND COMMERCE: LEGISLATIVE AND 
REGULATORY PERSPECTIVES 6 (2008) (“GLBA did not disturb the exemption of ILCs and their 
owners from Fed supervision.”). 
269. Michelle Clark Neely, Industrial Loan Companies Come Out of the Shadows, 
REGIONAL ECONOMIST, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS, July 2007, at 6. 
270. Moratorium on Certain Industrial Loan Company Applications and Notices, 71 Fed. 
Reg. 43482 (Aug. 1, 2006);  72 Fed. Reg. 5290 (Feb. 5, 2007);  72 Fed. Reg. 5217 (Feb. 5, 
2007). 
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banking industry officials, and watchdog groups.271  In 2010, the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-
Frank Act”) imposed a three-year moratorium on approving FDIC 
deposit insurance for new ILCs that would be owned or controlled by a 
commercial firm and on the transfer of ownership of an ILC to a 
commercial firm.272  
Between 2011 and 2016, the FDIC received no new applications 
to insure industrial loan companies.273  In 2017, Square, Inc. (“Square”), 
a provider of payment services to small businesses, submitted 
applications to the FDIC and UDFI.274  Square subsequently withdrew its 
FDIC application, before re-filed in 2018.275  Nelnet, Inc. (“Nelnet”), a 
student loan processor, also filed applications with the FDIC and UDFI 
in 2018276 and plans to begin originating educational and consumer loans.  
In 2020, the UDFI and FDIC approved ILC applications from Square and 
Nelnet.277   
At the same time, the FDIC published notice of a proposed 
rulemaking regarding its supervision of the parent companies of ILCs.278  
Historically, the FDIC has exercised authority over the parent companies 
of ILCs through written agreements entered into as a condition of FDIC 
 
271. Eric Dash, Wal-Mart Abandons Bank Plans, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2007, at C1;  Joe 
Adler, ILC Debate’s New Twist: Home Depot Drops its Bid, 173 AM. BANKER, Jan. 25, 2008, 
at 1. 
272. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
§ 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1597 (2010).  The moratorium expired on July 21, 2013.   
273. Oversight of the FDIC Application Process: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on 
Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 140th Cong. 12 (2016) (statement of Martin J. Gruenberg, 
Chairman, FDIC). 




275.See Application Status, UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTITUTIONS, 
https://dfi.utah.gov/general-information/application-status/ [https://perma.cc/V2GA-X93W] 
(last updated Dec. 14, 2020);  Christine A. Edwards & Julius L. Loeser, Winston & Strawn 
LLP, Public Comments on ILC Application by Square Financial, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 1, 2019), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=508a6bd9-3c2f-49ef-a061-9fc36a60dc90 
[https://perma.cc/2DMQ-9VYG]. 
276. Sullivan, supra note 274. 
277. Id.   
278. Parent Companies of Industrial Banks and Industrial Loan Companies, 85 Fed. Reg. 
17771 (Mar. 31, 2020);  see also Press Release, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Release No. 137-
2020, FDIC Approves Rule to Ensure Safety and Soundness of Industrial Banks (Dec. 15, 
2020) (final rule), https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2020/pr20137.html 
[https://perma.cc/3AT2-2BW7]. 
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approval.  The proposed rule would formalize past FDIC practice, 
requiring parent companies of ILC applicants to agree to commitments 
related to: (1) subsidiary information; (2) consent to examination; (3) 
annual reports; (4) maintenance of records; (5) independent audit; (6) 
limitation on BODs representation; (7) maintenance of capital and 
liquidity; and (8) execution of a tax allocation agreement.   It would also 
require ILCs controlled by a parent company to obtain prior written 
approval for material changes in business plan, changes in directors and 
senior officers, and entering into service contracts with specified entities. 
In 2016, the FRB recommended Congress place the parent 
companies of ILCs under its supervision.279  The reasons cited by the FRB 
included maintaining the separation of banking and commerce, leveling 
the competitive and regulatory playing field for entities controlling an 
insured depository institution, and mitigating the risks to the federal 
safety net by imposing consolidated supervision on the parent companies 
of ILCs.280 
ILCs remain the subject of debate because they continue to offer 
commercial firms the ability to own or control an FDIC-insured 
institution without regulation as a BHC or SLHC.281  Proponents of these 
exemptions point to lack of ILC failures and diversification of risk in 
support of continuing exemption of ILCs from regulation as BHCs or 
SLHCs.282  Opponents point to unfair competitive advantage and 
systemic risks that could result from the formation of additional ILCs.283 
 
279. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., REPORT TO THE CONGRESS AND THE FINANCIAL STABILITY 
OVERSIGHT COUNCIL PURSUANT TO SECTION 620 OF THE DODD-FRANK ACT 28 (2016), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20160908a1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6CJU-TNPH]. 
280. Id. at 32–35. 
281. 12 U.S.C §§ 1467a(a)(1)(A), 1842(c) (2018) (ILCs outside the definitions of savings 
association in HOLA and bank in BHCA).  
282. See Peter J. Wallison, Why Are We Still Separating Banking and Commerce? 182 AM. 
BANKER, July 27, 2017, at 1 (“Gramm-Leach-Bliley allowed BHCs to enter various 
nonbanking fields . . . .); see also Keith A. Noreika, Acting Comptroller of the Currency, 
Innovation and Financial Technology: Rethinking the Banking & Commerce Split, Remarks 
to the Utah Association of Financial Services and the National Association of Industrial 
Bankers 7–8 (Aug. 17, 2018)  (“Arguments that this separation makes banks safer ignore the 
benefits that banking institutions gain from diversification . . . .”). 
283. INDEP. COMTY. BANKS OF AMERICA, supra note 218, at 3–4; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., 
Beware of the Return of the ILC, 182 AM. BANKER, Aug. 2, 2017, at 1. 
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C. Convergence 
Convergence in the regulation of DIHCs arose from the common 
objectives of the BHCA and SLHCA to:  (1) preserve competition and 
prevent concentration, as well as subsequent laws; (2) equalize and then 
eliminate the prohibitions on affiliations with securities firms; (3) extend 
limitations on transactions with affiliates to savings associations 
transactions with SLHCs and their affiliates; (4) establish substantial 
parity regarding permissible activities for BHCs and SLHCs; (5) increase 
consistency related to the separation of banking and commerce; and (6) 
require SLHCs to maintain capital on a consolidated basis not lower than 
requirements in effect for insured depository institutions. 
1.  Competition Preserved and Concentration Prevented 
First, Congress sought to preserve competition and prevent 
concentration of banking control.  In the 1950s, Congressional reports 
connected with legislation to regulate bank holding companies cited 
concern with preserving bank competition and minimizing concentration 
of economic power among the reasons for further regulation of BHCs.284  
In 1956, Congress enacted the BHCA, which regulated companies 
controlling two or more banks.285  The FRB was required to consider 
whether a proposed merger or acquisition would be consistent with the 
“preservation of competition in the field of banking.”286  The House 
report supporting the legislation expressed concern with further 
 
284. The proposed Bank Holding Company Act of 1947 declared it to be the express policy 
of Congress to “control the creation and expansion of bank holding companies; to separate 
their business of managing and controlling banks from unrelated businesses, and generally 
maintain competition among banks and to minimize the danger inherit in concentration of 
economic power through centralized control of banks.”  S. 829, 80th Cong. § 2 (1947) 
(emphasis added).  The Senate Report in support of the act noted that “loopholes and 
deficiencies” in the Banking Act of 1933 had “nullified” its basic purpose and called for new 
legislation to guard against the use of holding companies to “evade traditional limitations 
upon bank expansion” and “gather under one management many different and varied 
enterprises wholly unrelated to the conduct of the banking business.”  S. REP. NO. 80-300, at 
1–2 (1947). The Senate Report also noted that “the administrative agencies must take into 
account the national policy against restraints of trade and commerce and the undue 
concentration of economic power and in favor of the maintenance of competition in the field 
of banking” when approving or disapproving the creation or expansion of bank holding 
companies.  Id. at 6. 
285. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 2, 3(a), 70 Stat. 133, 
133–34. 
286. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 3(c), 70 Stat. at 135. 
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“concentration of credit,” “monopolistic control of credit,” and 
“concentration of banking control in fewer and fewer hands.”287  The 
Senate report supporting the legislation noted the need for “adequate 
safeguards against undue concentration of control of banking activities” 
and avoidance of “dangers accompanying monopoly in this field.”288   
In 1966, Congress required the FRB to apply a balancing test in 
assessing the competitive impact of a proposed acquisition.  The BHCA 
was amended to prohibit the FRB from approving any acquisition that 
would result in a monopoly, or which may substantially lessen 
competition, unless the anticompetitive effects of the proposed 
acquisition are clearly outweighed by the convenience and needs of the 
community.289  
Congress took a similar approach to the regulation of SLHCs.  In 
1959, the House report in support of legislation temporarily halting the 
acquisition of saving and loan associations by companies cited desires to 
“preserve the traditional pattern of independent, locally managed savings 
and loan associations” and to “prevent undue concentration of economic 
control through the holding company device” among the reasons for the 
legislation.290  In 1968, Congress enacted the SLHCA, which established 
a comprehensive framework for the regulation of companies controlling 
one or more savings associations.291  The SLHCA required the FSLIC to 
consider factors identical to the factors contained in the amended 
standards embodied in the BHCA and Bank Merger Act (“BMA”) for 
 
287. H. REP. NO. 84-609, at 2 (1955).  The report also noted the “threat” to the “democratic 
ideal” of “the independent unit bank as an institution having its ownership and origin in the 
local community.”  Id.  
288. S. REP. NO. 84-1095, pt. 1, at 1 (1955);  see also S. REP. NO. 84-1095, pt. 2, at 1 (1956). 
289. Act of July 1, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-485, § 7(c), 80 Stat. 236, 237-38.  The amendment 
prohibited the FRB from approving any acquisition, merger, or consolidation that “would 
result in a monopoly, or which would be in furtherance of any combination or conspiracy to 
monopolize or to attempt to monopolize the business of banking.”  Id. In addition, the FRB 
was prohibited from approving a proposed transaction whose effect may be “substantially to 
lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, or which in any manner would be in restraint 
of trade, unless it finds that the anticompetitive effects of the proposed transaction are clearly 
outweighed in the public interest by the probable effect of the transaction in meeting the 
convenience and needs of the community to be served.”  Id. 
290. H. REP. NO. 86-679, at 2–3 (1959). 
291. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 
Stat. 5 (1968);  H. REP. NO. 90-997, at 2 (1967) (“The purpose of H.R. 8696 . . . is to provide 
a comprehensive statutory framework for the registration, examination, and regulation of 
holding companies controlling one or more savings and loan associations. . . .”). 
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approval of mergers and acquisitions.292  The SLHCA similarly 
prohibited the FSLIC from approving any acquisitions which would 
result in a monopoly or which may substantially lessen competition, 
unless the anticompetitive effects of the proposed acquisition are clearly 
outweighed by the convenience and needs of the community.293   
2.  Affiliation Prohibitions Equalized and then Eliminated 
Second, Congress equalized and then eliminated the prohibitions 
on bank affiliations with securities firms.  In 1987, Congress temporarily 
extended the applicability of the prohibition to member bank affiliations 
with securities firms engaged principally in underwriting securities and 
also the prohibition on director and management interlocks between a 
member bank and a securities firm extended the prohibition to 
nonmember banks and savings associations.294  These prohibitions also 
restricted the affiliation and interlocks of BHCs and SLHCs with 
securities firms.295  The extension of these prohibitions to savings 
associations expired in 1988.  In 1999, the GLBA repealed the 
prohibitions on affiliation and interlocks between banks and securities 
firms.296  With the transfer of responsibility for the regulation of SLHCs 
 
292. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 § 2, 82 Stat. at 10–11 
(amending section 408(e)(2) of the National Housing Act); S. REP. NO. 90-354, at 8 (1967) 
(“In providing standards for approving mergers and acquisitions, the committee has inserted 
language identical to the comparable standards contained in the Bank Holding Company Act 
and Bank Merger Act.”). 
293. Id. (amending section 408(e)(2) of the National Housing Act).  “No acquisition shall 
be approved . . . which will . . . substantially lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly, 
or which in any manner would be in restraint of trade, unless it found that the anticompetitive 
effects of the proposed acquisition are clearly outweighed in the public interest by the 
probable effect of the acquisition in meeting the convenience and needs of the community to 
be served.”  Id. 
294. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, §§ 103, 106, 101 
Stat. 552, 566, 576.  An exemption provided for affiliations between savings associations and 
firms principally engaged in the sale or underwriting of mortgage-backed securities, real 
estate partnerships, insurance products deemed to be securities, mutual funds, and securities 
whose sale or underwriting was permitted for national banks.  Id. 
295. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 § 106, 101 Stat. at 576–77.  CEBA 
temporarily applied sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Act to insured savings associations until 
March 1, 1988.   
296. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1341 (1999) (repealing sections 20 and 32 of the 1933 Act).  A FDIC policy statement 
expressed the opinion that Glass-Steagall Act does not prohibit a nonmember bank from 
establishing an affiliate relationship with a bona fide subsidiary engaged in securities 
activities.  The statement also stated that section 21 applied to nonmember banks, prohibiting 
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from the Office of Thrift Supervision (“OTS”) to the FRB in 2011, banks, 
savings associations, and their affiliates are on equal footing regarding 
affiliations with securities firms.297 
3.  Limitations on Transactions with Affiliates Extended 
Third, Congress extended the limitations on bank transactions 
with affiliates to savings association transactions with affiliates.  In 1987, 
CEBA made Section 23A, and the newly enacted Section 23B, applicable 
to transactions between a savings association subsidiary of an SLHC and 
its parent holding company or other affiliates solely engaged in activities 
permissible for a BHC.298  Other transactions between a saving 
association subsidiary of an SLHC and affiliates remained subject to 
affiliate transaction rules specified by the SLHCA.299  The Financial 
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
(“FIRREA”) repealed the CEBA approach to affiliate transactions.300  
FIRREA fully subjected all savings association transactions with 
affiliates to the same limitations on transactions with affiliates as were 
applicable to banks.301  The OTS issued implementing regulations in 
1991.302  At the time, the FRB had not exercised its authority to issue 
regulations implementing Sections 23A and 23B.  In 2002, the FRB 
issued Regulation W implementing Sections 23A and 23B for member 
banks.303  In 2002, the OTS revised its rules on savings association 
transactions with affiliates to conform to Regulation W.304 
 
affiliations between securities underwriting firms and entities engaged to any extent in 
business of receiving deposits, but did not apply to nonmember bank subsidiaries or affiliates.  
Statement of Policy on Applicability of Glass-Steagall Act to Securities Activities of 
Subsidiaries of Insured Nonmember Banks, 47 Fed. Reg. 38984 (Sept. 3, 1982). 
297.  See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”), § 603, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (Jul. 21, 2010); see also WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 
11.01[3] (“With the transfer of SLHC regulation to the Federal Reserve, it may be expected 
that securities firms seeking to own thrifts will be treated substantially like bank holding 
companies.”). 
298. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 §§ 102(a), 104(d), 101 Stat. at 564, 573.  
299. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2, 
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (adding § 408(d) to National Housing Act). 
300. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, § 407, 103 Stat. 183, 363.   
301. Id. § 301, 103 Stat. at 342;  see also WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 13.01[1] 
(discussing the addition of subsections 408(p) and (t) to the National Housing Act).   
302. 56 Fed. Reg. 34005 (Jul. 25, 1991). 
303. 67 Fed. Reg. 76560 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
304. 68 Fed. Reg. 57790 (Oct. 7, 2003);  see also  WILLIAMS, supra note 102, at § 13.01[2]. 
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4.  Substantial Parity Regarding Permissible Activities 
Fourth, Congress established substantial parity regarding the 
activities permissible for BHCs and SLHCs.  In 1987, CEBA authorized 
an SLHC to engage in any activity that the FRB determined by regulation 
to be permissible for BHCs under Section 4(c) of the BHCA.305  In 1999, 
the GLBA authorized BHCs and SLHCs that become FHCs to engage in 
certain financial activities, as well as activities incidental or 
complementary to a financial activity.306  Financial activities include 
securities underwriting and dealing, insurance underwriting and agency, 
merchant banking activities, activities previously determined by the FRB 
to be closely related to banking, and activities usual in connection with 
the transaction of banking abroad.307  The FRB may also determine that 
an activity is “complementary to a financial activity and does not pose a 
 
305. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104(b), 101 Stat. 
552, 568.  The FHLBB limited activities permissible pursuant to this authority to activities 
permitted for BHCs under regulations implementing section 4(c)(8) of the BHCA.  53 Fed. 
Reg. 312, 319 (Jan. 6, 1988);  see also 72 Fed. Reg. 14246, 12247, fn. 9 (Mar. 27, 2007).  In 
2007, the OTS expanded the permissible activities of SLHCs to all section 4(c) activities.  72 
Fed. Reg. 72235 (Dec. 20, 2007). 
306. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 103(a), 113 Stat. 1338, 
1342 (1999);  see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-
Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 103(a), 606(b) (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 
1467a(c), 1843(k)).    The GLBA also added section 10(c)(9) to HOLA, which limited the 
activities of a new or existing company acquiring control of a savings association after May 
4, 1999 to activities permitted for a financial holding company under section 4(k) of the 
BHCA.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 401(a), 113 Stat. at 1435.  The OTS read 
section 10(c)(9) as an affirmative grant of authority for SLHCs to engage in 4(k) activities 
without satisfying qualification requirements applicable to BHCs to become FHCs or 
providing any notice to the OTS.  76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56510 (Sept. 11, 2011).  Section 606(b) 
of the Dodd-Frank Act added section 10(c)(2)(H) to the HOLA, which authorized an SLHC 
to engage in section 4(k) activities if it meets the criteria and complies with the requirements 
applicable to a BHC electing FHC status under the BHCA.  Dodd-Frank Act § 606(b), 124 
Stat. at 1607.  The FRB interpreted this authority as requiring an SLHC to file a declaration 
with the FRB to elect to be treated as an FHC and certify that it satisfies the criteria for a BHC 
to engage in 4(k) activities.  76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56510 (Sept. 11, 2011).  Therefore, BHCs 
and SLHCs must file an effective declaration to become FHCs authorized to engage in 
financial in nature activities, as well as activities incidental or complementary to a financial 
activity.  12 C.F.R. §§ 225.82, 238.64 (2019). 
307. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 103(a), 113 Stat. at 1342.  Regulation Y listed 
the banking aboard activities as providing management consulting services; operating a travel 
agency; and organizing, sponsoring, and managing a mutual fund.  66 Fed. Reg. 400, 418 
(Jan. 3, 2001) (final rule) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(b) (2019)).  The FRB also 
determined by rule that acting as a finder in bring together one or more buyers and sellers of 
any product or service for transactions that the parties themselves will negotiate and 
consummate is incidental to a financial activity.  65 Fed. Reg. 80735 (Dec. 22, 2000) (codified 
at 12 C.F.R. § 225.86(d)). 
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substantial risk to the safety or soundness of depository institutions or the 
financial system generally."308 
5.  Increased Consistency Related to the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce 
Fifth, changes in federal law have brought increased consistency 
regarding separation of banking and commerce to the regulation of BHCs 
and SLHCs.  The legislative history of the BHCA establishes that 
separating banking from commerce was one of its primary policy 
objectives.  The separation of banking from commerce was embedded in 
the BHCA through its prohibition on a BHC’s engaging in activities other 
than banking or managing and controlling banks.309  The Senate Report 
in support of the BHCA noted that “the philosophy of this bill is that bank 
holding companies ought to confine their activities to the management 
and control of banks.”310  The separation of banking and commerce was 
 
308. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1)(B);  see also 12 C.F.R. § 225.89 (2019) (defining the 
procedure to request approval to engage in an activity that is complementary to a financial 
activity).  JP Morgan Chase & Co., 92 FED. RES. BULL. C57 (2005) (defining a 
complementary activity as an activity that appears to be “commercial rather than financial in 
nature but that is meaningfully connected to a financial activity such that it complements the 
financial activity.”).  145 CONG. REC. H11529 (Nov. 4, 1999) (statement of Rep. Leach) (“It 
is expected that complementary activities would not be significant relative to the overall 
financial activities of the organization.”).  The FRB determined by order that certain physical 
commodities activities are complementary to the financial activity of commodity derivatives 
activities.  Citigroup, Inc., 89 FED. RES. BULL. 508 (2003).  The FRB also determined that 
energy management services are complementary to the financial activities of commodity 
derivatives activities and derivatives advisory services and that energy tolling activities are 
complementary to the financial activity of commodity derivatives activities.  Fortis, S.A./N.V., 
94 FED. RES. BULL. C20 (2008);  Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC, 94 FED. RES. BULL. 
C60 (2008).  In response to a request from the FDIC, the FRB also determined that disease 
management and mail-order pharmacy activities are complementary to the financial activities 
of underwriting and selling health insurance.  Wellpoint, Inc., 93 FED. RES. BULL. C133 
(2007). 
309. Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(a), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956). 
310. S. REP. NO. 84-1095, pt. 1, at 1 (1955).  The Senate Report continued: “The 
combination under single control of both banking and nonbanking enterprises . . . [permits] 
departure from the principle that banking institutions should not engage in business wholly 
unrelated to banking.”  Id. at 2;  see also H.R. REP. NO. 84-609, at 1 (1955) (“The need for 
immediate legislation which would at the same time control the future expansion of bank 
holding companies and force them to divest themselves of nonbanking business has been 
established to the complete satisfaction of your committee.”).  The proposed Bank Holding 
Company Act of 1947 declared it to be the express policy of Congress “to separate [the] 
business of managing and controlling banks from unrelated businesses.”  S. 829, 80th Cong. 
§2 (1947).  The Senate Report supporting S. 829 stated: “The holding-company device . . . 
can be used to gather under one management many different and varied enterprises wholly 
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reinforced by the 1970 BHCA Amendments to the BHCA, which brought 
one-bank holding companies within the scope of the BHCA’s restrictions 
on activities311 and required divestiture of impermissible activities or the 
bank by December 31, 1980.312  
Historically, there has been less separation of banking and 
commerce in the savings and loan industry than in the banking industry.  
As initially enacted, the SLHCA only restricted the activities of multiple 
SLHCs—those controlling two or more insured institutions.313  Unitary 
SLHCs remained free to engage in commercial activities.  Furthermore, 
while the SLHCA required divestiture of unrelated activities, the list of 
activities permissible for multiple SLHCs314 included some that were 
impermissible for BHCs.315  For example, the SLHCA authorized 
multiple SLHCs to conduct insurance agency businesses.316  As initially 
enacted, the BHCA did not authorize a BHC to engage in any insurance 
activities.317 
As the twentieth century progressed, federal laws regulating 
BHCs and SLHCs brought increased consistency regarding separation of 
banking and commerce through greater overlap in permissible activities 
and restrictions on unitary SLHCs.  For instance, the Garn-St. Germain 
Depository Institutions Act of 1982 prohibited a BHC from providing 
insurance as a principal, agent, or broker, but expanded BHC authority to 
engage in insurance activities through specific exceptions, such as 
providing life insurance in connection with an extension of credit and 
engaging in insurance agency activities in a place with a population not 
 
unrelated to the conduct of a banking business, which the committee feels is inimical to sound 
banking practice.”  S. REP. NO. 80-300, at 1 (1947). 
311. Bank Holding Company Act 1970 Amendments, Pub. L. No. 91-607, § 2, 84 Stat. 
1760.   
312. Id. § 103, 84 Stat. at 1762, 1763;  see generally HELLER, supra note 114, at 182–203. 
313. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 
2(c), 82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (amending section 408(c) of the National Housing Act).  As initially 
enacted, the BHCA only restricted the activities of a company controlling two or more banks.  
Pub. L. No. 84-511, §§ 2, 4(a)(2), 70 Stat. 133, 135 (1956).  However, the 1970 BHCA 
Amendments applied the activity restrictions to one-bank holding companies.  Bank Holding 
Company Act 1970 Amendments § 2, 84 Stat. 1760 (1970).  GUSLHCs controlling one 
savings association continue to be free from the activity restrictions of  HOLA.  See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1467a(c) (2018).   
314. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 § 2, 82 Stat. at 8 
(amending section 408(c) of the National Housing Act). 
315. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135. 
316. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967 § 2, 82 Stat. at 8 
(amending section 408(c)(2)(B) of the National Housing Act). 
317. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4(a), 70 Stat. at 135. 
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exceeding 5,000.318  In 1999, further overlap in permissible activities 
arose from the GLBA, which authorized a BHC that became an FHC to 
engage in insurance underwriting, agency, and brokerage.319  The OTS 
interpreted the GLBA to authorize SLHCs to engage in the same 
insurance activities.320 
Additional federal law regulating SLHCs raised the barriers 
separating banking and commerce.  In 1987, CEBA narrowed the unitary 
SLHC exemption from activities restrictions to companies with a savings 
association subsidiary formed before March 5, 1987, which met the QTL 
test.321  Therefore, CEBA slightly increased the degree of separation 
between banking and commerce with respect to SLHCs, or in other 
words, slightly increased convergence in the regulation of BHCs and 
SLHCs.  In addition, while the GLBA left GUSLHCs free from 
restrictions on activities, it also restricted the activities of a company that 
formed or acquired a unitary SLHC on or after May 4, 1999.322  In this 
way, the GLBA reinforced the separation of banking and commerce with 
respect to SLHCs and promoted convergence in the regulation of BHCs 
and SLHCs 
The GLBA also allowed greater mixing of banking and 
commerce by authorizing BHCs and SLHCs to engage in merchant 
banking activities.  This authority permitted BHCs and SLHCs to control 
a company engaged in commercial activities for a limited time.323  
Therefore, the GLBA slightly increased the convergence in the regulation 
of BHCs and SLHCs. 
 
318. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 601, 96 
Stat. 1469, 1536. 
319. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 102, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1343 (1999). 
320. Availability of Information, Public Observation of Meetings, Procedure, Practice for 
Hearings, and Post-Employment Restrictions for Senior Examiners; Savings and Loan 
Holding Companies, 76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56510 (Sept. 11, 2011) (“The OTS interpreted 
[section 10(c)(9)(A) of HOLA] to be an affirmative grant of authority to all Covered SLHCs 
to engage in 4(k) Activities . . . without having to satisfy any of the financial holding company-
related criteria in the BHC Act.”)   
321. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104, 101 Stat. 552, 
568. 
322. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (“GLBA”) § 401, 113 Stat. at 1435. 
323. Id. § 103, 113 Stat. at 1344. 
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6.  Capital Required on a Consolidated Basis 
Finally, in 2010, Congress required the FRB to establish 
minimum leverage and risk-based capital requirements for all DIHCs, 
including SLHCs, on a consolidated basis not less than generally 
applicable requirements in effect for insured depository institutions.324  
The FRB’s current risk-based capital standards for BHCs, SLHCs, and 
state member banks are codified in Regulation Q.325  Generally, these 
institutions must maintain the following consolidated capital ratios: (1) a 
common equity tier 1 capital ratio of 4.5%; (2) a tier 1 capital ratio of 6%; 
(3) a total capital ratio of 8%; and (4) a leverage ratio of 4%.326  However, 
certain BHCs and SLHCs with less than $10 billion in total consolidated 
assets can elect to be “Qualified Community Banking Organizations.”  
These organizations are considered to have met the above minimum 
capital requirements if they maintain a leverage ratio of 9%.327  
Furthermore, small BHCs and SLHCs (less than $3 billion in total 
consolidated assets) are exempt from Regulation Q.328  Still, each insured 
depository subsidiary of a small BHC or SLHC is expected to be well-
capitalized.329 
 
324. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 171, 124 Stat. 1376, 1436 (2010).  Furthermore, the International 
Lending Supervision Act mandates each federal banking agency to require banking 
institutions to achieve and maintain adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of 
capital.  International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97 Stat. 
1278, 1280  (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3907(a)(1) (2018)).  In addition, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 added section 38(c) to the FDIA, requiring 
each federal banking agency to adopt risk-based capital requirements for insured depository 
institutions.  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”), 
Pub. L. No. 102-242, § 131(a), 105 Stat. 2236, 2254 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(c) (2018)). 
325. 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (2019).   
326. Id.  § 217.10. 
327. Id. § 217.12. 
328. Id. § 217.1(c)(1)(ii)–(iii). 
329. Id. pt. 225, app. C, § 2.B.  A BHC is “well capitalized” if it maintains on a consolidated 
basis a total risk-based capital ratio of 10.0% or greater and a tier 1 risk-based capital ratio of 
6.0% or greater, while not being subject to any written agreement, order, capital directive, or 
prompt corrective action directive issued by the FRB to meet and maintain a specific capital 
level for any capital measure.   Id. § 225.2(r)(1).  A SLHC is “well capitalized” if each of its 
depository institutions is well capitalized, while not being subject to any written agreement, 
order, capital directive, or prompt corrective action directive issued by the FRB to meet and 
maintain a specific capital level for any capital measure.  Id. § 238.2(s). 
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D. Remaining Differences 
There are very few remaining differences in the regulation of 
DIHCs.  The most significant differences involve the authority of the 
holding company to engage in various activities.   
First, a BHC that is not a FHC is prohibited from engaging in an 
activity other than managing or controlling banks, unless the activity fits 
within one of the narrow, circumscribed exceptions.330  For instance, an 
ordinary BHC is not authorized to engage in  the underwriting life 
insurance or property and casualty insurance.331  However, an ordinary 
BHC may act as a principal, agent, or broker for the sale of insurance 
related to the extension of credit by the BHC or its subsidiaries (e.g., sell 
life credit insurance) or engage in any insurance agency activity in a place 
that has a population not exceeding 5,000 (e.g., sell general property and 
casualty insurance).332   
Second, a BHC or SLHC that qualifies as a compliant FHC may 
engage in financial activities and activities incidental or complementary 
to a financial activity.333  For instance, a compliant FHC may act as a 
principal, agent, broker, or underwriter for any type of insurance, and 
underwrite, deal in, or make a market in any type of securities.334 
Third, a company that was not a BHC and becomes an FHC after 
November 12, 1999 may continue to engage in activities related to 
trading, sale, or investment in commodities that are not generally 
permissible activities for BHCs, if the company was engaged in any of 
these activities as of September 30, 1997 and meets other specified 
conditions.335  The HOLA and its implementing regulations do not 
contain a similar provision for a company that becomes an SLHC.   
 
330. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c) (2018). 
331. First Oklahoma Bancorporation, 58 FED. RES. BULL. 571 (1971) (underwriting 
general life insurance); NCNB Corporation, 64 FED. RES. BULL. 506 (1978). 
332. 12 C.F.R. § 225.28(b)(11)(i), (iii) (2019). 
333. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k)(1). 
334.  Id. § 1843(k)(4)(B), (E). 
335. Id. § 1843(o).  This statutory authority permits certain FHCs to engage in a broader 
set of physical commodity activities than may be otherwise authorized for a FHC under the 
complementary authority, such as storing, transporting, and extracting commodities, and 
without the conditions that the FRB has placed on engaging in complementary commodities 
activities to protect safety and soundness.  FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., supra note 279, at 27.   
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Fourth, an ordinary SLHC may engage in activities that are not 
authorized for a BHC or FHC, such as general insurance agency336 and 
real estate development activities,337 as well as providing services to any 
person, so long as the SLHC primarily provides the service to its 
affiliates.338  A BHC is prohibited from engaging in general insurance 
agency and real estate development activities.339  A BHC, even if it is a 
compliant FHC, is limited to providing audit services for the BHC and its 
subsidiaries, but not for any other BHC, bank, savings association, or 
company.340   
Finally, GUSLHCs and ILC parent companies may engage in 
commercial activities.341  BHCs, even if they are compliant FHCs, are 
prohibited from engaging in commercial activities, unless the activities 
fit within one of limited exceptions to this prohibition, such as merchant 
banking.342  It is possible, however, that the exemption of GUSLHCs and 
corporate owners of ILCs from restrictions on activities, as well as the 
FHC authorization to engage in merchant banking, will be eliminated.  In 
2016, the FRB recommended to Congress that it: 
 
(i) repeal the exemption that permits corporate owners of 
ILCs to operate outside of the regulatory and supervisory 
framework applicable to other corporate owners of 
insured depository institutions;343  
 
336. SLHCs may engage in insurance agency activities without restriction as to type of 
insurance.  12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(2)(B). 
337. 12 C.F.R. § 238.53(b)(4), (6) (2019) (acquiring unimproved real estate for 
development and development, subdivision, and construction of improvements of 
unimproved real estate for sale or rental). 
338. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(2)(F)(ii); 12 C.F.R. § 238.53(b)(3), (6); 12 C.F.R. § 584.2-
1(b)(2), (3) (2019) (An SLHC “may engage in the following activities . . . furnishing or 
performing clerical accounting and internal audit services primarily for its affiliates.”). 
339. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c); UB Financial Corp., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 428, 429 (1972); First 
Security Corp., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 325 (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(d) (2019) (including 
land development); Boatmen’s Bancshares, Inc., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 427, 428 (1972) 
(including real estate brokerage).  Furthermore, Congress specifically prohibited the FRB 
from determining that real estate brokerage or management are permissible for a BHC or 
FHC.  Omnibus Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8, § 624, 123 Stat. 524, 678. 
340. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(1)(C), (k); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.22(b)(i), 225.86. 
341. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(3), (9)(C). 
342. Id. § 1843. 
343. Acceptance of this FRB recommendation by Congress through enactment of new 
legislation would limit the activities of ILC parent companies. The recent FDIC proposal to 
regulate the activities of the parent companies of ILCs would not limit the activities of ILC 
parent companies.   Parent Companies of Industrial Banks and Industrial Loan Companies, 
85 Fed. Reg. 17771 (Mar. 31, 2020).  
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(ii) repeal the exemption for GUSLHCs from the activity 
restrictions applicable to all other SLHCs; and  
(iii) repeal the authority of FHCs to engage in merchant 
banking activities.344 
These actions would reinforce the separation between banking 
and commerce, subject ILCs to consolidated supervision, and level the 
playing field among organizations that control an FDIC-insured 
depository institution.345  The repeal of the industrial loan company 
exemption from the definition of a “bank” in the BHCA would force the 
corporate owners of ILCs to cease engaging in commercial activities or 
divest of the industrial loan company.  Similarly, the repeal of merchant 
banking authority would force FHCs to divest of merchant banking 
investments, reinforcing the separation of banking and commerce.  
V.  DIFFERENTIATION AND CONVERGENCE IN THE SUPERVISION OF DIHCS 
During the first half of the twentieth century, federal and state 
banking regulators developed slightly different approaches to the 
supervision of depository institutions under their jurisdiction.  The 
supervisors generally agreed that supervision should prevent and correct 
unsound situations; however, there were variations in the manner in 
which they accomplished that goal.346  As the FDIC began to examine 
 
344. FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., supra note 279, at 28.  The report also recommends repeal 
of the grandfather provision of section 4(o) of the BHCA.  Id.  The report noted: 
 
[The] grandfather provision . . . has permitted two FHCs to engage in a 
broad range of activities related to physical commodities such as the 
storage, transportation, and extraction of commodities.  This 
grandfathered authority raises safety and soundness concerns as well as 
competitive issues, as it is currently available to only two firms.  In 
addition, this grandfather provision is inconsistent with the separation of 
banking and commerce. 
 
Id. at 29. 
345. Id. at 33–34; see also ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Serv., 109th Cong. 17, 81, 88–89 (2006) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, 
Federal Reserve Board).  
346. See, e.g., 1919 OCC ANN. REP. 6. (proposing adherence to the law, regulation, and 
principles of sound banking); 1938 FDIC ANN. REP. 61,  (preventing and correcting unsound 
situations); 1939 OCC ANN. REP. 40., (correcting unhealthy situations to maintain sound 
operating condition); 9 FHLBB ANN. REP. 79 (1941) (encouraging sound business practices 
and preventing development of unsound practices); 1946 OCC ANN. REP. 15 (appraising 
management and the soundness of policies being followed); 1949 OCC ANN. REP. 13 
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banks in the 1930s, it observed diversity in the standards and procedures 
for supervision of state chartered banks and sought improvement and 
uniformity in standards and procedures among federal and state 
supervisory authorities.347  Thereafter, the FDIC, OCC, FRB, and state 
supervisors often reached agreement on standard examination policies, 
released joint statements on examination and supervisory practices, and 
cooperated in the resolution of issues at particular institutions.348  
During the second half of the twentieth century, the supervisory 
practices of the federal banking regulators became even more similar.  
This occurred through continued consultation, cooperation, agreements, 
and statements, as well as conferences and training.  For instance, in 
1952, the OCC, FDIC, and FRB established an Inter-Agency Bank 
Examination School, which trained examiners from these three agencies 
and many state banking departments.349  In addition, the FRB, OCC, and 
FDIC routinely shared bank examination reports.350  Furthermore, the 
FRB often conducted joint examinations in cooperation with the state 
banking authorities or alternated examinations with state authorities.351  
In 1976, the FDIC began to conduct bank examinations on an alternate 
year basis with state authorities.352  In 1978, the federal banking agencies 
agreed to a uniform rating system for depository institutions, calling it the 
CAMEL rating system.353 
 
(identifying corrections deemed necessary to maintain each bank in sound condition); 1948 
FHLBB ANN. REP. 10 (preventing the development of continuance of unsafe and unsound 
financial practices).  
347. 1938 FDIC ANN. REP. 61. 
348. See, e.g., 1937 FRB ANN. REP. 36 (suggesting cooperation of federal and state banking 
authorities to work out management issues at banks); 1938 FRB ANN. REP. 37 (explaining the 
agreement of OCC, FRB, FDIC, and representatives of state banking departments regarding 
revisions to bank examination procedures); 1940 FRB ANN. REP.26 (using FRB policy when 
practicable to conduct joint examinations or make alternate examination agreements with state 
banking authorities); 1942 FRB ANN. REP. 2, 21 (explaining the joint statement of OCC, 
FDIC, FRB, and National Association of Supervisors of State Banks regarding examination 
and supervisory policy concerning investments in government securities and loan on such 
securities). 
349. 1958 FRB ANN. REP. 94. 
350. See, e.g., 1960 FRB ANN. REP. 89; 1975 FRB ANN. REP. 299; 1976 FRB ANN. REP. 
413. 
351.1956 FRB ANN. REP. 57.  
352. 1976 FDIC ANN. REP. xiii; 1980 FDIC ANN. REP. 5.  
353. Banking Agencies Adopt Uniform Interagency Bank Soundness Rating System, [1978-
1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,451 (May 10, 1978).  The “C” stood 
for capital, “A” for asset quality, “M” for management ability, “E” for earnings, and “L” for 
liquidity.  Examiners assigned numeric values of 1 to 5 to each component and a composite 
rating.  The agencies did not share their ratings with the supervised institution.  Between 1982 
and 1988, the agencies allowed examiners to disclose the composite rating to bank 
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The supervisory approach of the FHLBB for insured savings 
associations developed independent of cooperation with the federal 
banking regulators.  In 1934, the FHLBB established an Examination 
Division to conducted examinations focused on fact-finding, with a 
separate group within the FHLBB making supervisory recommendations 
related to compliance with law, sound policies, and good management.354  
In the 1940s, the FHLBB examination reports assessed the soundness of 
the institution, evaluated the institution’s degree of compliance with legal 
 
management and directors. See, e.g., Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Division of Bank Supervision 
Memorandum System, Transmittal No. 184, Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System 
(Sept. 24, 1982); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Issuance, EC-238, CAMEL 
Disclosure (Mar. 31, 1987); Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Issuance  No. SR 88-
37, Disclosure of Numeric Composite Examination and Inspection Ratings to 
Examined/Inspected Institutions (Dec. 28, 1988).  In 1996, the agencies updated the rating 
system, which included more emphasis on risk management practices, revisions of composite 
rating definitions, and the addition of a sixth component addressing sensitivity to market risk, 
represented by the addition of “S” to the acronym, making it the CAMELS rating system.  61 
Fed. Reg. 67021 (Dec. 19, 1996).   The agencies also instructed examiners to discuss with 
bank directors and senior management the factors considered in assigning each component 
rating, as well as the composite rating.  Id. at 67024.  However, the ratings remained 
confidential and institutions were prohibited from disclosing ratings to the public. 12 C.F.R. 
§§ 4.32(b)(2), 4.36(d) (2019) (mandating the OCC prohibition); id. § 309.5(g)(8) (preventing 
the FDIC from disclosing ratings); id. §§ 261.2(c)(1), 261.20(g), 261.22(e) (restricting the 
FRB); Interagency Advisory: Confidentiality of the Supervisory Rating and Other Nonpublic 
Information, OCC BULL. 2005-4 (2005), https://www.occ.gov/news-
issuances/bulletins/2005/bulletin-2005-4.html [https://perma.cc/PA5G-Y3E9]; Benjamin B. 
Christopher, Recent Developments Affecting Financial Institutions, 2 FDIC BANKING REV., 
No. 1 1989, at 29, 36. 
    The federal banking regulators also adopted uniform approaches to evaluating the trust, 
information technology, consumer compliance, and Community Reinvestment Act (“CRA”) 
performance of depository institutions.  In 1978, the FDIC, FRB, and OCC adopted the 
Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System . Federal Agencies Adopt Uniform Rating System 
for Bank Trust Departments, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
97,600 (Sept. 21, 1978);  see also SR 98-37, Uniform Interagency Trust Rating System (Dec. 
23, 1998) (describing revisions related to definitions of components, compliance, and risk 
management); Uniform Rating System for Information Technology.  Banking Agencies Adopt 
Policy on Interagency Data Processor Examination, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,471, 
1978-1979 Transfer Binder (Jun. 14, 1978); Uniform Rating System for Information 
Technology, 64 Fed. Reg. 3109 (Jan 20, 1999) (modifications related to components and risk 
management).  In 1980, the FDIC, FRB, and OCC adopted a uniform consumer compliance 
rating system, which evaluated an institution’s compliance with consumer protection and civil 
rights laws.  1980 FFIEC ANN. REP. 20.  In 1978, the federal banking agencies implemented 
a uniform CRA ratings system for depository institutions.  Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977; Implementation, 43 Fed. Reg. 47144 (Oct. 12, 1978); Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bd., 
Community Reinvestment Act Examination Procedures (Nov. 22, 1978),  
https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/ny%20circulars/nycirc_1978_08469a.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AA25-AAQQ] (stating that examiners assigned a rating of 1 to 5 for agency 
use only based on the institution’s overall CRA performance). 
354. 4 FHLBB ANN. REP. 8 (1936);  5 FHLBB ANN. REP. 16–17 (1937). 
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requirements, and made suggestions for institution practices and 
policies.355  FHLBB examiners used a “standard form” with sections for 
comparison of monthly balance sheets, statement of operations, loan 
statistics, share accounts, and other real estate owned.  Examiners also 
reported on record keeping and internal checks and controls used by 
associations to safeguard assets.  Examination reports concluded with 
examiner comments on the condition, operations, and policies of the 
association.356  In the 1980s, the FHLBB developed the MACRO rating 
system for insured savings associations.357 
The formation of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination 
Council (“FFIEC”) provided further impetus for convergence in 
supervisory practices.358  In 1979, Congress established the FFIEC to 
 
355. 9 FHLBB ANN. REP. 77–79 (1941);  1948 FHLBB ANN. REP. 8;  Centralized 
Examining Division, 1 FHLB REV., Nov. 1934, at 33;  The New Examination Form, 5 FHLB 
REV., Jan. 1939, at 8;  Subject to Federal Examination, 6 FHLB REV., Jan. 1940, at 110;  
Verne C. Bonesteel, The Supervisory Examination – its Purposes and Objectives, 11 FHLB 
REV., Sept. 1945, at 344. 
356.  Bonesteel, supra note 355, at 350. 
357. George H.K. Wang & Daniel Sauerhaft, Examination Ratings and the Identification 
of Problem/Non-problem Thrift Institutions, 2 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 319, 320–21 (1989); Astoria 
Federal Savings and Loan Association v. United States, 80 Fed. CL. 65, 75–76 (Fed. Cir. 
2008).  In the MACRO rating system, “M” stood for Management, “A” stood for Asset 
quality, “C” stood for Capital adequacy, “R” stood for Risk, and “O” stood for Operating 
results.  Id.  Examiners rated each of these areas on a scale of 1 (strong performance) to 5 
(poor performance), and then assigned a composite rating based on a subjective weighting of 
the categories.  Wang & Sauerhaft, supra note 357.   The ratings were not disclosed with the 
institution or public.  In 1988, the FHLBB began to disclose component and composite ratings 
savings associations.  Christopher, supra note 353, at 36 (“[Thrift] [i]nstitutions will not be 
permitted to disclose their [MACRO] ratings ‘in any form’ to the public.”). 
358. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-630, §§ 1002, 1004, 92 Stat. 3641, 3694; see also About the FFIEC, FED. FIN. 
INSTITUTIONS EXAMINATION COUNCIL, https://www.ffiec.gov/about.htm 
[https://perma.cc/Q2SF-UJHK] (last visited May 3, 2018).  The FFIEC established a liaison 
committee composed of representatives of five state agencies to encourage application of 
uniform examination principles and standards by state and federal supervisory agencies.  
Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 § 1007, 12 U.S.C. § 
3306 (2018).  Changes in federal regulatory agencies and greater coordination with state 
agencies led to changes in the composition of the FFIEC.  In 1991, Congress established the 
OTS, which assumed some responsibilities of the FHLBB, including membership on the 
FFIEC. . In 2006, Congress made the chair of the liaison committee a voting member of the 
FFIEC.  Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 714, 120 
Stat. 1966, 1995.  In 2010, Congress abolished the OTS, and its responsibilities for financial 
institutions were transferred to the other federal banking agencies.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 
Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010).  The CFPB became a member of the FFIEC when it was established 
by Congress in 2010.  The FFIEC currently consists of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Chairman of the FDIC, a Governor designated by the Chairman of the FRB, the Director of 
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prescribe uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal 
examination of financial institutions and to make recommendations to 
promote uniformity in the supervision of financial institutions.359  At that 
time, the FFIEC consisted of the Comptroller of the Currency, the 
Chairman of the FDIC, a Governor designated by the Chairman of the 
FRB, the Chairman of the FHLBB, and the Chairman of the NCUA.360  
Changes in law and the work of the FFIEC have resulted in a great deal 
of uniformity regarding capital, reporting, applications, examination, and 
enforcement for financial institutions under the jurisdiction of the federal 
banking regulators and state banking agencies.   
A. Examinations 
1.  Bank Holding Companies 
As initially enacted, the BHCA authorized the FRB to conduct 
examinations of the holding companies under its jurisdiction.361  The 
FRB fulfilled its responsibilities regarding BHCs through evaluation of 
reports, on-site inspections, and actions on applications to form or expand 
activities.362  In 1978, the FRB began to utilize a new standardized Report 
of Bank Holding Company Inspection, which resulted in the on-site 
review of 85% of BHCs on an annual basis.363  In 1979, the federal 
banking agencies approved policies to enhance interagency coordination 
in the inspection of BHCs and examination of lead banks controlled by 
BHCs.364 
In 1979, the FRB adopted the BOPEC/F-M rating system for 
inspections of BHCs.365  The "B" stood for "Bank Subsidiaries," "O" 
 
the CFPB, the Chairman of the NCUA, and the Chair of the state liaison committee.  About 
the FFIEC., supra. 
359. Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 § 1002, 92 
Stat. at 3694. 
360. Id. § 1004, 92 Stat. at 3694. 
361. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No.  84-511, § 5(c), 70 Stat. 133, 137 
(1956). 
362. 1978 FRB ANN. REP. 357. 
363. Id.  
364. 1979 FRB ANN. REP. 277. 
365. Federal Reserve Board Adopts System for Appraising and Rating Performance and 
Financial Condition of Bank Holding Companies, [1978-1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 97,708 (Feb. 7, 1979) (evaluating bank holding companies by examining 
"Bank Subsidiaries; Other (Nonbank) Subsidiaries; Parent Company; Earnings--
Consolidated; Capital Adequacy--Consolidated"). 
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stood for Other (Nonbank) Subsidiaries, "P" stood for "Parent Company," 
"E" stood for "Earnings-Consolidated," "C" stood for "Capital adequacy-
-Consolidated," "F" stood for "Financial Composite Rating," and "M" 
stood for "Management Composite Rating."366  Examiners assigned a 
numeric value to each component on a scale of one to five in descending 
order of performance quality.  The “F” composite was assigned a numeric 
value on the same scale and the “M” composite was assigned "S" for 
Satisfactory, "F" for Fair, or "U" for Unsatisfactory.367  In adopting the 
BOPEC/F-M rating system, the FRB noted its concern with the "risk 
characteristics of the entire organization,"368 as well as the need for 
"capital on a consolidated basis that must serve as the ultimate source of 
support and strength to the entire corporation.”369  Initially, the ratings 
were not shared with bank directors or management.  However, 
examiners were instructed to provide the numeric and alphabetic ratings 
to senior management and directors in 1996.370 
In 2005, the FRB replaced the BOPEC rating system with the RFI 
rating system.371  Under the RFI rating system, each BHC was assigned 
component ratings of “R” for Risk Management; “F” for Financial 
Condition, and “I” for potential Impact of the parent company and non-
depository subsidiaries on the subsidiary depository institution(s); “D” 
for Depository Institution; as well as “C” for a Composite rating.  The 
ratings were presented in this manner: RFI/D(C).  The R component was 
supported by four subcomponents that reflect the effectiveness of the 
banking organization's risk management and controls: (1) Board and 
Senior Management Oversight; (2) Policies, Procedures, and Limits; (3) 
Risk Monitoring and Management Information Systems; and (4) Internal 
Controls.  The F component was similarly supported by four 




368. Id. at 2. 
369. Id. at 10. 
370. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 96-26, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Provision of 
Individual Components of Supervisory Rating System to the Officer in Charge of Supervision 
at Each Federal Reserve Bank (Nov. 15, 1996), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/1996/sr9626.htm 
[https://perma.cc/F4YY-PAU5]. 
371. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 19-4/CA 19-3, Supervision and Regulation Letter on 
Supervisory Rating System for Holding Companies with Total Consolidated Assets Less 
Than $100 billion (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1904.pdf [https://perma.cc/4ESG-
MXDJ]. 
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organization's (1) Capital; (2) Asset Quality; (3) Earnings; and (4) 
Liquidity.  The composite, component, and subcomponent ratings were 
assigned using a one to five numeric scale with one indicating the highest 
rating and five the lowest rating.  The inspection report included the 
composite and component ratings.  Contemporaneously, the FRB issued 
guidance stating that the ratings were furnished for confidential use and 
should not be disclosed to the public.372 
In 2019, the FRB adopted the Large Financial Institution (“LFI”) 
system.373  The LFI system applies to all domestic BHCs with $100 
billion or more in total consolidated assets.  The FRB continues to apply 
its RFI rating system to BHCs with less than $100 billion in total 
consolidated assets.374  The LFI rating system reflects three core areas of 
focus: (1) Capital Planning and Positions; (2) Liquidity Risk 
Management and Positions; and (3) Governance and Controls.  Each LFI 
component is rated according to a four-category scale: (1) Broadly Meets 
Expectations; (2) Conditionally Meets Expectations; (3) Deficient-1; and 
(4) Deficient-2.375 
2.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies 
The FHLBB developed the CORE rating system for use in its 
examination of SLHCs.  As initially enacted, the SLHCA authorized the 
FHLBB to conduct examinations of the holding companies under its 
jurisdiction.376  In 1988, the FHLBB adopted the CORE rating system for 
 
372. Bank Holding Company Rating System, 69 Fed. Reg. 70444, 70446 (Dec. 6, 2004); 
see also Interagency Advisory: Confidentiality of the Supervisory Rating and Other 
Nonpublic Information, supra note 353. 
373. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018); 84 Fed. Reg. 4309 (Feb. 15, 2019); see also Fed. 
Reserve Bd., SR 19-3/CA 19-2, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Large Financial 
Institution (LFI) Rating System to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal 
Reserve Bank and Large Financial Institutions (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1903.pdf [https://perma.cc/W2JN-
NRA4]; Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371. 
374. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018).  The FRB planned to implementation of the LFI 
rating system, applying it to institutions subject to the Federal Reserve’s LISCC framework 
effective February 1, 2019 and to the remaining LFIs in early 2020.   
375. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018).  The new LFI rating system also applies to U.S. 
intermediate holding companies of FBOs with $50 billion or more in total consolidated assets 
as proposed.   
376. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2, 
82 Stat. 5, 8 (1968) (codified as amended 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a, 1843 (2018)). 
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SLHCs.377  Under the CORE rating system, the “C” stood for Capital, 
“O” for Organizational Structure, “R” for Relationship, and “E” for 
Earnings.  Examiners rated these components on a scale of one to three 
in descending order of performance quality and assigned a composite 
rating of Above Average, Satisfactory, or Unsatisfactory.378  FIRREA 
transferred responsibility for the supervision of SLHCs and savings 
associations from the FHLBB to the OTS.379  In 2007, the OTS revised 
the CORE rating system.  The OTS changed the meaning of the “R” to 
Risk Management and adopted a numeric rating scale from one to five 
for component and composite ratings.380 
When the FRB assumed responsibility for the supervision of 
SLHCs in 2011, the FRB stated that its intention was to eventually 
supervise SLHCs “on a consolidated basis in a manner that is consistent 
with the [FRB’s] established risk-based approach regarding bank holding 
company . . . supervision.”381  Initially, the FRB assigned “indicative” 
ratings to SLHCs using the RFI rating system.382  The frequency and 
scope of inspection for BHCs was also applied to SLHCs by the 
Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(“EGRRCPA”).383  The FRB applied the same off-site surveillance 
 
377. 72 Fed. Reg. 72442, 72443 (Dec. 20, 2007) (The preamble to the rating system states 
that the OTS implemented the former CORE rating system in “1988.”  However, because the 
OTS was not formed until 1989, the former implementation must refer 1989 or action by the 
FHLBB in 1988); see also OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, HOLDING COMPANIES HANDBOOK, 
SECTION 100, SUPERVISORY APPROACH 100.8 (2009), https://occ.gov/static/ots/holding-co-
handbook/ots-hch-000.pdf [https://perma.cc/A35R-T5KU].  
378. 72 Fed. Reg. 17618, 17619, fn. 1 (Apr. 9, 2007) (proposed rule). 
379. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, §§ 301, 401, 103 Stat. 183, 278, 354 (1989).   
380. 72 Fed. Reg. 72442, 72443 (Dec. 20, 2007) (final rule). 
381. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 11-11/CA 11-5, Supervision and Regulation Letter on 
Supervision of Savings and Loan Holding Companies (SLHCs) to the Officer in Charge of 
Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank and To Savings and Loan Holding Companies 
Supervised by the Federal Reserve 2 (July 21, 2011), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1111.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HU4-
BKF3].  The FRB’s RFI rating system replaced the CORE rating system of the OTS for 
SLHCs.  Id. 
382. Id. at 3.  Previously, the OTS used the CORE rating system for SLHCs in which the 
“C” stood for Capital, “O” for Organizational structure, “R” for Risk management”, and “E” 
for Earnings.  72 Fed. Reg. 72942 (Dec. 20, 2007) (final rule)).  The OTS seems to have 
implemented CORE system in 1989 when “C” stood for Capital, “O” for Organizational 
structure, “R” for Relationship, and “E” for Earnings.  
383. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (“EGRRCPA”), 
Pub L. No. 115-174, § 207, 132 Stat. 1296, 1312 (2018);  see also Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 13-
21, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Inspection Frequency and Scope Requirements for 
Bank Holding Companies and Savings and Loan Holding Companies with Total Consolidated 
Assets of $10 billion or Less to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve 
Bank and to Holding Companies with Total Consolidated Assets of $10 Billion or Less (Dec. 
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program to BHCs and SLHCs.384  In 2019, the FRB began to assign 
ratings using the RFI rating system to every SLHC of a depository in 
nature with less than $100 billion in total consolidated assets.385  
However, the FRB delayed its application of the LFI rating system for 
SLHCs that are depository in nature with $100 billion or more in assets 
to consider whether the RFI, LFI, or some other rating system is 
appropriate on a permanent basis.386  The FRB continued to assign 
“indicative” ratings for SLHCs, those large SLHCs, as well as to SLHCs 
engaged in significant commercial or insurance activities.387 
Generally, DIHCs of like size and nature are subject to the same 
examination standards and rating systems.  The FRB assesses the 
condition of all SLHCs of a depository nature and BHCs with up to $100 
billion in total consolidated assets using the RFI rating system.388  BHCs 
and SLHCs between $3 billion and $100 billion in total consolidated 
assets are examined annually, while BHCs and SLHCs with less than $3 
billion in total consolidated assets are examined every eighteen 
months.389  However, the FRB assigns indicative RFI ratings to insurance 
SHLCs and commercial SLHCs regardless of size.390 
 
17, 2013), https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1321.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GK58-KJ7L] (modified as of Mar. 6, 2019 to reflect frequency and scope 
expectations for holding companies with total consolidated assets between $ 1 billion and $3 
billion to align with section 207 of EGRRCPA). 
384. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 15-16, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Enhancements to 
the Federal Reserve System's Surveillance Program to the Officer in Charge of Supervision 
at Each Federal Reserve Bank (Dec. 10, 2015), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1516.pdf [https://perma.cc/EMU5-
XMBN]. 
385. 83 Fed. Reg. 56081 (Nov. 9, 2018); Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371. 
386. Id. 
387. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381, at 3.  An “indicative” rating indicates how an SLHC 
would be rated under the RFI rating system if formally applied to the SLHC.  Id.; see also 
Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 14-9, Supervision and Regulation Letter on Incorporation of Federal 
Reserve Policies into the Savings and Loan Holding Company Supervision Program to the 
Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank (Nov. 7, 2014), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1409.pdf [https://perma.cc/TL23-
S6Y4]. 
388. Application of the RFI/C(D) Rating System to Savings and Loan Holding Companies, 
83 Fed. Reg. 56081 (Nov. 9, 2018);  Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371.  
389. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371, attachment 1, at 2; Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 
383. 
390. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371, at 1.  SLHCs are considered “insurance SLHCs” if 
they are either insurance companies or hold 25% of more of their total consolidated assets in 
subsidiaries that are insurance companies.   SLHCs are considered “commercial SLHCs” if 
they derived 50% or more of their total consolidated assets or total revenues form activities 
that are not financial in nature under section 4(k) of the BHCA.  Id. 
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B. Capital 
Until the early 1980s, bank regulators used informal standards to 
determine the capital of depository institutions.  Traditionally, banking 
law required a minimum capitalization for organizers to obtain a charter 
and begin operations.391  However, banking regulators expected operating 
institutions to maintain a higher level of capital than the legal 
minimum.392  Federal banking regulators began to use ratios to access 
capital adequacy, starting with a capital-to-deposit ratio, then capital-to-
asset ratios, and eventually risk-based asset ratios.393  Despite regulatory 
 
391. From 1864 to 2000, section 5138 Revised Statutes imposed minimum capital amount 
for national banks.  However, in 2000, Congress repealed the requirement because it 
previously granted the federal banking agencies the authority to establish minimum capital 
requirements.  American Homeownership and Economic Opportunity Act of 2000, Pub. L. 
No, 106-569, § 1233, 114 Stat. 2944, 3037 (2000).  Many state laws still impose minimum 
capital amounts for banks.  See, e.g., 5 DEL. CODE ANN. § 745 (2019); GA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-
410 (2019); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 286.3-070 (West 2019).  Other state laws grant the 
banking commissioner the discretion to establish minimum capital amounts.  See, e.g., OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1107.03 (2019); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (West 2019). 
392. HOWARD D. CROSSE & GEORGE H. HEMPEL, MANAGEMENT POLICIES FOR 
COMMERCIAL BANKS 73–74 (Prentice-Hall, Inc., 2nd ed., 1973) (“In recent years as a matter 
of policy, supervisory authorities have usually required new banks to start with more than the 
legal minimum of capital.”). 
393. From 1900 to the late 1930s, bank regulators used the ratio of capital to deposits to 
measure capital adequacy.  State bank regulators expected a capital to deposits ratio of 10%  or 
more for healthy institutions.  YAIR E. ORGLER & BENJAMIN WOLKOWITZ, BANK CAPITAL 68 
(1976);   see also 1914 OCC ANN. REP. 21.  In 1939, the FDIC criticized the capital-to-
deposits ratio because banks incur losses on assets rather than deposits.  ORGLER & 
WOLKOWITZ, supra, at 69.  So, the FDIC began to use a capital-to-assets ratio to measure the 
soundness of insured banks.  1939 FDIC ANN. REP. 12.  In 1947, the FDIC enhanced its 
calculations, adding a ratio without cash and U.S. government obligations.  1947 FDIC ANN. 
REP. 49.  In 1948, the OCC developed a risk-asset ratio as a screening device for assessment 
of capital adequacy, which excluded cash, bank balances, and U.S. government obligations.  
See, e.g., 1948 OCC ANN. REP. 4.  However, the OCC viewed the risk-asset ratio as a 
preliminary step and made final determinations of capital adequacy based on its assessment 
of factors, particularly management competence and asset quality.   CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra 
note 392, at 76. 
   The differences in the risk associated with assets eventually led to the development of 
more sophisticated measures of capital adequacy.  In 1952, the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York developed a formula assigning weights to balance sheet items in order to calculate 
capital adequacy.  ORGLER & WOLKOWITZ, supra, at 69; CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note 392, 
at 77; Kenneth J. Gordan, Risk-Based Capital Requirements: The Proper Approach to Safe 
and Sound Banking?, 10 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 491, 494 (1991).  In 1956, the FRB developed 
a revised version of the formula, which became known as the “ABC ratio.”  ORGLER & 
WOLKOWITZ, supra, at 69; CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note 392, at 80–83.  It provided for 
capital based on balance sheet items and additional capital for banks that did not meet a 
liquidity test and for banks that engaged in trust activities.  CROSSE & HEMPEL, supra note 
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attention to capital, federal banking regulators did not impose explicit 
minimum capital requirements until the early 1980s.394   
1.  Bank Holding Companies 
The FRB’s authority to impact the capitalization of institutions 
under its jurisdiction arises from its authority to act on applications, 
promulgate capital standards, and issue capital directives.  Under the 
BHCA, the FRB is required to take various factors into consideration 
when reviewing a BHC’s proposed acquisition of a bank or nonbank 
entity, including the impact of the acquisition on the financial resources 
of the acquiring and acquired firm.395  For example, an acquisition may 
benefit an acquired firm with access to capital or dilute the capital 
position of an acquiring firm.  The FRB weighs these and other 
considerations in making decisions to approve or deny applications.  The 
FRB has denied applications based on capital considerations.396   
The FRB first issued formal capital guidelines for BHCs in 
1981.397  In 1983, the International Lending Supervision Act (“ILSA”) 
 
392, at 81–82.  The FRB continued to revise and use its ABC ratio.  ORGLER & WOLKOWITZ, 
supra, at 71–72;  see also id. at 86 app. 4.2 (Form for Analyzing Bank Capital, Feb. 1973).  
   The FDIC and the OCC also continued to revise their approaches to measure capital 
adequacy.  The FDIC relied on variants of the capital-to-assets ratio.  ORGLER & WOLKOWITZ, 
supra, at 71.   In 1962, the OCC abandoned its risk-asset approach to capital adequacy, opting 
to rely upon a factor analysis.  James J. Saxon, Comptroller of the Currency, Address at the 
National Bank Division Meeting, American Bankers Association, (Sept. 24, 1962) 
(reproduced in 1963 OCC ANN. REP. 321 (1964)).   In 1973, the OCC began to experiment 
with a ratio of classified assets to total capital to place banks in a category A, B, C, or D.  
James E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, Address before the National Correspondent 
Banking Conference, American Bankers Association, (Nov. 6, 1973) (reproduced in 1973 
OCC ANN. REP. 295 (1974)).   
   By the late 1970s, the FDIC, FRB, and OCC generally accepted a further revised version 
of the OCC’s approach to capital adequacy.  Joseph J. Norton, Capital Adequacy Standards: 
A Legitimate Regulatory Concern for Prudential Supervision of Banking Activities?, 49 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1299, 1320 (1989).  Furthermore, the federal banking agencies were using trends and 
peer group comparisons to determine capital adequacy. Id.  In 1978, the FFIEC incorporated 
these practices into the CAMEL rating system discussed above.   See supra note 353 and 
accompanying text. 
394. Statement of Policy on Capital, 46 Fed. Reg. 62693 (Dec. 29, 1981) (FDIC); 68 FED. 
RES. BULL. 33 (1982) (FRB and OCC).   
395. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (2018). 
396. Tennessee Valley Bancorp, Inc., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 176 (1975); Donald R. Hakala & 
Douglas V. Auston, Denials of BHC Formations and Acquisitions: Has There Been a Shift in 
Policy, 99 BANKING L. J. 947, 951 (1982). 
397. Capital Adequacy Guidelines, 68 FED. RES. BULL. 33 (1982) (joint policy statement 
by the FRB and OCC governing BHCs, state member banks, and national banks).  The FDIC 
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gave the federal banking regulators explicit authority to establish capital 
standards for bank affiliates, including bank holding companies and their 
nonbank subsidiaries.398  In 1985, the FRB issued revised capital 
adequacy guidelines for BHCs.399  In 1989, the FRB adopted risk-based 
capital guidelines for BHCs.400  The OCC and FDIC also adopted capital 
adequacy guidelines.401  The capital adequacy guidelines issued by these 
three federal banking regulators aligned capital regulation in the United 
States with the standards set forth the initial Basel Accord (“Basel I”).402  
 
issued a regulation addressing capital adequacy.  Statement of Policy on Capital, 46 Fed. Reg. 
at 62693 (FDIC). 
398. International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 (“ILSA”), Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 
97 Stat. 1278, 1280 (1983).  Congress enacted the International Lending Supervision Act 
(“ILSA”) in reaction to a decision of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturning an OCC 
capital directive related to the unsafe and unsound capital level at a national bank. First Nat’l 
Bank of Bellaire v. Comptroller of the Currency, 697 F.2d 674, 685 (5th Cir. 1983).  ILSA 
directed the federal banking agencies to "cause banking institutions to achieve and maintain 
adequate capital by establishing minimum levels of capital for such banking institutions." 
International Lending Supervision Act of 1983 § 908(a)(1), 97 Stat. at 1280.   ILSA further 
stated that the "failure of a banking institution to maintain capital at or above its minimum 
level . . . may be deemed . . . to constitute an unsafe and unsound practice."  Id. § 908(b)(1), 
97 Stat. at 1280; see also S. REP. No. 98-122, at 17 (1983) ("[A]ny of the provisions of the 
bill may be applied by the appropriate federal banking agency to any affiliate of any insured 
bank, including any bank holding company individually or on a consolidated basis for its 
nonbank subsidiaries . . . .".); S. REP. No. 100-19, at 36 (1987); 50 Fed. Reg. 16,057, 16,064 
(Apr. 24, 1985) (FRB); Wake Bancorp, Inc., 73 FED. RES. BULL. 925 (1987).   
399. 50 Fed. Reg. 16057 (Apr. 24, 1985);  see also 50 Fed. Reg. 11128 (Mar. 19, 1985) 
(FDIC); 50 Fed. Reg. 10207 (Mar. 14, 1985) (OCC).   While ILSA allowed each federal 
banking agency to establish such minimum capital as it deemed appropriate.  International 
Lending Supervision Act of 1983 § 908(a)(2), 97 Stat. at 1280.  However, the federal banking 
regulators adopted uniform standards with common definitions of bank capital. 50 Fed. Reg. 
16057, 16067 (Apr. 24, 1985) (FRB); 50 Fed. Reg. 11128, 11140 (Mar. 19, 1985) (FDIC); 50 
Fed. Reg. 10207, 10216 (Mar. 14, 1985) (OCC).  The agencies established a minimum level 
of primary capital to total assets of 5.5% and a minimum level of total capital to total assets 
of 6%.  50 Fed. Reg. 16057, 16066 (Apr. 24, 1985) (FRB); 50 Fed. Reg. 11128, 11136 (Mar. 
19, 1985) (FDIC); 50 Fed. Reg. 10207, 10216 (Mar. 14, 1985) (OCC).   
400. 54 Fed. Reg. 4186 (Jan. 27, 1989).   
401. Id. (OCC); 54 Fed. Reg. 11500 (Mar. 21, 1989) (FDIC) (effective Dec. 30, 1990).   
402. In 1988, the Governors of the Basel Committee on Banking Regulations and 
Supervisory Practices endorsed the Basel Accord.  The Basel Committee consisted of central 
bank representatives from the Group of Ten countries (Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States) 
and Luxemburg.  54 Fed. Reg. 4186, 4186–87 (Jan. 27, 1989).  The Basel Committee is 
headquartered at the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland.  The Basel 
Accord arose from recognition of the need to "strengthen the soundness and stability of the 
international banking system and to remove a source of competitive inequality arising from 
differences in national capital requirements." History of Basel Committee, BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm [https://perma.cc/5M5F-PWXG] (last 
visited Jan. 6, 2020).  Action by the Basel Committee does not issue bind member countries 
but recommends a regulatory framework for the member countries. 
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These guidelines also reinforced the existing policy that organizations 
undertaking significant expansion, either through internal growth or 
acquisitions, maintain strong capital positions substantially above 
minimum levels.403  In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
Improvement Act of 1991 gave the FRB the authority to issue capital 
directives.404 
2.  Savings and Loan Holding Companies 
The FHLBB’s concern with the capital adequacy of SLHCs was 
based on its approach to capital adequacy of insured savings associations, 
which focused on the risk associated with assets as it calculated the net 
worth of insured savings associations.405  However, in 1985, the FHLBB 
shifted its focus from net worth to capital adequacy, stating that it used 
minimum net worth requirements to “gauge capital adequacy.”406  In 
1986, the FHLBB amended its regulations pertaining to the calculation 
of “regulatory net worth” to refer to the calculation of “regulatory 
capital.”407  In 1987, CEBA specifically authorized the FHLBB to set and 
enforce regulatory capital requirements.408  FIRREA abolished the 
FHLBB and required its successor, the newly created OTS, to establish 
 
403. 54 Fed. Reg. 4186, 4187 (Jan. 27, 1989).  
404. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (“FDICIA”), Pub. 
L. No. 102-242, § 131, 105 Stat. 2236, 2258 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(A) (2018)). 
405. From 1934 to 1980, the National Housing Act required each insured savings 
association to hold a reserve of 5% of its insured accounts.  50 Fed. Reg. 6891 (Feb. 19, 1985) 
(referring to 12 C.F.R. § 563.13 (1984)).  The FHLBB viewed its express statutory authority 
under section 403(b) of the National Housing Act as broad authority for it to establish and 
define the minimum reserve requirements.  Id. at 6893.  In 1964, the FHLBB began to include 
“risk assets,” “adjusted net worth,” and “scheduled items” in the calculation of the reserve 
requirement.  29 Fed. Reg. 44 (Jan. 3, 1964).  In 1972, the FHLBB required insured savings 
associations to have a net worth equal to the greater of 5% of insured accounts plus 20% of 
scheduled items or the amount determined by the so-called “Asset Composition and Net-
Worth Index.”  37 Fed. Reg. 26579 (Dec. 14, 1972).  The Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 eliminated the specific statutory reserve requirement and 
left the determination of the appropriate reserve to the discretion of the FHLBB within the 
range of 3 to 6 % of insured accounts.  Depository Institutions Deregulation Act of 1980, Pub. 
L. No. 96-221, § 409, 94 Stat. 132, 160. 
406. 50 Fed. Reg. 6891, 6892 (Feb. 19, 1985).   
407. 51 Fed. Reg. 33565 (Sept. 22, 1986) (effective Jan. 1. 1987). 
408. Thrift Industry Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 406, 101 Stat. 552, 614 (1987).  
In issuing and implementing regulations, the FHLBB observed that “adequate capital is of 
critical importance to the safety and soundness of insured institutions and the FSLIC deposit 
insurance fund.  51 Fed. Reg. 363 (Jan. 6, 1988). 
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uniform capital standards for savings associations.409  The OTS did not 
promulgate a standardized capital requirement for SLHCs, but considered 
the overall risk profile of the consolidated entity on a case-by-case 
basis.410   
When the Dodd-Frank Act transferred responsibility for the 
supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the FRB,411 the so-called “Collins 
Amendment” to the Dodd-Frank Act required the federal banking 
agencies to establish minimum leverage and risk-based capital 
requirements on a consolidated basis for insured depository institutions, 
DIHCs, and nonbank financial companies supervised by the FRB.412  The 
 
409. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 303–04 (amending section 5(t) of HOLA).  Specifically, 
FIRREA required savings associations to have core capital of 3% of assets, tangible capital 
of at least 1.5% of assets, and risk-based capital in amounts required by regulations to be 
issued by the OTS that would be at least as stringent as those applicable to national banks.  Id.  
In its preamble to the implementing regulations, the OTS noted the importance of “levels of 
capital . . . related to the risk of activities in which a savings association engages . . . to ensure 
that the association can afford to cover losses that may arise from such activities without 
becoming insolvent.”  54 Fed. Reg. 46845, 46846 (Nov. 8, 1989).  The OTS intended these 
standards to be consistent with the capital standards established by Basel I.  Id. 
410. OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, supra note 377, at 100.8.  The OTS described its 
process as follows:  
 
This involves assessing traditional analytical measures, including the 
overall leverage, the level of short-term debt and liquidity, cash flow and 
reliance on thrift and other subsidiary earnings, interest coverage, quality 
of earnings, and level of consolidated tangible and equity capital. The 
objective is to ensure that the holding company enterprise maintains 
adequate capital to support its risk profile and to meet the minimum 
capital standards of any regulated financial sector (banking, securities, or 
insurance) in which it operates. Another objective is to ensure that an 
appropriate equity buffer exists to shield the thrift from unexpected 
problems within the enterprise. OTS can require holding company 
enterprises to meet individualized capital requirements when capital 
adequacy is a concern.   
 
Id. 
411. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010). 
412. Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(1)–(2), 124 Stat. at 1436.  The leverage and capital 
standards were required to be not less than or quantitatively lower than the leverage and risk-
based capital requirements applicable to insured depository institutions as of July 21, 2010.  
Id.   Small BHCs subject to the Small Bank Holding Company Policy Statement of the FRB 
were exempt from these requirements.  Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(5), 124 Stat. at 1437.  The 
Dodd-Frank Act did not provide a similar exemption for small SLHCs.  The FRB, OCC, and 
FDIC issued implementing regulations.  78 Fed. Reg. 55340 (Sept. 10, 2013) (FDIC); 78 Fed. 
Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (OCC and FRB).  These changes became effective from 2014 to 
2019.  These actions also partially implemented international agreements.  BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY 
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Collins Amendment delayed effectiveness of the requirement until 2015 
for SLHCs.413  The FRB adopted consolidated capital requirements 
applicable to SLHCs that became effective January 1, 2014.414 
3.  Source of Strength 
Historically, the FRB expected BHCs to act as a source of 
strength for their bank subsidiaries.415  As amended in 1984, Regulation 
Y provided that a "bank holding company shall serve as a source of 
financial and managerial strength to its subsidiary banks."416  Later, an 
FRB policy statement provided that "a bank holding company should 
stand ready to use available resources to provide adequate capital funds 
to its subsidiary banks during periods of financial stress or adversity.”417  
The Dodd-Frank Act codified this doctrine, by requiring BHCs, 
SLHCs, and any other company that directly or indirect controls an 
insured depository institution to act as a source of strength.418  Therefore, 
the FRB, OCC, or FDIC, as the case may be, is required to impose the 
source-of-strength requirement on companies that control an insured 
depository institution, including entities exempt from the definition of a 
 
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS (2011), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf [https://perma.cc/WEZ8-VVJE] [hereinafter BASEL 
III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING 
SYSTEMS]; see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS 
AND MONITORING (2010), https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf [https://perma.cc/FUA9-
PY5R] [hereinafter BASEL III: INTERNATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR LIQUIDITY RISK 
MEASUREMENT, STANDARDS AND MONITORING].  
413. Dodd-Frank Act § 171(b)(4)(D), 124 Stat. at 1437. 
414. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013). 
415. Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Revered and Revisited – Part I, 129 
BANKING L. J. 771 (2012). 
416. 49 Fed. Reg. 794, 820 (Jan. 5, 1984) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(a)).  In its preamble 
to the proposed rule, the FRB stated:  “The provision is derived from section 3(c) of the BHC 
Act, which requires the FRB to consider the financial and managerial resources and future 
prospects of the company and banks concerned; from section 5(b) of the BHC Act, which 
authorizes the FRB to issue regulations; and from the FRB’s authority under the Financial 
Institutions Supervisory Act to issue cease and desist orders to prevent unsafe or unsound 
banking practices.”  48 Fed. Reg. 23520, 23523 (May 25, 1983). 
417. Policy Statement on the Responsibility of Bank Holding Companies to Act as Sources 
of Strength to Their Subsidiary Banks, 52 Fed. Reg. 15707 (Apr. 30, 1987); see also Board 
of Governors v. First Lincolnwood Corp., 439 U.S. 234, 251 (1978) (reversing the 7th circuit 
decision in First Lincolnwood Corp. Board of Governors, 560 F.2d 258 (7th Cir. 1977)). 
418. Dodd-Frank Act § 616(d), 124 Stat. at 1616 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1831o-1 (2018)); 
see also Paul L. Lee, The Source-of-Strength Doctrine: Revered and Revisited – Part II, 129 
BANKING L. J. 867 (2012). 
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bank under the BHCA or savings association under HOLA, such as a 
credit card bank, limited purpose trust entity, or ILC.419 
4.  Basel II 
In 2007, the federal banking agencies adopted a new risk-based 
capital adequacy framework for banks, savings associations, and BHCs, 
which covered risk-based capital requirements arising from credit risk, 
market risk, and operational risk.420  This action partially aligned the 
United States with the report released by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (“BCBS”), entitled International Convergence of 
Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework 
(“Basel II”).421  The framework set forth three pillars for risk-based 
capital:  (1) credit risk, market risk, and operational risk; (2) supervisory 
review of capital adequacy; and (3) market discipline through enhanced 
public disclosures.422 
5.  Stress Tests 
The Dodd-Frank Act required the FRB to conduct annual stress 
tests on the largest and most complex financial firms to determine 
whether they have capital necessary to absorb losses as a result of adverse 
economic conditions.423  The FRB conducts Dodd-Frank Act stress tests 
for BHCs with average total consolidated assets of $100 billion or more, 
U.S. intermediate holding companies of foreign banking organizations, 
and any nonbank financial company the Financial Stability Oversight 
Council has determined shall be supervised by the FRB.424  Stress test 
 
419. 12 U.S.C. § 1831o-1(b) (2018). 
420. 72 Fed. Reg. 69288, 69289 (Dec. 7, 2007); see also BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK (2006), 
https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf [https://perma.cc/B888-6FER]. 
421. 72 Fed. Reg. 69288 (Dec. 7, 2007) (covering FRB, FDIC, OCC, and OTS); see also 
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 420. 
422. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 
420, at 2. 
423. Dodd-Frank Act,  § 165(i), 124 Stat. at 1430 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5365(i)(1) 
(2018)). 
424. 12 C.F.R. 252.4(a) (2020).  On July 6, 2018, the FRB issued a statement regarding the 
impact of EGRRCPA.  Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
(“EGRRCPA”), Pub L. No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).  The FRB stated, consistent with 
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models assess whether each firm is “sufficiently capitalized to absorb 
losses in stressful economic conditions while continuing to meet 
obligations to creditors and other counterparties and to lend to households 
and businesses.”425  The stress test models are also used in the 
Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (“CCAR”), pursuant to the 
FRB’s capital plan rule.426   
6.  Basel III 
In 2010, the BCBS released a report entitled Basel III: A Global 
Regulatory Framework for a More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems 
(“Basel III”), which sought to strengthen bank capital requirements, 
increase bank liquidity, and decrease bank leverage.427  The reforms 
embodied in the report aimed to “improve the banking sector’s ability to 
absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress, whatever the 
source, thus reducing the risk of spillover from the financial sector to the 
real economy.”428 
The FRB issued Regulation Q to implement Basel III for BHCs, 
SLHCs, and state member banks.429  Regulation Q raised minimum 
capital requirements.430  It also required all institutions regulated by the 
FRB to maintain a capital conservation buffer to avoid restrictions on 
capital distributions and discretionary bonus payments to executive 
officers.431  In addition, Regulation Q required certain BHCs to maintain 
a leverage buffer432 and institutions using “advanced approaches” to 
calculate of risk-based assets to maintain a countercyclical buffer.433  
 
the EGRRCPA, that it will not take action to require BHCs with total consolidated assets 
greater than or equal to $50 billion but less than $100 billion to comply with the FRB’s capital 
plan rule (12 C.F.R. § 225.8) or the FRB’s supervisory stress test and company-run stress test 
rules (12 C.F.R. pt. 252, subparts E–F).  Fed. Reserve Bd. et al., Interagency Statement 
Regarding the Impact of the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection 
Act (EGRRCPA) (July 6, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/files/bcreg20180706a1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2T6Q-HCC9].   
425. 84 Fed. Reg. 6664 (Feb. 28, 2019). 
426. 12 C.F.R. § 225.8 (2019). 
427. BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND 
BANKING SYSTEMS, supra note 412. 
428. Id. at 1. 
429. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 217 (2019)). 
430. 12 C.F.R. § 217.10. 
431. Id. § 217.11(a). 
432. Id. § 217.11(d);  79 Fed. Reg. 24528 (May 1, 2014).   
433. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217.11(b), 100(b)(1). 
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Furthermore, Regulation Q imposed public disclosure requirements on 
certain large institutions.434  Regulation Q does not apply to BHCs and 
SLHCs governed by the Small Bank Holding Company Policy 
Statement435 or SLHCs substantially engaged in insurance underwriting 
or commercial activities.436 
C. Reporting 
As initially enacted, the BHCA and SLHCA authorized the FRB 
and FSLIC, respectively, to require periodic reports from supervised 
institutions.437  The scope and number of reports increased over time with 
the increased size and complexity of financial institutions.  Generally, the 
reports assist the federal banking agency in fulfilling their responsibilities 
for the supervision and regulation of financial institutions.438  Currently, 
the FRB has authority to require reports from BHCs and SLHCs.439  The 
FRB requires BHCs and SLHCs to file annual reports and changes in 
organizational structure reports as they occur.440  Depository institutions 
that engage in transactions with affiliates, such as a parent BHC or SLHC, 
are required to file a report.441  Generally, BHCs and SLHCs file financial 
 
434. Id. §§ 217.61–217.63. 
435. Id. § 217.1(c). 
436. Id. §§ 217.1(c), 217.2. 
437. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, § 2, 
82 Stat. 5, 7 (1968) (federal savings associations); Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. 
L. No. 84-511, § 5(c), 70 Stat. 133, 137 (BHCs). 
438. See, e.g., Financial and Regulatory Reporting, FED. RES. BOARD, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/topics/reporting.htm 
[https://perma.cc/H9R4-25NB] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020) (“Data collected from regulatory 
reports facilitate early identification of problems that can threaten the safety and soundness 
of reporting institutions; ensure timely implementation of the prompt corrective action 
provisions required by law; and serve other legitimate supervisory purposes.”). 
439. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(b)(2), 1844(c) (2018). 
440. FED. RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF ANNUAL REPORT OF HOLDING 
COMPANIES, FORM FR Y-6 (2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-
620191231_i.pdf [https://perma.cc/8G57-SWNJ];  FED. RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR 
PREPARATION OF REPORT OF CHANGES IN ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE, FORM FR Y-10 
(2016), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-1020191231_i.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/PRE9-3XWC]. 
441. FED. RESERVE BD., GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF HOLDING COMPANY 
REPORT OF INSURED DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS’ SECTION 23A TRANSACTIONS WITH 
AFFILIATES, FORM FR Y-8 (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-
820180630_i.pdf [https://perma.cc/S6SZ-UUEK]. 
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statements with the FRB.442  However, SLHCs engaged primarily in 
commercial or insurance activities are exempt from filing the same report 
but are required to file similar reports.443 
D. Applications 
Current federal law requires BHCs and SLHCs to file 
applications with the FRB seeking the approval of acquisitions.  For 
instance, the BHCA requires the prior approval of the FRB for any action 
(1) that causes a company to become a BHC; (2) that causes a bank to 
become a subsidiary of a BHC; (3) by which a BHC acquires direct or 
indirect control of more than 5% of the voting shares of a bank; (4) by 
which a BHC acquires all the assets of a bank; or (5) by which a BHC 
merges or consolidates with another BHC.444  Similarly, the HOLA 
requires the prior approval of the FRB for an SLHC to acquire a 
subsidiary savings association, acquire voting shares of a savings 
association, purchase assets of a savings association, or merge or 
consolidate with another SLHC.445  The form for a BHC to acquire a 
savings association differs from the form used by an SLHC to acquire a 
savings association.446  While there are minor differences in the 
information requested by the forms,447 the core statutory factors for 
 
442. FED. RESERVE BD., CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS FOR HOLDING COMPANIES 
– FR Y-9C (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-
9C20191231_f.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SEF-66NC]. 
443. FED. RESERVE BD., QUARTERLY SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING COMPANY REPORT—FR 
2320 (2019), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_232020191231_f.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/92JM-KZPG] [hereinafter QUARTERLY SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING 
COMPANY REPORT—FR 2320]; FED. RESERVE BD., SAVINGS ASSOCIATION HOLDING 
COMPANY REPORT—FR LL-(B)11 (2019), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_LL-(b)1120200102_f.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/AL7V-7NMD] [hereinafter SAVINGS ASSOCIATION HOLDING COMPANY 
REPORT—FR LL-(B)11]. 
444. 12 U.S.C. § 1842(a)(2)(2018);  12 C.F.R. § 225.11(b) (2019). 
445. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e)(1);  12 C.F.R. § 238.1. 
446. FED. RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION BY A BANK HOLDING COMPANY 
TO ACQUIRE A NONBANK COMPANY AND/OR ENGAGE IN NONBANKING ACTIVITIES, FORM FR 
Y-4 (2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-420180731_i.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/N8SR-KUEQ] [hereinafter INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION BY A BANK 
HOLDING COMPANY TO ACQUIRE A NONBANK COMPANY AND/OR ENGAGE IN NONBANKING 
ACTIVITIES, FORM FR Y-4]; FED. RESERVE BD., FORM H-(E) (2008), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/slhc/OTS_FormHe_20190131.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/797V-7QM6] (SLHC) [hereinafter FORM H-(E)]. 
447. For example, for SLHC acquisitions, Form H-(E) requests information about 
transaction expenses and tax treatment that are not requested by the FR Y-3 for BHC 
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review of proposed acquisitions under the BHCA and HOLA are 
substantially the same.  Under both statutes, the FRB must consider the 
impact of the acquisition on: (1) competition; (2) financial and 
managerial resources and future prospects; (3) the deposit insurance fund; 
and (4) convenience and needs of the community to be served. 448  The 
forms filed with the FRB to seek approval of acquisitions reflect the 
requirements of the underlying statutes and the historical development of 
the forms under different federal banking regulators, even though the 
FRB now has jurisdiction over both types of transactions.449 
E. Enforcement 
The agencies may take informal and formal enforcement actions 
against institutions for violations of laws, rules, or regulations, unsafe or 
unsound practices, and violations of written commitments.450  Informal 
enforcement actions are non-binding, good faith actions.  Examples of 
informal actions include commitments, board resolutions, and 
memoranda of understanding.  Formal actions are legally binding and 
enforceable actions.  The appropriate enforcement action for a particular 
institution depends upon the severity of the problems, the institution's 
ratings, supervisory confidence in management, and other factors.   
Formal actions that the federal banking agency may take include 
cease and desist orders, written agreements, and orders assessing civil 
money penalties.  The agencies may seek a cease and desist order when 
a supervised institution or an institution-affiliated party is engaging, has 
 
acquisitions.  See FORM H-(E), supra note 446, at items 110.70, 130.   Conversely, the FR Y-
3 asks for more information about nonbanking activities than the H(e).  Compare FED. 
RESERVE BD., INSTRUCTIONS FOR PREPARATION OF APPLICATION TO BECOME A BANK HOLDING 
COMPANY AND/OR ACQUIRE AN ADDITIONAL BANK OR BANK HOLDING COMPANY FR Y-3, at 2 
(2018), https://www.federalreserve.gov/reportforms/forms/FR_Y-320180731_i.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FT7P-P85G] with FORM H-(E), supra note 446, at item 410.10.  
448. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a, 1843. 
449. Id. § 1467a (effectuating § 10 of HOLA for SLHC acquisitions through filing Form 
H-(e)); id. § 1843 (effectuating § 4 of the BHCA for BHCs acquisitions through filing Form 
FR Y-4). 
450. The often-cited definition of “unsafe and unsound practice” is “any action, or lack of 
action, which is contrary to generally accepted standards of prudent operation, the possible 
consequences of which, if continued, would be abnormal risk or loss or damage to an 
institution, its shareholders, or the agencies administering the insurance funds.”   112 CONG. 
REC. 26,474 (1966) (remarks of Senator Robertson) (adopting the testimony of John Horne, 
Chairman, Federal Home Loan Bank Board); see also Gulf Federal Savings and Loan 
Association v. FHLBB, 651 F.2d 259, 263 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1121 (1982). 
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engaged, or is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound practice in 
conducting the business of a supervised institution.451  The agencies may 
impose civil money penalties for (1) violation of law or regulation, 
written agreement or cease and desist order; or (2) recklessly or 
knowingly engaging in unsafe and unsound practices likely to cause 
substantial institutional loss or leading to individual pecuniary gain.452  
The amount of the penalty is tied to a number of factors, as set forth in 
interagency guidance.453  The agencies are required to disclose these 
formal actions to the public.454 
When an agency pursues an enforcement action it usually 
attempts to obtain consent to the action.  If consent is not obtained, the 
agency prepares a notice of charges.455  The notice of charges is served 
on the affected party or parties.  If the party continues to contest the 
action, a public hearing is held before administrative law judge, who 
issues a recommendation to the agency.  The agency then issues a final 
 
451. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b).  The agencies may also issue a temporary cease and desist order 
in certain circumstances.  Id. § 1818(c). 
452. Id. § 1818(i).  
453. Assessment of Civil Money Penalties, 63 Fed. Reg. 30227 (June 3, 1998) (Fed. Fin. 
Insts. Examination Council).  Amounts adjusted annually for inflation.  12 C.F.R. § 
263.65(b)(2) (2019).  For 2018, the penalties are tiered from $9819 to $49,096 to $1,963,870 
per day.  Id. 
454. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(u).  The agencies are also authorized to take enforcement action 
against current and former institution-affiliated parties of institutions under their jurisdiction.  
These actions include removal and prohibition orders and orders assessing civil money 
penalties.  Id. § 1818(e),(i).  The agencies may suspend, remove, or prohibit an institution-
affiliated party from participation in the conduct of the affairs of a supervised institution based 
upon (i) violation of law or regulation, breach of fiduciary duty or unsafe or unsound practice 
(ii) when there is an institutional loss, prejudice to depositors or personal gain to the party, 
and (iii) personal dishonesty or willful or continuing disregard for safety and soundness.  Id. 
§ 1818(e).  Furthermore, any person convicted of any criminal offense involving dishonesty 
or a breach of trust or money laundering or who entered into a pre-trial diversion in connection 
such an offence may not (i) become or continue as an institution-affiliated party with respect 
to any insured depository institution (ii) own or control, directly or indirectly any insured 
depository institution or otherwise participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of the 
affairs of any insured depository institution, unless the obtain the prior written consent of the 
FDIC.  Id. § 1829; see also Modifications to the Statement of Policy Pursuant to Section 19 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act Concerning Participation in the Conduct of the Affairs 
of an Insured Institution by Persons Who Have Been Convicted of Crimes Involving 
Dishonesty, Breach of Trust or Money Laundering or Who Have Entered Pretrial Diversion 
Programs for Such Offenses, 83 Fed. Reg. 38143 (Aug. 3, 2018); Modifications to Statement 
of Policy for Section 19 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 74849 (Dec. 18, 
2012); FDIC Policy Statement, 63 Fed. Reg. 66184 (Dec. 1, 1998). 
455. FED. RESERVE BD., BANK HOLDING COMPANY SUPERVISION MANUAL § 2110.0.2.1 
(2020), https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/bhc.pdf [https://perma.cc/ETY8-
3UD8].  
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decision and order.456  Within the next ten days, the affected party may 
appeal the determination to an appellate court.457 
Noncompliant FHCs are subject to a type of formal enforcement 
action.  FHCs are noncompliant if they fail to meet capital, management, 
and community reinvestment requirements.458  A noncompliant FHC 
must either decertify as an FHC and cease engaging in activities only 
permissible pursuant to BHCA Section 4(k), or enter into an agreement to 
correct its noncompliance within 180 days.459  The FRB does not 
generally publicly disclose the existence of these enforcement 
agreements.  However, a BHC or SLHC with securities registered pursuant 
to the Securities Exchange Act may decide that it must disclose the 
agreement upon advice of its legal counsel to decrease the risk of insider 
trading liability because execution of the agreement is a material event 
under federal securities laws.460  
F. Consolidated Supervision   
The FRB developed the practice of consolidated supervision to 
understand BHC structure, activities, resources, and risks, as well as 
address deficiencies before they pose a danger to subsidiary depository 
institutions.461  The consolidated supervision of BHCs and SLHCs takes 
place within the framework of legal authority established by Congress.462  
 
456. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1). 
457. Id. § 1818(h)(2). 
458. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 § 4(l), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(l).   
459. Id. § 4(m), 12 U.S.C. § 1843(m) (BHCs); Home Owners’ Loan Act § 10(c), 12 
U.S.C. § 1467a(c) (SLHCs). 
460. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j (prohibiting use of a “manipulative and deceptive device” in 
connection with the purchase or sale of securities); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2019) (stating 
that “manipulative and deceptive devices” includes the purchase or sale of an issuer’s 
securities on the basis of material non-public information). 
461. Fed. Reserve Bd., SR 08-9/CA 08-12, Supervision and Regulation Letter on 
Consolidated Supervision of Bank Holding Companies and the Combined Operations of 
Foreign Banking Organizations to the Officer in Charge of Supervision at Each Reserve Bank 
and to Domestic and Foreign Large Complex Banking Organizations, Regional Banking 
Organizations, and U.S. Offices of Multi-Office Foreign Banking Organizations Supervised 
by the Federal Reserve (Oct. 16, 2008), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/srletters/2008/SR0809.htm 
[https://perma.cc/T2BG-F5T5] (“Consolidated supervision of a BHC encompasses the parent 
company and its subsidiaries, and allows the Federal Reserve to understand the organization’s 
structure, activities, resources, and risks, as well as to address financial, managerial, 
operational, or other deficiencies before they pose a danger to the BHC’s subsidiary 
depository institutions.”). 
462. Id.  
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The key authorities needed to practice consolidated supervision are the 
authority to require reports, conduct examinations, establish capital 
requirements, and take enforcement action.463   
The FRB’s concern with the impact of affiliates on depository 
institutions has a long history.  In 1933, the FRB obtained authority to 
require reports from any affiliate of a member bank, and require such 
affiliates to submit to examination as a condition of the FRB’s approval 
of an application of a holding company affiliate of a member bank to vote 
stock of a member bank.  In connection with its consideration of 
applications for voting permits, the FRB sought a “comprehensive picture 
of the entire group” and “information concerning various relationships 
within the group.”464 
In 1956, the FRB obtained the power to require reports from and 
conduct examinations of multi-bank holding companies.465 In 1970, the 
FRB obtained the authority to require reports and conduct examinations 
of one-bank holding companies.466  In 1974, Congress authorized the 
FRB to take enforcement action against BHCs and their nonbank 
subsidiaries through issuance of a cease-and-desist order.467  In 1978, 
Congress granted the FRB the explicit authority to order a bank holding 
 
463. ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. On Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 83 
(2006) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General Counsel, Federal Reserve Board) (“The 
hallmarks of this consolidated supervisory framework are broad grants of authority to examine 
and obtain reports from bank holding companies and each of their subsidiaries, establish 
consolidated capital requirements for bank holding companies, and take supervisory or 
enforcement actions against bank holding companies and their nonbank subsidiaries to 
address unsafe or unsound practices or violations of law. Consolidated capital requirements 
help ensure that bank holding companies have real capital to support their group-wide 
activities, do not become excessively leveraged, and are able to serve as a source of strength 
for their subsidiary banks.”). 
464. 1934 FRB ANN. REP. 54 (“In connection with the consideration of applications of 
holding company affiliates for voting permits, arrangements were completed, wherever 
practicable, to have the various banks controlled by the same holding company affiliate 
examined as nearly as practicable as of the same date in order that a comprehensive picture 
of the entire group might be obtained and information concerning various relationships within 
the group be developed.”). 
465 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 137; Bank Holding 
Company Act Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, 84 Stat. 176..  
466. Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 § 101, 84 Stat. at 176 (providing 
authority to require reports and conduct examinations obtained through amendment of the 
definition of a bank holding company). 
467. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 93-495, § 110, 88 Stat. 1500, 1506 (1974). 
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company to divest a nonbank subsidiary or cease activity.468  In 1983, 
Congress gave the FRB explicit authority to set capital requirements.469  
Therefore, the FRB had accumulated all the powers necessary to practice 
consolidated supervision related to BHCs by 1983.   
In 1999, the GLBA repealed prohibitions on affiliations between 
bank, securities, and insurance firms and authorized FHCs to engage in 
financial activities, as well as activities incidental or complementary to a 
financial activity.470  Subject to limitations, the GLBA also extended the 
supervisory and enforcement powers of the FRB to FHC subsidiaries 
engaged in securities, insurance, and commodities activities.471  
Furthermore, the FRB obtained the authority to require divestiture of a 
depository institution subsidiary of a BHC.472  Therefore, in 1999, the 
FRB possessed the authority, albeit subject to some limitations, to assess 
FHC risk on a group-wide basis and take enforcement action to address 
threats to a depository institution subsidiary from its nonbank affiliates. 
In 2011, the Dodd-Frank Act transferred responsibility for the 
supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the FRB.473  While the OTS did 
not practice consolidated supervision, the FRB began to apply its 
consolidated approach to supervision to SLHCs in 2011, after the transfer 
of responsibility for the supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the 
FRB.474  Congress also required the FRB to establish consolidated capital 
requirements for SLHCs by 2015.475  The FRB set forth its capital 
requirements for SLHCs, as well as BHCs, in rules that became effective 
in 2014.476   
 
468 Financial Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 
95-630, § 105(a), 92 Stat. 3646.  
469 International Lending Supervision Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-181, § 908, 97 Stat. 
1280. 
470. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (”GLBA”), Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 101, 113 Stat. 1338, 
1341 (1999). 
471. Id. § 113, 113 Stat. at 1369. 
472 Previously, the FRB could only issue a cease-and-desist order against a depository 
institution subsidiary or order the divestiture of a nonbank subsidiary.  See Financial 
Institutions Regulatory and Interest Rate Control Act of 1978 § 105(a), 92 Stat. at 3646; 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 19 (1978).  
473. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), 
Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010).   
474. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381. 
475. Dodd-Frank Act, § 171(b)(1), (b)(4)(D), 124 Stat. at 1436–37 (codified as amended 
at 12 U.S.C. § 5371 (2018));  Insurance Capital Standards Clarification Act of 2014, Pub. L. 
No. 113-279, 128 Stat. 3017 (amending Dodd-Frank Act section 171). 
476. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013) (effective Jan. 1, 2014). 
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G. Remaining Differences in Supervision 
Only a few differences remain in the supervision of DIHCs.  First, 
there are differences in the rating system used to evaluate DIHCs of the 
same size.  The FRB assesses BHCs with total consolidated assets of 
$100 billion or more using the LFI rating system; however, the FRB 
assesses SLHCs of a depository nature with $100 billion or more in total 
consolidated assets using the RFI rating system.477  The FRB also assigns 
“indicative” RFI ratings to SLHCs that are engaged in significant 
commercial or insurance activities rather than actual RFI ratings.478 
Second, there are differences in the capital requirements 
applicable to BHCs and SLHCs based upon the activities in which they 
are engaged.  Generally, all top-tier BHCs and SLHCs domiciled in the 
United States are subject to the same capital requirements.479  However, 
SLHCs domiciled in the United States and substantially engaged in 
insurance underwriting or commercial activities are not currently subject 
to the FRB’s consolidated capital requirements.  In 2019, the FRB issued 
a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish a “Building Block 
Approach” to capital requirements for DIHCs that are significantly 
engaged in insurance activities, which adjusts and aggregates existing 
legal requirements to determine an enterprise-wide capital 
requirement.480  
Third, there are different forms for routine reports and approval 
of acquisitions of the same type of institution.  For example, SLHCs 
engaged primarily in commercial or insurance activities are exempt from 
filing form FR Y-9 filed by BHCs and most SLHCs.  Instead, they file 
form FR 2320 and FR LL-(b)11 reports.481  As a further example, the 
acquisition of a savings association by a BHC requires the filing of form 
 
477. 83 Fed. Reg. 58724 (Nov. 21, 2018); 84 Fed. Reg. 4309 (Feb. 15, 2019); see also Fed. 
Reserve Bd., supra note 371; Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 373.  The FRB plans to apply the 
LFI rating system to these SLHCs in the future.  Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371. 
478. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381, at 3. 
479. 78 Fed. Reg. 62018 (Oct. 11, 2013).   
480. 84 Fed. Reg. 57240 (Oct. 24, 2019). 
481. QUARTERLY SAVINGS AND LOAN HOLDING COMPANY REPORT—FR 2320, supra note 
443; SAVINGS ASSOCIATION HOLDING COMPANY REPORT—FR LL-(B)(11), supra note 443. 
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FR Y-4,482 while the acquisition of a savings association by a SLHC 
requires the filing of form H(e).483   
Finally, there are differences in the FRB’s supervision of mutual 
BHCs and mutual SLHCs.  The FRB has statutory responsibilities related 
to mutual SLHCs that it does not have with respect to mutual BHCs.  
Because Congress preempted state law related to the chartering and 
regulation of mutual SLHCs, the FRB has exclusive authority to charter 
and regulate mutual SLHCs.484  Congress has not preempted state law 
related to mutual BHCs.  Several states charter mutual BHCs.485  In any 
event, the FRB supervises all SLHCs through examination, capital, 
reporting, source of strength, and other requirements.486  Furthermore, the 
FRB acts upon the applications of mutual SLHCs to convert to stock 
form.487  The FRB also acts upon the requests of mutual SLHCs to waive 
dividends.488  The FRB’s responsibilities with respect to charters, 
 
482. INSTRUCTIONS FOR NOTIFICATION BY A BANK HOLDING COMPANY TO ACQUIRE A 
NONBANK COMPANY AND/OR ENGAGE IN NONBANKING ACTIVITIES, FORM FR Y-4, supra note 
446. However, the filing must be modified to satisfy the same information and publication 
requirements that would apply if the savings association to be acquired was a bank.  Id. 
483. FORM H-(E), supra note 446. 
484. Section 10(o)(7) of HOLA provides that a “mutual holding company shall be 
chartered by the Director of the [OTS] and shall be subject to such regulations as the Director 
may prescribe.” 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(o)(7) (2018) (emphasis added).  This language was added 
to HOLA by FIRREA.  Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 301, 103 Stat. 183, 337 (1989).  The preamble 
to the implementing regulations issued by the OTS explains the OTS’ position that section 
10(o)(7) preempts state law authorization for state-chartered thrifts to establish and operate 
mutual SLHCs.  58 Fed. Reg. 44105, 44106 (Aug. 19, 1993) (“Congress intended section 
10(o) to expressly preempt state law with regard to the creation and regulation of mutual 
holding companies.”).  The preamble went on to state that “[t]he explanatory statement that 
accompanied the amendments when they were offered at a House Banking Committee mark-
up of the FIRREA legislation stated that the amendments “would provide a clear regulatory 
framework for MHCs, and unquestionable regulatory authority to the [OTS] by providing that 
MHCs will be chartered by the [Director of the OTS] and subject to (OTS] regulation.”  Id.  
485. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 167H, §§ 1–12 (2019); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
1116.05 (2019) (Ohio); 7 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.  § 115.1 (West 2019). 
486. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(b)(1) (register with the FRB); id. § 14167a(b)(2) (submit reports);  
id. § 1467a(b)(4) (submit to examination);  id. § 5371(b) (capital requirements); id. § 1831o-
1 (source of strength).   
487. 12 C.F.R. pt. 239, subpart E (2019). 
488. Consistent with statutory standards and its orders, the FRB imposes conditions on its 
approval of dividend waivers.  Fed. Reserve Bd., Interpretive Letter to Kevin M. Houlihan, 
Elias, Matz, Tiernand, & Herrick LLP (May 28, 1997), as reprinted in 1997 Fed. Res. Interp. 
Ltr. LEXIS 63 (Greater Delaware Valley Holdings);  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”),  Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 625, 124 Stat. 1376, 
1637 (2010) (adding § 10(o)(11) to HOLA).  Section 239.8 of Regulation MM implements 
this provision of law.  12 C.F.R. § 239.8 (2019).  The preamble to the interim final regulation 
creating Regulation MM provides an explanation of the inherent conflict of interest in 
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conversions, and dividend waivers are unique to its role as the primary 
federal regulator of mutual SLHCs.  
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The separate regulation and supervision of BHCs and SLHCs 
arises from the charters of the depository institutions controlled by these 
companies.  BHCs control banks and SLHCs control savings 
associations.489  During the first half of the twentieth century, banking 
organizations were authorized to engage in very different lines of 
business.  Banks were authorized to accept demand deposits, make 
consumer, residential, and commercial loans and provide trust 
services,490 while savings associations were authorized to accept time 
deposits and finance home loans.491  These differences in authorized 
activities existed when Congress authorized the comprehensive 
regulation of BHCs in 1956 and SLHCs in 1968.492 
As the twentieth century progressed, the regulation of banking 
organizations became more and more similar.  Congress eliminated 
almost all differences in the authorized activities of banks and savings 
associations, as well as permissible activities for BHCs and SLHCs.  For 
example, Congress authorized federal savings associations to accept 
demand deposits, make consumer and commercial loans, and provide 
trust services.493  Congress also authorized BHCs to acquire savings 
associations494 and authorized SLHCs to engage in activities permissible 
 
directors of a mutual SLHC waiving its receipt of dividends with distribution of dividends to 
the directors and other insiders.  76 Fed. Reg. 56508, 56512 (Sept. 13, 2011). 
489. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(a)(1)(D), 1841(a)(1).  
490. See, e.g., National Bank Act, ch. 106, § 8, 13 Stat. 99, 101 (1864) (authorizing the 
national association to receive deposits, loan money on personal security); Federal Reserve 
Act, Pub. L. No. 63-43, § 11(k) 38 Stat. 251, 262 (1913) (authorizing FRB to permit national 
banks to provide trust services); McFadden Act, 69-639, § 16, 44 Stat. 1224, 1232 (1927) 
(authorizing national associations to make loans secured by first lien upon improved real 
estate). 
491. See, e.g., Home Owners’ Loan Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-42, § 5(b)–(c), 48 Stat. 
128, 132 (federal savings and loan associations authorized to accept deposits related to 
borrowed money and make loans on security of first liens on homes). 
492. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, 70 Stat. 133; Savings and 
Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-255, 82 Stat. 5 (1968). 
493. Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 
96-221, §§ 401–403, 94 Stat. 132, 153–156;  Garn-St. German Depository Institutions Act, 
Pub. L. No. 97-320, § 312, 96 Stat. 1469, 1496 (1982). 
494. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 
101-73, § 601, 103 Stat. 183, 408.   
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for BHCs.495  When Congress transferred responsibility for the regulation 
and supervision of SLHCs from the OTS to the FRB in 2011496  the Dodd-
Frank Act also required the FRB to establish minimum leverage and risk-
based capital requirements for SLHCs on a consolidated basis not less 
than generally applicable requirements in effect for insured depository 
institutions.497   
As regulation of banking organizations became more and more 
similar, the supervisory practices of the federal banking agencies also 
converged.  The agencies adopted similar approaches to capital adequacy, 
examinations, reports, application forms, and enforcement.  The FRB 
also began to supervise SLHCs on a consolidated basis in a manner 
consistent with its supervision of BHCs.498  In 2011, the FRB began to 
assign indicative ratings to SLHCs using the RFI rating system developed 
for BHCs.499  In 2019, the FRB started to assign actual RFI ratings to 
SLHCs of a depository nature with less than $100 billion in total 
consolidated assets.500   
The number of BHCs and SLHCs grew throughout most of the 
twentieth century.  At the beginning of the twentieth century, it appears 
that no companies controlled depository institutions.501  At the time of 
enactment of the BHCA in 1956, there were sixty-nine BHCs.502  In 1957, 
only two companies were known to control savings and loan 
associations.503  In 1966, there were ninety-eight SLHCs.504  During the 
1970s and 1980s, the number of BHCs and SLHCs grew dramatically.505  
 
495. Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, § 104(b), 101 Stat. 
552, 568. 
496. Dodd-Frank Act Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank 
Act”), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 312, 124 Stat. 1376, 1521 (2010).   
497. Id. § 171, 124 Stat. at 1436. 
498. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 381.  The FRB’s RFI rating system replaced the CORE 
rating system of the OTS for SLHCs. 
499. Id.   
500. 83 Fed. Reg. 56081 (Nov. 9, 2018);  Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 371. 
501. Group Banking in the United States, 24 FED. RES. BULL. 92, 97 (1938). 
502. 1957 FRB ANN. REP. 71. 
503. S. REP. NO. 86-810, at 1–5 (1959). 
504. Savings and Loan Holding Company Amendments of 1967: Hearings on H.R. 1322, 
H.R. 8696, and H.R. 12025 Before the Subcommittee on Domestic Finance of the Committee 
on Banking and Currency of the House of Representatives, 90th Cong. 1st, Sess. 1 (Aug. 21-
22, 1967) (statement of John E. Horne, Chairman, FHLBB), at 10 (“By the end of 1966 . . . 
there were 98 holding companies controlling 184 associations representing 12.5 percent of 
the whole industry.”).   
505. See supra Figures 3 and 4 and accompanying footnotes.  
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At their height, there were 6,474 BHCs in 1988.506  The number of BHCs 
began to decrease near the end of the twentieth century.507  The number 
of SLHCs crested at 893 in 2008.508  When the FRB assumed 
responsibility for the regulation and supervision of SLHCs in 2011, there 
were 427 top-tier SLHCs.509  At the end of 2019, there were 3,725 top-
tier BHCs and 187 top-tier SLHCs.510 
The convergence in the regulation and supervision of BHCs and 
SLHCs, decrease in the number of SLHCs, and consolidation of 
responsibility for the regulation and supervision of BHCs and SLHCs 
with the FRB suggest that it is time to unify statutory framework for the 
regulation of DIHCs.  Congress could consolidate regulation of all 
holding companies controlling an FDIC-insured depository institution 
under one statute of uniform application.  One way to create a unified 
statutory framework would be to transfer the regulation of SLHCs from 
HOLA to a revised version of the BHCA entitled the “Depository 
Institution Holding Company Act” (“DIHCA”) 
A unified statutory framework for the regulation of holding 
companies controlling FDIC-insured depository institutions could have a 
number of benefits.511  First, a unified statutory framework for the 
regulation of DIHCs would reinforce the separation of banking from 
commerce.  The separation of banking from commerce generally prevents 
companies controlling an insured depository institution from obtaining a 
funding advantage over companies that do not.512  The separation also 
prevents extension of the federal safety net, ultimately backed by 
taxpayers, to commercial entities.513  However, several exceptions to 
 
506. 1988 FRB ANN. REP. 169. 
507. See supra Figures 3 and 4 and accompanying footnotes. 
508. National Information Center, supra note 213. 
509. 2011 FRB ANN. REP. 90. 
510. 2019 FRB ANN. REP. 44–45. 
511. The unified statutory framework would only apply to holding companies controlling 
FDIC-insured DIs.  It would not apply to credit unions for two reasons.  First, natural person 
credit unions are not controlled by holding companies, but by their share account holders 
(depositors).  This article addresses holding companies.  Second, the deposits of credit unions 
are federally insured through the National Credit Union Share Insurance Fund administer by 
the NCUA.  See supra introductory text in Part II. 
512. INDEP. COMTY. BANKS OF AMERICA, supra note 218, at 3–4. 
513. The federal safety net consists of deposit insurance and access to credit and payment 
services from Federal Reserve Banks.  ILCs-A Review of Charter, Ownership, and 
Supervision Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Fin. Inst. and Consumer Credit of the 
H. Comm. on Fin. Serv., 109th Cong. 83 (2006) (statement of Scott G. Alvarez, General 
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separation currently exist.  BHCs and SLHCs that become FHCs are 
authorized to engage in merchant banking activity—investing in 
commercial companies for a limited period of time.514  Furthermore, the 
parent companies of ILCs may engage in commercial activities.  They are 
not subject to restrictions on their activities because ILCs, while insured 
by the FDIC, are excluded from the definition of a bank in the BHCA.515  
In addition, GUSLHCs may engage in commercial activities because they 
are not subject to restrictions on their activities by the HOLA.516  The 
separation of banking and commerce would be reinforced by the repeal 
of FHC authority to engage in merchant banking activity, elimination of 
the exclusion of ILCs from the definition of a bank in the BHCA, and 
elimination of the GUSLHC exemption from the restriction on activities 
in HOLA.517  The FRB has recommended Congress take these actions.518   
Second, a unified statutory framework would level the 
competitive playing field among DIHCs.  This could be accomplished by 
establishing a standardized list of permissible activities for DIHCs.  The 
permissibility of activities for BHCs and SLHCs developed in a 
patchwork manner in response to market developments and policy 
choices.  The underlying rationale for differences in permissible activities 
may have made sense in the market for financial services at the time they 
became authorized.  In the contemporary market, the authority of SLHCs 
and BHCs to engage in an activity may differ for no reason other than the 
charter of the underlying depository institution.  For example, ordinary 
SLHCs are authorized to engage in real estate development, while 
ordinary BHCs and FHCs are not authorized to engage in real estate 
development activities.519  This may have made sense when savings 
 
Counsel, Federal Reserve Board) (stating that protections of the federal safety net consist of 
deposit insurance and access to the Federal Reserve's discount window and payments system). 
514. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(k)(4)(H) (2018). 
515. Id. § 1841(c)(2)(H). 
516. Id. § 1467a(c)(3), (9)(C). 
517. The FRB views merchant banking, the ILC exclusion, and the GUSLHC exemption 
as undermining the separation of banking from commerce.  In the FRB’s view, the ILC 
exclusion and GUSLHC exemption create an uneven playing field among organizations that 
control an FDIC-insured depository institution and increase risk to the federal safety net.  The 
FRB has recommended the repeal of merchant banking authority as well as elimination of the 
ILC exclusion and GUSLHC exemption.  FED. RESERVE BD. ET AL., supra note 279, at 28. 
518. Id. 
519. 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 238.53(b)(4), (6) (2019) (SLHCs may acquire 
unimproved real estate for development and develop, subdivide, and improve unimproved 
real estate for sale or rental).  UB Financial Corp., 58 FED. RES. BULL. 428, 429 (1972); First 
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associations were the principal means of home financing.  Today, banks, 
savings associations, and government sponsored enterprises all play a 
role in making home mortgage loans.  In enacting a unified statutory 
framework for the regulation of DIHCs, Congress could set forth a 
standardized list of permissible activities after weighing the risks and 
benefits associated with specific activities, such as real estate 
development.   
Third, a unified statutory framework would expand the ability of 
the FRB to address dangers to depository institutions posed by their 
affiliates by subjecting all DIHCs to consolidated supervision.  This 
would be accomplished by eliminating the exclusion of ILCs from the 
definition of a bank in the BHCA and elimination of the GUSLHC 
exemption from the restriction on activities in HOLA.  With these 
actions, depository holding companies not currently subject to 
consolidated supervision would become subject to consolidated 
supervision.  One of the primary purposes of consolidated supervision is 
to assess risk and address deficiencies on a consolidated group basis 
before they pose a danger to a holding company’s subsidiary depository 
institutions.520  Expanding the FRB’s jurisdiction to cover GUSLHCs and 
the parent companies of ILCs would help mitigate potential dangers to 
subsidiary depository institutions and the federal safety net. 
Finally, a unified statutory framework for the regulation of 
DIHCs could improve supervisory efficiency through eliminating 
unnecessary complication.  There would be many opportunities to 
standardize and simplify statutory language in a DIHA.  The definitions 
applicable to the regulation of DIHCs could be standardized.  For 
instance, the definition of “control” could be standardized for 
determinations of control related to a bank, savings association, BHC, 
SLHC, or other company.521  In addition, simplification could flow from 
the deletion of statutory language that is no longer applicable, such as 
grace periods for divestiture of impermissible activities.522  Furthermore, 
statutory language could be eliminated that incorporates authorized 
activities by reference, such as language in Section 10 of HOLA 
 
Security Corp., 61 FED. RES. BULL. 325 (1975); 12 C.F.R. § 225.126(d) (BHCs not authorized 
to engage in real estate development). 
520. Fed. Reserve Bd., supra note 461, at 2. 
521. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1467a(a)(2), 1841(a)(2). 
522. Id. § 1842(a). 
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authorizing SLHCs to engage in activities permissible for BHCs under 
Sections 4(c) and 4(k) of the BHCA.523   
In light of regulatory convergence, consolidation of supervisory 
responsibility, declining numbers of holding companies, and the benefits 
of a unified statutory framework, it is now time for Congress to 
consolidate the regulation and supervision of companies controlling an 





523. Id. § 1467a(c)(2)(F)(i), (c)(2)(H). 
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APPENDIX A – TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
This article uses many terms and acronyms to refer to types of 
financial institutions, banking regulators, and federal laws.  Key words 
and phrases are defined below.   Acronyms are defined when first used in 
this article and are collected below.    
 
Acronym/Word/Phrase  Meaning 
1933 Act ≡ Banking Act of 1933 
1970 BHCA 
Amendments 
≡ Bank Holding Company Act 
Amendments of 1970 
Activities ≡ Broad categories of things done by a 
financial institution, such as 
accepting deposits, making loans, 
selling securities, or providing 
insurance.  Activities may be 
authorized by the institution’s 
charter or enabling legislation and 
may automatically apply or require 
notice or approval by a regulator.   
Bank ≡ Unless noted, the definition of bank 
in the BHCA is used when referring 
to a “bank.”  The BHCA defines a 
bank as an institution organized 
under the laws of the United States 
that (1) is an FDIC-insured 
institution; or (2) receives demand 
deposits and makes commercial 
loans.524   
 
524. Id. § 1841(c)(1).  Generally, a demand deposit is payable as a matter of right on 
demand.  HELLER, supra note 114, at 5–6.  Broadly speaking, commercial loans are secured 
or unsecured loans to companies or individuals for other than personal, family, or household 
purposes.  Id. at 10.  The Federal Deposit Insurance Act defines a bank as any national or state 
bank.  12 U.S.C. § 1813(a)(1).  A state bank is any bank, trust company, savings bank, or 
similar institution that is in the business of receiving deposits (other than trust funds) and is 
incorporated under the laws of any state.  Id. § 1813(a)(2).  Under the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Act, a bank does not include nationally-chartered savings banks and savings 
associations, as well as state savings associations.  Id. § 1813(a)(1).  However, as depository 
institutions, they may obtain deposit insurance if they met the definition of a depository 
institution set forth in the Federal Deposit Insurance Act.  12 U.S.C. §§ 1813(c), 1815(a). 
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Acronym/Word/Phrase  Meaning 
Banking organization ≡ An institution that performs banking 
functions, such as accepting deposits 
and making loans, as well as the 
companies that own or control such 
institutions, which includes banks, 
savings associations, BHCs, SLHCs, 
and ILCs.  
Basel I ≡ international accord reached by the 
BCBS in July 1988 
Basel II ≡ international accord reached by the 
BCBS in June 2004 
Basel III ≡ international accord reached by the 
BCBS in November 2010 
BCBS ≡ Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision 
BHC(s) ≡ bank holding company(ies) 
BHCA ≡ Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 
BMA ≡ Bank Merger Act 
CCAR ≡ Comprehensive Capital Analysis 
and Review 
CEBA ≡ Competitive Equality Banking Act 
of 1987 
CRA ≡ Community Reinvestment Act of 
1977 
Depository institution ≡ Institution whose deposits were or 
are insured by the FDIC, FSLIC, or 
NCUA.525   
DIHC ≡ Depository Institution Holding 
Company, which includes a BHC 
and SLHC. 
DIHCA ≡ Depository Institution Holding 
Company Act 
 
525. The FSLIC provided federal deposit insurance for savings associations, but it was 
abolished by FIRREA in 1989.  The NCUA provides federal deposit insurance for state and 
federal credit unions.   
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Acronym/Word/Phrase  Meaning 
Dodd-Frank Act ≡ Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of 2010 
EGRRCPA ≡ Economic Growth, Regulatory 
Relief, and Consumer Protection Act 
FDIA ≡ Federal Deposit Insurance Act 
FDIC ≡ Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation 
Federal banking agency 
or regulator 
≡ Refers to the OCC, FRB, FDIC, 
FHLBB, or OTS. 
FFIEC ≡ Federal Financial Institutions 
Examination Council 
FHC(s) ≡ financial holding company(ies) 
FHLB ≡ Federal Home Loan Bank 
FHLBA ≡ Federal Home Loan Bank Act 
FHLBB ≡ Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
FHLB System ≡ Federal Home Loan Bank System 
Financial institution ≡ An institution that provides financial 
services, such as a bank, thrift, 
industrial loan company, securities 
firm, insurance company, or 
commodities broker 
FIRIRCA ≡ Financial Institutions Regulatory 
and Interest Rate Control Act of 
1978 
FIRREA ≡ Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 
1989 
FISA ≡ Financial Institutions Supervisory 
Act of 1966 
FR Act ≡ Federal Reserve Act 
FRB ≡ Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 
FR System ≡ Federal Reserve System 
FSLIC ≡ Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation 
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Acronym/Word/Phrase  Meaning 
GAAP ≡ Generally Accepted Accounting 
Principles 
GLBA ≡ Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
Glass-Steagall Act ≡ Section 16, 20, 21, and 32 of the 
1933 Act 
Guidance or Guidelines ≡ General, nonbinding agency 
expectations, priorities, or views 
related to compliance with law, 
regulation, or safe and sound 
practices.526   
GUSLHC(s) ≡ Grandfathered Unitary Savings and 
Loan Holding Company 
HOLA ≡ Home Owners Loan Act 
ILC(s) ≡ industrial loan company(ies) 
Insured depository 
institution 
≡ Institution whose deposits were or 
are insured by the FDIC or 
FSLIC.527   
Laundry list ≡ List of permissible activities for 
BHCs included in Regulation Y 
LFI ≡ large financial institution 
NB Act ≡ National Bank Act 
NCUA ≡ National Credit Union 
Administration 
Nelnet ≡ Nelnet, Inc. 
NHA ≡ National Housing Act 
 
526. Fed. Reserve Bd. et al., SR 18-05/CA 18-7, Supervision and Regulation Letter on 
Interagency Statement Clarifying the Role of Supervisory Guidance to the Officer in Charge 
of Supervision at Each Federal Reserve Bank, Attachment, at 1 (Sept. 11, 2018), 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/supervisionreg/srletters/sr1805.htm 
[https://perma.cc/4M2R-K95K] (“Unlike a law or regulation, supervisory guidance does not 
have the force and effect of law, and the agencies do not take enforcement actions based on 
supervisory guidance. Rather, supervisory guidance outlines the agencies’ supervisory 
expectations or priorities and articulates the agencies’ general views regarding appropriate 
practices for a given subject area.”); see also Peter Weinstock & Marysia Laskowski, “If it 
Walks Like a Duck. . . .”: The Demise of the Guidance Masquerade, 135 BANKING L. J. 215 
(2018). 
527. The FSLIC provided federal deposit insurance for savings associations, but it was 
abolished by FIRREA in 1989.   
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Acronym/Word/Phrase  Meaning 
OCC ≡ Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency 
OTS ≡ Office of Thrift Supervision 
Permissible activities ≡ Activities authorized for an 
institution by legislation, charter, 
regulation, or order.   
Powers ≡ Activities authorized for an 
institution by legislation or charter. 
QTL ≡ qualified thrift lender 
Regulation ≡ Written rules by which a financial 
institution should conduct its 
business – laws enacted by 
legislatures and rules codified by 
banking regulators.528   
Riegle-Neal Act ≡ Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
SLHC(s) ≡ savings and loan holding 
company(ies) 
SLHCA ≡ Savings and Loan Holding Company 
Amendments of 1967 
Square ≡ Square, Inc. 
Supervision ≡ Practices of regulators related to the 
monitoring, reporting, inspecting, 
and examining of financial 
institutions.529   
Thrift(s) ≡ Various forms of institutions that 
historically encouraged savings, 
such as savings banks, savings and 
loan associations, building and loan 
associations, cooperative banks, and 
homestead associations. 
UDFI ≡ Utah Department of Financial 
Institutions 
 
528. FED. RESERVE SYS., THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM PURPOSES & FUNCTIONS 74 (10th 
ed. 2016) (discussing the Federal Reserve System’s supervisory and regulatory functions). 
529. Id. 
